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In t ro d u c t io n
The Good-Natured Man was an in c a rn a t io n  in R es to ra t io n  
and e igh tee n th -ce n tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e  of  moral values which 
became more va luab le  and more i d e a l i s t i c  as they became 
l e s s  p r a c t i c a l .  One needs only to  r e c a l l  how many times 
w r i t e r s  o f  t h e  period 1660-1800 used such terms as 
appearance , a r t , d i s s i m u l a t io n , and hypocrisy to recognize  
t h a t  th e  age was a c u te ly  conscious of  the  s p l i t  between 
C h r i s t i a n  and o ther  e t h i c a l  id e a ls  and a c tu a l  p r a c t i c e .
And j u s t  as the  f a l l e n  Adam can t r u l y  app rec ia te  th e  
u n f a l l e n  one because experience  makes innocence v a luab le ,  
so th e  s o c i e ty  which recognizes i t s  f a l l e n  cond i t ion  i s  
b e s t  q u a l i f i e d  to a p p re c ia te  the  moral va lues  which are  
no longer  compatible  with c u r ren t  so c ia l  v a lues .  As i t  
became more and more c l e a r  in  so c ie ty  t h a t  moral va lues 
had l i t t l e  in f luence  on a c tu a l  human conduct,  they were 
defended more and more v o c i f e r o u s ly .  A f te r  Hobbes 
den ig ra ted  human n a tu re  and m otiva t ion ,  th e  l i t e r a t e  
community in  England became very much concerned about 
th e  " s o c i a l  h y p o th e s i s " - - th e  n a tu r a l  s o c i a b i l i t y  o f  man.
And when Locke l ikew ise  " s t ru c k  a t  a l l  fundamentals,
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threw a l l  o rde r  and v i r tu e  out o f  the  world, and made 
the  very idea  of  th e s e  . . . u nna tu ra l ,  and without found­
a t io n  in  our  minds," eighteenth  century th in k e r s  saw 
t h e i r  "ground for  moral ity"  th rea tened  and r a l l i e d  to 
i t s  defense .  The charac te r  o f  the  Good-Natured Man is  
both the  product  and device of  those m in i s t e r s ,  
p h i lo sop h ers ,  and a r t i s t s  who reevalua ted  human na ture  
and t r i e d  to  r e s t o r e  or  preserve b e l i e f  in  th e  value  
of  moral goodness by giving i t  a b a s is  in  n a tu re .  The 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and q u a l i t i e s  of the Good-Natured Man 
were f i r s t  defined by the L a t i tu d in a r i a n  d iv in e s .  Then 
Shaftesbury  demonstrated t h a t ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  i f  a l l  these  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  were embodied in one person, th a t  person 
would l i v e  happ i ly  and harmoniously with h is  own physica l ,  
p sycho lo g ica l ,  and s p i r i t u a l  na ture ,  with h i s  so c ie ty ,  
and with th e  n a tu r a l  un iverse .  The w r i t e r s  o f  b e l l e  
l e t t r e s  brought the  Good-Natured Man to  l i f e  as a c h a rac te r ,  
placed him in  so c ie ty  and recorded h i s  jo y s ,  c o n f l i c t s ,  
successes ,  and f a i l u r e s .
My purpose  is  to  describe and i n t e r p r e t  the cha rac te r  
and fu nc t io n  o f  the  Good-Natured Man in  se le c te d  
e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  novels ,  p lays ,  and essays .  I s h a l l  
t r a c e  the  Good-Natured Man's emergence as a d i s t i n c t l y
e igh teen th -cen tu ry  B r i t i s h  c h a ra c te r ,  but I  s h a l l  not 
t r a c e  in  d e t a i l  the  genealogies o f  p a r t i c u l a r  good- 
natured c h a ra c te r s .  I  s h a l l  attempt to d iscover what 
the  Good-Natured Man i s  l i k e  when he appears, what 
themes a re  im p l ic i t  in  h is  c h a rac te r  and presence,  and 
what e f f e c t  he has on th e  tone,  p l o t ,  and theme of 
c e r t a i n  works, th a t  i s ,  what func t ion  the c h a ra c te r  has 
as pa r t  of  th e  organic u n i ty  of g iven works. I  be l ieve  
t h i s  study w i l l  provide some in s ig h t s  through a d i f f e r e n t  
angle of  v i s io n  in to  l i t e r a t u r e  and l i f e  in  e igh teen th-  
century England.
Chapter I
Theological  and Ph i losoph ica l  Background
Louis Bredvold has commented t h a t  the  h i s to r y  of  an 
idea sometimes appears to  be analogous to  the  l i f e  h i s to r y  
of  l iv i n g  organisms.  "Like p lan ts  and animals, ideas 
f l o u r i s h  bes t  in  a pp ro p r ia te  environments and c l im ates ,  
and l i k e  them ideas reveal  t h e i r  r e a l  na tu re  in  t h e i r  
growth and ev o lu t ion ."^  But even when, a t  a f a i r l y  
mature po in t  in  i t s  "growth and e v o lu t io n ,"  the " rea l  
nature" o f  an idea can be unders tood,  one s t i l l  can only 
specu la te  about i t s  roots  o r  ancestors  and about which 
provide the  most nourishment and v i t a l i t y  to  the  organism. 
The idea o f  man's n a tu r a l  goodness did not begin as a 
seed or  germ in  the  seventeenth cen tury .  The idea is 
as anc ien t  as Adam and a comprehensive s tudy  o f  the  
id e o lo g ica l  o r ig in s  of t h e  Good-Natured Man as he appears 
in  e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e  and w r i t in g s  would no 
doubt cover the  e n t i r e  per iod  of  recorded human h i s t o r y .  
But in  the  R es to ra t ion  period  and the  e igh teen th  century 
condi t ions  in  England seem to have been p a r t i c u l a r l y  
favorab le  to  the  growth and evolu t ion  o f  t h e  ideas of
5"goodness" and "nature"  as they r e l a t e  to  man. And the  
a t t i t u d e  toward th e  idea o f  man's n a tu ra l  goodness and 
the complex of d o c t r in es  which the  idea incorpora ted  
were unique and new in t h e  world.
In o rd e r  to unders tand  the  ideo lo g ica l  background 
th a t  condit ioned th e  p o r t r a y a l  of  the  Good-Natured Man 
in e igh tee n th -ce n tu ry  English  l i t e r a t u r e ,  we must f i r s t  
review the  growth and evo lu t io n  o f  the  concept o f  "n a tu ra l  
goodness" in  the l a t e  seven teen th  and e a r ly  e igh teen th  
c e n tu r ie s .  I f  t h i s  background can be sketched with 
s u f f i c i e n t  c l a r i t y  and w i th  adequate but not confusing 
d e t a i l ,  i t  w i l l  f u n c t io n  fo r  us as the  map of  the  
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  of th e  town and c i t a d e l  o f  Namur did fo r  
Uncle Toby--not in  p rocuring  fo r  us g hobbyhorse, but 
in g iv ing  c l a r i t y  to  our d i sco u rse  and allowing us to 
show more p r e c i s e ly  where a p a r t i c u l a r  concept o r  
c h a rac te r  f i t s  in to  the o v e r a l l  scheme o f  th ing s .
Even a f t e r  the  R e s to ra t io n ,  Calvinian theology and 
dogma were the  orthodox r e l i g i o u s  views. There fo re ,  man 
was g e n e ra l ly  thought to be s i n f u l  and depraved because 
of  the  f a l l  of Adam. The good man re ta in e d  h is  v i r t u e  
only by pe rpe tua l  suppress ion  and d i s c ip l i n e  of h i s  n a tu re ,  
and, of course ,  only  by th e  g race  of God was th a t
suppress ion  p o s s ib l e .  This uncomplimentary view of  man
was endorsed by Thomas Hobbes who a s s e r t s  in  Leviathan
(1650) t h a t  s e l f - i n t e r e s t ,  o r  " e g o i s t i c  /pas s io n /  o f
p r ide  and s e l f - e s t e e m ,"  i s  the  t r u e  motive of a l l  man’s
ac t ions  and t h a t  the  n a tu r a l  pass ions  of man, i f  not
c o n t ro l le d  by government, would lead to a s t a t e  of constant
so c ia l  war. He says concerning m ora l i ty :
. . . moral phi losophy i s  nothing e l s e  but the  sc ience 
of  what is  good and e v i l  in  the  conversation and 
s o c i e ty  of  mankind. Good and ev i l  a re  names th a t  
s i g n i f y  our a p p e t i t e s  and avers ions ,  which in d i f f e r e n t  
tempers,  customs, and d oc t r in es  of men are d i f f e r e n t ;  
and d ivers  men d i f f e r  not only in  t h e i r  judgment on 
th e  senses of  what is  p lea san t  and unpleasant  to  the 
t a s t e ,  smell ,  h e a r in g ,  touch,  and s ig h t  but a lso  of 
what i s  conformable o r  d i sag reeab le  to  reason in  the 
a c t io n s  o f  common l i f e .  Nay, the  same man in  divers 
times d i f f e r s  from h im se l f ,  and one time p r a i s e s - -  
t h a t  i s ,  c a l l s  good--what another  time he d isp ra is e s  
and c a l l s  e v i l .  . .
There a re  o th e r  th eses  in  Hobbes' w r i t ings  t h a t  
f u r t h e r  reduce the  d ig n i ty  o f  man. One t h e s i s  supports 
u n iv e r s a l  determinism. He a s s e r t s  th a t  the  universe  and 
the  c re a tu r e s  in i t  a re  mechanical .  Men’s act ions a re  the 
automatic r e s u l t s  o f  fo rces  o p e ra t ing  through them.
Thus, Hobbes c l e a r l y  and q u i te  convincingly  proposed th a t  
man is  not  e s s e n t i a l l y  good o r  n a t u r a l l y  s o c ia l ,  t h a t  
m o ra l i ty  is  r e l a t i v e ,  and t h a t  what i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
considered the  worst in  man i s ,  in  f a c t ,  h i s  rea l  n a tu re .
7But a l ready  in  the  seventeen th  century th e re  were 
those who ob jec ted  to t h i s  view of  human na ture  and by 
ob jec t ing  began a t h e o lo g ic a l  and phi losophical  controversy,  
One of the  unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the R es to ra t ion  and 
e igh teen th  century  i s  t h a t  f o r  near ly  a century and a h a l f  
the  c h ie f  B r i t i s h  ph i losophers  devoted much i f  not a l l  of 
t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  to e th i c a l  in v e s t ig a t io n .  The Cambridge 
P l a t o n i s t s ,  such as Henry More, John Norris ,  and Ralph 
Cudworth, f i r s t  spoke out in  defense of the inna te  goodness 
o f  man. A genera t ion  a f t e r  them L a t i tu d in a r ian  d iv in e s ,  
such as Benjamin Miichcote, John T i l lo tson ,  and I saac  
Barrow, included in t h e i r  sermons against  p u r i t a n  dogma 
and the o f fe n s iv e  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and moral d oc t r in e s  
o f  Hobbes a s e r i e s  o f  accolades of  man's na tu ra l  goodness.
R. S. Crane has s tud ied  and documented ex tens ive ly  
the  con tr ib u t io n s  o f  the  L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s .  ^ He p o in ts  out 
t h a t  in the  1660 's and 1670 's Isaac  Barrow preached a 
number o f  sermons aga ins t  both  Hobbes and the  Augustinian 
a t t i t u d e s  propagated by both Lutheran and C a lv in i s t i c  
dogma. During th e  1680 's i t  became a recognized duty 
of  the preacher  when d e l iv e r in g  a sermon on c h a r i ty  t o  
p i c tu r e  human beings " in  an amiable l ig h t  as c re a tu re s  
n a t u r a l l y  disposed to  impulses of  p i t y  and benevolence. '"^
8For example, ^\fhlchcote says in one of h i s  sermons th a t  
"Nothing i s  more c e r t a i n l y  t rue  than t h a t  a l l  v ice i s  
u n n a tu r a l ,  and contra ry  to the na tu re  o f  man. All th a t  
we c a l l  Sin,  which is  naught and con tra ry  to  the Reason 
o f  Things , i s  d e s t r u c t iv e  of Human Nature;  and a man fo rce th  
h im sel f  when he doth i t . " ^  And T i l l o t s o n  was convinced 
t h a t  "Nothing is  more unnatural  than s i n ;  ' t i s  not 
according to our o r i g i n a l  na ture  and frame, but i t  i s  the  
c o r ru p t io n  and depravat ion  of  i t ,  a second na ture  
superinduced upon us by c u s t o m . Out o f  the  L a t i tu d in a r ia n  
sermons a lso  grew another  popular conception concerning 
th e  Good-Natured Man, t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  the benevolent emotions 
may be enjoyable  to  the  indiv idua l  who allows himself  to 
f e e l  them. T i l l o t s o n  i s  r ep re sen ta t iv e  r a t h e r  than unique 
when he says,  "There i s  no sensual P leasure  in  the world 
comparable to the  Delight  and S a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  a good 
man takes  in  doing good."^
E rn es t  Tuveson has pointed out th a t  compiling numerous 
s ta tements  s im i l a r  to those  above may be mis leading.  With 
examples from sermons by John Norris  and Henry More,
Tuveson i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  even though the  divines sounded 
l i b e r a l  in  speaking of  "goodness" as being as "natura l"  
as g r a v i ty  or s i g h t ,  as seemingly i n e v i t a b l e  in  man as
t h e  ope ra t ion  o f  n a tu r a l  law in the  cosmos, they never 
r e a l l y  absorbed m ora l i ty  in to  na tu re  or  i d e n t i f i e d  conduct 
i n  the  world as th e  purpose of ex is tence .  They s t i l l  
saw good as merely p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a t ransce n d en ta l  
God. The L a t i tu d in a r ia n s  car ry  the  n a tu r a l i z in g  tendency 
f u r t h e r  than do the  Cambridge P l a t o n i s t s ,  but in t h e i r  
sermons the need f o r  grace and redemption is  always 
d i s c e r n ib le  in  th e  background. Even Barrow, who was 
perhaps the  most l i b e r a l  o f  a l l ,  f r eq u en t ly  po in ts  out  
t h a t  the  soul must undergo s p i r i t u a l  awakening before
Q
i t s  goodness can be r e l e a s e d .
However, without a doubt l a t i t u d i n a r i a n  preaching was 
i n f l u e n t i a l  in  b r ing ing  about a change in  a t t i t u d e  toward 
human na tu re  and a new emphasis on a l t ru is m .  The rec u r ren t  
d r i f t  o f  l a t i t u d i n a r i a n  w r i t in g s ,  though the  w r i t e r s  may 
have been for  the  most p a r t  unconscious o f  i t ,  was toward 
a kind of  Pelagianism. Pelagius had maintained in  h i s  
debate  with S t .  Augustine th a t  the  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  and 
in na te  goodness o f  human n a tu re  remain s ince  c r e a t i o n  and 
t h a t ,  because of long n e g lec t  of  good educat ion ,  customs, 
and conduct, c o r ru p t io n  and wickedness have en te red .  
Likewise ,  the L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  aff irmed t h a t  human n a tu re  
was noble and th a t  so c ia l  a f f e c t io n s  and the  cap a c i ty  fo r
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moral goodness were in h e re n t ly  par t  o f  human n a tu re .
P a r t  o f  the  Pe lag ian  do c t r in e  (which was condemned as 
heresy  in 431 A. D.) was t h a t  man could by the  e x e rc i s e  
of  h i s  w i l l  ac t  r ig h te o u s ly ,  do good works, and thereby 
earn  s a l v a t io n .  S im i la r i l y  th e  L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  affirmed 
t h a t  man’s passions and in c l i n a t io n s  have "a vehement 
tendency to  ac ts  o f  love and good w i l l . " ^
Mart in  B a t t e s t i n ,  who discovers in  l a t i t u d i n a r i a n  
sermons the  moral b a s i s  o f  Henry F i e ld i n g ' s  a r t ,  a s s e r t s  
t h a t  th e  m a n i fe s ta t io n  of  good na tu re  in  a comprehensive 
and e n e rg e t i c  c h a r i ty  which had as i t s  goal th e  be tterment  
of  so c ie ty  no les s  than s a lv a t io n  of  ind iv idua l  souls  
became the  core of  l a t i t u d i n a r i a n  C h r i s t i a n i t y .  "I‘/hat 
th e  l a t i t u d i n a r i a n s  meant by c h a r i ty ,  however, was not  
mere a lms-giv ing ,  but an a c t iv e ,  u n iv e r sa l  love o f  
humanity, embracing f r iend  and enemy, expressed by 
p r a c t i c e  and not merely by p ro fe s s io n ,  and l im i te d  only 
by th e  oppor tun i ty  and power of  the  i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s ,  
fo r  the  L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  the  p r a c t i c e ,  purpose, and meaning 
of r e l i g i o n  was c h a r i ty ,  t h a t  i s ,  a d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  a c t iv e ,  
and u n iv e r s a l  benevolence, and the  "g rea t  root o f  a l l  
the  d iso rde rs  and mischiefs  in  the  world" was " s e l f - l o v e  
in  a l l  i t s  various  forms de tr im enta l  to  s o c i e ty - - a v a r i c e .
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ambition,  van i ty ,  hypocrisy
Of course,  the  L a t i t u d in a r i a n s  had to do b a t t l e  with 
foes o th e r  than th e  p u r i t a n s  and Hobbes. Their  p o s i t io n  
t h a t  the  ten d e r  pass ions  would n a tu r a l l y  motivate  c h a r i t a b le  
ac t io n s  flew d i r e c t l y  in to  the  t e e th  of  the  s t r i c t  ra t iona l i sm  
and i n s e n s i t i v e  detachment of  the S to ic  i d e a l .  On the  o ther  
hand, some s c e p t i c a l  i d e a l i s t s ,  l i k e  Rochester in  h is  
"Sa ty r  Against Mankind" fo r  example, saw in  reason a 
f a c u l ty  which served only to  make men worse than animals 
whose impulses they s h a r e d . I n  o rder  to  defend t h e i r  
b e l i e f  in  th e  d ig n i ty  of  man, the  L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  had to 
defend the  su b - r a t io n a l  d r ives  of human na tu re ,  to redef ine  
the  na tu re  and func t ion  of  reason, and to  show t h a t  both 
sentiment and reason f i t  "n a tu ra l ly "  in to  the  d iv in e ly  
ordained ,  r a t i o n a l  laws of  the  un iverse .
C lea r ly ,  the  d r i f t  in  r e l ig io u s  and e th i c a l  w r i t in g  
was away from both th e  orthodox b e l i e f  t h a t  " the  t r u e
13ground o f  m ora l i ty  can only be the  Will and Law of  God" 
and the  Hobbesian b e l i e f  t h a t  m oral i ty  i s  a s t r i c t l y  human 
c re a t i o n  based on d e s i r e ,  i n t e r e s t ,  experimentat ion,  and 
c o n t r a c t .  At the  same time th e re  was a syn thes is  of  the  
two views tak ing  p lac e .  Or, to speak in  broader  g e n e r a l i t i e s ,  
the  d r i f t  was away from the  Hebrew-Christian world view
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and toward the  G reek-Rena i s  s anc e world view. The Hebrews 
handed down the ideas t h a t  God is  the a l l -powerfu l  cen ter  
o f  the  un iverse  who c rea ted  th e  world and began h i s to r y ,  
t h a t  God con t ro l s  the  world c o n t in ua l ly  and intervenes 
p e rso na l ly  in to  h i s t o r y ,  t h a t  God is  th e  source o f  moral i ty  
and a l l  law, t h a t  the  B ib le  conta ins  a l l  t h a t  man can o r  
needs to know about the  world,  and tha t  man should be 
w i l l in g  to l i v e  with mystery and not ask quest ions s ince  
God i s  beyond h i s  unders tand ing .  After  the  Pur i tans  who 
supported t h i s  ideology were ousted from power a t  the  
t ime of the  R es to ra t io n ,  t h e  Greek or Renaissance ideology 
ro se  to  eminence. Less a t t e n t i o n  was given to the  o ther  
world and more was given to  t h i s  one. F a i th  in the  super­
n a tu r a l  diminished, f a i t h  in  th e  n a tu ra l  increased,  and 
concern about joy  and happiness  in  l i f e  replaced concern 
about s a lv a t io n .  The s e c u l a r  and s c i e n t i f i c  s p i r i t  rose 
to  the  fo re .^ 4
Thus i t  i s  not s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  i t  came to seem d e s i r a b l e  
to  base m ora l i ty  not upon God's w i l l  or  the  prospect  o f  
rewards and punishments in  th e  h e r e a f t e r ,  but upon human 
n a tu re  and what was known as " th e  na ture  of  th ings .
Although the  L a t i t u d in a r i a n s  would not go th is  f a r ,  the 
B r i t i s h  moral phi losophers  d id .  I t  became an agreed t e n e t
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of English  philosophy " t h a t  i f  one supposes the goodness, 
r igh teousness ,  j u s t i c e ,  o r  p i e t y  i s  what i t  is only because 
i t  i s  commanded by God . . . then i t  makes no sense to say 
of Him t h a t  He i s  good o r  r i g h t  o r  j u s t  o r  pious,  fo r  i t  
i s  then merely being sa id  o f  Him t h a t  He i s  what He i s .  . . . 
I f  we are  to  give a foundat ion  fo r  m ora l i ty  at a l l , "  we must 
decide t h a t  God w i l l s  what i s  good, r i g h t ,  j u s t  o r  pious. 
These no t ions  were e i t h e r  an tecedent  to o r  contenable with 
God’s w i l l i n g  them, and, i f  so, deserve to  be in v es t ig a ted  
in  t h e i r  own r ig h t  without r e fe ren c e  to God or the  Bible .
That i s  b a s i c a l l y  th e  l o g ic  behind the  autonomy of e th ic s .
But t h e r e  was a l so  ano the r  cause fo r  "na tu ra l iz ing"  
m o ra l i ty ,  th e  same cause t h a t  had drawn so much t a l k  about 
"nature" from the  L a t i tu d in a r ia n s - -H o b b e s . "Since Hobbes 
had founded what looked l i k e  a p lau s ib le  e th ic a l  theory 
on the  b a s i s  of i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  ’n a tu r e ’ - - t h a t  is  to 
say, on the  b as is  o f  an a t tempt to inqu ire  into r ig h tn e ss ,  
goodness, and j u s t i c e  w i thout  r e spec t  to the  commands 
of  G od-- i t  became incumbent upon subsequent authors to 
do so a l s o W h a t e v e r  t h e  reasons ,  the  change in  the 
base of  m ora l i ty  from God to  na tu re  was the  major event 
which s igna led  the  appearance and s ig n i f ic an c e  o f  the 
Good-Natured Man. "The su p p o s i t io n  tha t  moral values depend
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upon the d iv ine  w i l l  r a t h e r  than the  nature  of  man leads to
t h e  d oc t r in es  of  f ree  w i l l ,  s in ,  the F a l l ,  and moral d iso rde r .
The b e l i e f  t h a t  moral va lues  depend upon the  na tu re  of  man 
r a t h e r  than  the  w i l l  of God leads to the  doc tr ines  of 
n a tu r a l  v i r t u e  and moral o rd e r .
The B r i t i s h  m ora l is ts  a l l  agreed th a t  i t  was necessary 
to  come to terms with Hobbes’ arguments and to f ind  the
base of  m o ra l i ty  in  na tu re ,  and, consequently, in  human
n a tu re ;  however, they d isagreed  as to what f a c u l ty  in  
man perceives  moral d i s t in c t io n s - - s e n t im e n t  o r  reason.
As a r e s u l t ,  two schools o f  moral thought a rose ,  and, of 
course ,  the  e th i c a l  controversy increased  in  complexity.
The r a t i o n a l i s t s  were convinced th a t  they founded m ora l i ty  
on human na tu re  in  that  man has as h i s  fundamental 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  the  a b i l i t y  to  reason,  and thereby the  
a b i l i t y  to  understand t r u t h .  To follow reason and to 
follow n a tu re  were for  them the  same th ing .  The 
s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  s to u t ly  maintained th a t  in o rder  to follow 
human n a tu re  one ought t o  follow i t  n a tu r a l l y ,  i n s t i n c t i v e l y ,  
a u to m a t ica l ly .  I t  i s  p r im a r i ly  the  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  who 
belong in  the  genealogy of  the  Good-Natured Man.
Anthony Ashley Cooper, t h e  Third Earl  of  Shaftesbury ,  
who was a pup i l  o f  Locke, an admirer o f  the  L a t i t u d in a r i a n s ,
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and the  e d i t o r  o f  Benjamin Wlilchcote's Sermons (1698), 
is  fo r  our review of  the  background of  the  Good-Natured 
Man the  most important  o f  the  m o ra l i s t s .  His co l lec ted  
works, C h a r a c te r i s t i c s  (1711), went through eleven ed i t ions  
before  1790, and c e r t a i n l y  he had great  in f luence  on the 
philosophy and l i t e r a t u r e  o f  th e  e ighteenth  century .
The exact na tu re  of h is  in f luence  has been c a l l e d  in to  
quest ion .  I t  was long assumed th a t  the in f luence  of  
Shaftesbury "cons is ted  in  h is  o r i g i n a l i t y ,  the  newness 
of h is  theory o f  the ' moral sense '  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
The t r a d i t i o n a l  opinion,  held by such c r i t i c s  as C. A.
Moore and W. E. Alderman, was t h a t  most i f  not a l l  the  
d i s t i n c t i v e  elements o f  the  sent imenta l  benevolism of  
the  e ighteenth  century  a l ready  ex is ted  a t  t h e  beginning 
of  the  century in  the  w r i t in g s  o f  Shaftesbury, th a t  
Shaf tesbury 's  w r i t in g s  were popular  in  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c i r c l e s  
throughout the  cen tury ,  and th a t  th e re fo re  Shaftesbury 
and h is  immediate d i s c i p l e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  Hutcheson, 
provided the ideology behind th e  c re a t io n  o f  good-natured 
ch arac te rs  by l i t e r a r y  a r t i s t s  and condit ioned the response 
of the  public  to these  c h a r a c t e r s .  But R. S. Crane has 
shown t h a t  most o f  the moral theory in Shaf tesbury 's  
w r i t ings  had a l ready  been advanced by L a t i tu d in a r ia n s
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before  Shaftesbury was even born.  A .  R. Humphreys was 
convinced tha t  Shaf tesbury  "was ahead o f  h is  time only 
in  the  confidence with which he a r t i c u l a t e d  what many 
were f e e l in g . "  And Mart in  C. B a t t e s t i n  has argued th a t  
th e  d i r e c t  in f luence  of  Shaftesbury  on a t  l e a s t  one major
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a r t i s t  of  the period--Henry  F i e l ding--was n e g l i g i b l e . “ 
However, Shaf tesbury  is  important  to  us because, as 
th e  e a r l i e r  c r i t i c s  recognized ,  h i s  philosophy conta ins 
more completely than any o th e r  the  ideas and enthusiasms 
t h a t  are  behind the  appearance o f  the  good-natured charac te rs  
and the  e th i c a l  con trove rsy  in  e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  England. 
Moreover, Shaftesbury was the  f i r s t  ro b r ing  to g e th e r  
th e  ideas about benevolent human na tu re  advanced by the  
d iv in e s ,  the  n a t u r a l i s t i c  view o f  e t h i c s ,  and th e  new 
world-view of  s c ien c e .  The d iv ines  had advanced the  
p ro p o s i t io n  " th a t  v i r t u e  i s  cen tered  in  a n a tu r a l  impulse 
toward humanitar ian  f e e l in g s  fo r  and sympathy with one 's  
fe l lows ,  t h a t  the  e x e rc i s e  of t h i s  v i r t u e  i s  accompanied 
by an inward f ee l in g  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and joy,  while  the  
sp e c ta c le  of d i s t r e s s  produces sympathetic  pa in ."^^  
S h a f te sb u ry ' s  "moral sense" is  e s s e n t i a l l y  not d i f f e r e n t  
from t h i s  "n a tu ra l  impulse" o r  from what Henry More had 
e a r l i e r  c a l le d  the  "boniforra f a c u l ty . "  But Shaftesbury
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goes on to show how th e s e  ideas a re  in harmony with the
u n iv e rsa l  system, t h a t  i s ,  he r e i n t e r p r e t s  m ora l i ty ,  as
a par t  o f  a p e r f e c t  u n iv e r s e  which has a myriad of  pa r ts
harmoniously o pe ra t ing  according to u n a l t e r a b le  laws.
This is  h is  unique c o n t r ib u t io n .
According to Shaf tesbury ,  man is  not  a machine whose
l i f e  is  determined by forces  working through him. Man
s t i l l  has h is  f r e e  w i l l  and is  not  forced to  act  in  harmony
with the  g rea t  whole. But man i s  so constructed  t h a t  i f
he does behave " n a t u r a l l y , ” he w i l l  promote h is  own happiness
and the happiness of a l l  c re a tu re s  in  the  un iv e rse .
Shaf tesbury 's  concern f o r  the  " s o c i a l  h yp o th es is " - - th e
n a tu ra l  s o c i a b i l i t y  of  man--is c e n t r a l  to h is  system of
b e l i e f .  The "connatura l  i d e a s " w i t h i n  man correspond
to the  o rder  o f  which he is  p a r t .  They confirm and are
confirmed by i t ;  they give man a ground fo r  m ora l i ty  in
h is  na ture  i t s e l f ,  f r e e  him from dependence upon the
revealed w i l l  o f  an a r b i t r a r y  God, and r e l i e v e  him of  the
re l a t iv i s m  t h a t  sees a l l  law as the  a r b i t r a r y  invention 
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0 f  man.
In Book One o f  Inqu iry  Concerning Vir tue  o r  Merit 
(1699), Shaftesbury  de f ines  the  moral sense as "a rea l  
Antipathy o r  Aversion to I n j u s t i c e o r  Wrong, and . . .
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a r e a l  Affec t ion  o r  Love towards Equity and R igh t , fo r  
i t s  own sake, and on the  account o f  i t s  own n a tu ra l  
Beauty and Worth" ( I ,  20). This moral sense theory brings 
to g e th e r  the  Hobbesian and L a t i tu d in a r i a n  ideas of  " in t e r e s t "  
and "goodness." The following quotat ion supports t h i s  
a s s e r t i o n  and most o f  what has been sa id  thus f a r  about 
S h a f te sb u ry ' s  moral theory :
We know t h a t  every Creature has a p r iv a te  Good and 
I n t e r e s t  of h i s  own; which Nature has compel'd him 
to  seek, by a l l  the  Advantages afforded him, w i th in  the 
compass of h i s  Make. We know th a t  the re  i s  in  r e a l i t y  
a r i g h t  and a wrong S ta t e  of every Creature ;  and that  
h i s  .r ight-one i s  by Nature forwarded, and by h imself  
a f f e c t i o n a t e l y  sought. There being th e re fo re  in  every 
Crea tu re  a c e r t a i n  I n t e r e s t  o r  Good; th e r e  must be also 
a c e r t a i n  End, to  which every thing in h is  Const i tu t ion  
must n a tu r a l l y  r e f e r .  To t h i s  End, i f  any th ing ,  
e i t h e r  in h is  A p p e t i te s ,  Pass ions ,  or  A ffec t ions ,  be 
not  conducing, but  the  con tra ry ;  we must of  n e cess i ty  
own i t  i l l  to him. And in  t h i s  manner he i s  i l l , with 
r e s p e c t  to h i m s e l f ; as he c e r t a i n l y  i s ,  with respec t  to 
o th e r s  of h i s  k i n d , when any such Appetites or Passions 
make him any-way in ju r io u s  to  them. Now, i f  by the 
n a t u r a l  C o n s t i tu t io n  of  any r a t i o n a l  Creature,  the  same 
I r r e g u l a r i t y s  o f  Appe t i te  which make him i l l  Others , 
make him also H im se lf ; and i f  the same Regular i ty  of 
A f fec t io n s ,  which causes him to be good in one sense,  
causes him to be good a lso  in  the  o t h e r ; then i s  tha t  
Goodness by which he i s  thus use fu l  to o the rs ,  a rea l  
Good and Advantage to  h im sel f .  And thus Vir tue and 
I n t e r e s t  may be found a t  l a s t  to agree.  ( In q u i ry , I ,  3-4)
Thus, fo r  Shaftesbury  the  source o f  m ora l i ty  i s  man's
n a tu r a l  a f f e c t i o n s ,  not  h i s  reason.  In  order  "to deserve
the name of good o r  v i r tu o u s
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a Creature  must have a l l  h i s  In c l in a t io n s  and Affect ions ,  
h i s  D ispos i t ions  of  Mind and Temper, suitable, and agreeing 
with the  Good of  h i s  Kind, or of tha t  System in which he 
i s  included, and of  which he c o n s t i t u t e s  a PART. To 
stand thus well  a f f e c t e d ,  and to have on e ’s Affect ions 
r i g h t  and i n t l r e , not only in  respect  o f  one 's  s e l f ,  
but of  Society and the  Publick:  This i s  R e c t i tu d e ,
I n t e g r i t y , o r  VIRTUE. And to  be wanting in  any o f  these ,  
o r  to have t h e i r  Contrarys,  is  D eprav i ty , Corrupt ion , 
and VICE. ( I n q u i r y , I ,  24)
Therefore,  goodness or  v i r t u e  c o n s i s t s  " in  a c e r t a i n  j u s t
D ispos i t ion ,  o r  p ropo r t io nab le  Affect ion  of a r a t i o n a l
Creature towards the  moral Objects of Right and Wrong"
( Inquiry ,  I ,  18) . Any cons idera t ion  of  personal  rewards or
punishments robs ac t ions  o f  t h e i r  moral va lue .  The moral
value l i e s  in t h e  immediate a f f e c t i o n  or r e l i s h  fo r  the
good.
Contrary to  what Bernard Mandeville would lead one 
to b e l iev e ,  Shaftesbury was well  aware th a t  t h i s  "d ispos i t ion"  
was not evident in  th e  na tu re  o f  most men in  h i s  so c ie ty .
His accounting f o r  t h i s  f a c t  r e c a l l s  the  Pelagian arguments 
of the L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s .  Since a "Sense o f  Right and Wrong" , 
is  as "n a tu ra l  to  us as n a tu r a l  Affec t ion  _/i.e. f e e l i n g /  
i t s e l f , "  and i s  the  " f i r s t  P r in c ip le  of  our C o n s t i tu t io n  
and Make," i t  cannot be taken  away by anything except 
"contrary  Habit and Custom (a second N a tu re ) ." And, o f  
course, t h i s  same "Force o f  Custom and Education in  opposi t ion
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to  Nature" can c re a te  a wrong sense o f  r i g h t  and wrong 
( In q u i ry , I ,  20-21).
In Book Two o f  ^  Inqu iry  Concerning V ir tue  Shaftesbury 
deals  with  the  motives to embrace v i r t u e  ( i . e .  goodness) 
and the o b l ig a t io n s  to be. v i r tu o u s .  Here he goes to g rea t  
length  to  prove t h a t  p r iv a t e  i n t e r e s t ,  o r  s e l f - l o v e ,  and 
publ ic  i n t e r e s t s ,  o r  s o c i a l  concerns,  a re  the  same. He 
divides th e  a f f e c t io n s  o r  pass ions  in to  th re e  groups:
"Natural  A f fe c t io n s ,  which lead to  the  Good of  the  Publ ic" ;  
" S e l f -A f fe c t io n s ,  which lead only to the  Good o f  the  
P r iv a te " ;  and "Unnatural A f fe c t io n s , "  which do not lead 
"to any Good o f  th e  Publ ic  o r  P r iv a te "  ( I n q u i r y , 1, 29-30). 
Both of  t h e  f i r s t  two are  necessa ry  but e i t h e r  can become 
excess ive  and destroy  i t s  own end. f loral  goodness depends 
on a proper  ba lance  between the  f i r s t  two. In regard to 
the  "Natural  Affect ions"  he argues t h a t  "To have the 
Natural  A f fec t ions  (such as a re  founded on Love, Complacency, 
Goodwill, and in a Sympathy with the  Kind o r  Species) is  
to  have t h e  c h ie f  means and power of Self-Enjoyment,  the  
h ighes t  possess ion  and happiness in  L ife"  ( I n q u i ry , 1, 50).  
For the  p lea su re s  of  the  mind a re  su p e r io r  to those  of the  
body, and the  mental p leasu res  a re  no o th e r  than  na tu ra l  
a f f e c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  e f f e c t s .  In regard  to  the  "Self-Pass ions"
21
he argues " th a t  by having th e  S e l f -P a ss io n s  too in tense  
or  s t rong ,  a c r e a tu r e  becomes miserable" ( I n q u i r y , I ,  54).
Shaftesbury concludes h is  work by cla iming h i s  "Moral 
a r i thmetick" has as much evidence to  suppor t  i t  "as th a t  
which is  found in  Numbers., o r  M a t h e r a a t i c k s I t  is a 
simple m a t te r  o f  ad d i t io n  and s u b t r a c t i o n ;  "To be wicked 
or  v i t i o u s ,  i s  to  be miserable  and unhappy," and "Everything 
which is  an Improvement of V i r tu e ,  or an Establ ishment  o f  
r ig h t  A ffec t ion  and I n t e g r i t y ,  is  an Advancement o f  I n t e r e s t ,  
and leads to the  g r e a t e s t  and most so l id  Happiness and 
Enjoyment" ( I ,  63 ,64 ) .
This view o f  what c o n s t i t u t e s  m o ra l i ty ,  whether
o r ig in a l  with Shaftesbury o r  no t ,  i s ,  w i th  v a r i a t i o n s
p e cu l ia r  to each work and au thor ,  the  view i l l u s t r a t e d ,
te s t e d ,  o r  c o n t r a d ic te d  by the  l i t e r a r y  a r t i s t s  of
e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  England. Of course ,  p a r t i c u l a r  w r i te r s
were inf luenced by persons o r  works not mentioned above
25in c re a t in g  good-natured c h a r a c t e r s ,  and a f t e r  the  deluge 
of  good-natured c h a rac te rs  in  l i t e r a r y  works, some w r i te r s  
were probably unaware of  th e  in f luences  d iscussed  above.
The foregoing i s  intended only to g ive  a b r i e f  account o f  
the severa l  id e a l s  t h a t  were brought  t o g e t h e r  and incorporated 
into  a c h a r a c t e r  whose very presence gave a major theme to
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e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  w r i te r s - -w h a t  happens to  a good, n a tu r a l ,  
u n f a l l e n  man in a co r ru p t ,  u n n a tu ra l ,  f a l l e n  society?
A f te r  Shaftesbury,  i t  i s  no longer poss ib le  to speak 
with any c e r t a i n t y  about th e  in f lu en ce  of  sp e c i f i c  w r i t e r s  
on th e  popular  o r  general  i d e a l  of  the  Good-Natured Man. 
However, i t  i s  en l igh ten ing  to see the  immediate background 
of  t h e  Good-Natured Man, th e  sen t im en ta l  e th ic s  of the  
L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  and Shaftesbury,  in the  l a r g e r  pe rspec t ive  
of  th e  e th i c a l  debate  which spans from befo re  the  
L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  to  the  end o f  th e  e igh teen th  century.  Of 
course ,  the  debate  i s  too ex tens ive  and i n t r i c a t e  to 
fol low here  in  d e t a i l .
A f te r  the  Reformation an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  answer to 
the  quest ion  "What should I do?'  was no longer  p o ss ib le .  
T here fo re ,  the  search  was on fo r  a means to d i s t in g u ish  
between r ig h t  and wrong. Ralph Cudworth, who was one o f  
the  f i r s t  to  b r in g  the  e th i c a l  ra t io n a l i sm  of  the  Greeks 
in to  B r i t i s h  moral philosophy, a s s e r t s  t h a t  man has "a 
Super ior  Power o f  I n t e l l e c t i o n  and Knowledge of a d i f f e r e n t  
Nature from Sense, which is  not terminated in mere Seeming 
and Appearance only ,  but in  th e  Truth and R ea l i ty  of  th in g s ,  
and reaches to  t h e  Comprehension of th a t  which Really and
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Absolute ly i s ,  whose Objects a re  the  E te rn a l  and Immutable
Essences and Nature o f  Things, and t h e i r  Unchangeable
Rela t ions  to  one a n o t h e r . T h i s  b e l i e f  in  a "Superior
Power of  I n t e l l e c t i o n , "  l a t e r  c a l l e d  "Rational  In tu i t ion"
27by Richard P r i c e ,  which guides man's conduct by means of 
immediate r a t i o n a l  pe rcep t ion  o f  r i g h t  and wrong res ts  
on f a i t h  in  the  "Nature of Things ,"  t h a t  i s ,  on the f a i t h  
t h a t  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between good and e v i l  i s  a na tura l  
one, t h a t  a th ing  is  good because  i t  has an e te rn a l  and 
immutable n a tu re  of  goodness. Cudworth attempts to show 
t h a t  moral good and e v i l ,  j u s t i c e  and i n j u s t i c e ,  honesty 
and d ishones ty  cannot p oss ib ly  be a r b i t r a r y  things made 
by w i l l ,  human o r  d iv ine ,  and without foundation in na ture .  
Even God cannot make a th ing  white  without whiteness or 
round without roundness, " th a t  i s ,  without c e r t a i n  Natures" 
( I I ,  247). For " th a t  which implies a C ontrad ic t ion  is a 
Non-Entity, and th e r e f o re  cannot be the  Object o f  Divine 
Power. And the  Reason ■’s the  same fo r  a l l  o th e r  th ings ,  
as j u s t  and u n j u s t ;  fo r  every th ing  is  what i t  i s  immutably 
by the  n e c e s s i ty  o f  i t s  own Nature ;  n e i t h e r  is  i t  any 
Derogation a t  a l l  of  the  power o f  God to  say, th a t  he 
cannot make a th ing  to  be t h a t  which i t  i s  n o t . "  Thus, 
Cudworth maintains  th a t  man knows what he ought to do
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because reason guides him by means o f  immediate r a t io n a l  
percep t ion  o f  r i g h t  and wrong. At the  basis  o f  a l l  moral 
o b l ig a t io n  th e r e  must be a r a t i o n a l  perception o f  what 
ought to be ( I I ,  255).
The r a t i o n a l i s t s '  p o s i t io n  i s  fu r th e r  supported by
Samuel Clarke who holds th a t  judgments about r igh tness
and wrongness a re  _a p r i o r i  and determined by th e  fact
t h a t  th e re  a re  e t e r n a l  f i t n e s s e s  and un f i tne sses  of  things
which are the  same to every r a t i o n a l  being th a t  considers
them. For example, " 'T i s  undeniably more F i t ,  abso lu te ly
and in  the  Nature o f  the  th ing  i t s e l f  t h a t  a l l  Men should
endeavor to promote th e  u n iv e r s a l  good and welfare  of  A l l ,
than th a t  a l l  Men should be c o n t in u a l ly  contr iv ing  the
28r u in  and d e s t r u c t io n  o f  A l l . "  Clarke and Cudworth would 
agree with William Wollaston t h a t  "Truth is but a conformity 
to  na ture :  and to  follow n a tu re  cannot be a combat t r u th , "
and "To deny things to be as they a re  i s  a t r an sg re ss io n  
o f  the  great  law o f  n a tu re ,  the  law of reason.
C r i t i c s  of th e  r a t i o n a l i s t s '  theory  argue th a t  reason 
i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  as a moral guide  because even i f  i t  can 
apprehend moral t r u t h ,  i t  cannot account for  moral 
o b l ig a t io n  and a c t io n .  Hume l a t e r  uses th i s  argument 
very e f f e c t i v e l y ,  but a l l  the  r a t i o n a l i s t s  o f f e r  what
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they cons ider  adequate explanat ion  o f  " r a t i o n a l  motivation" 
to  good a c t io n s .  The ty p ic a l  exp lana t ion  i s  th a t  the 
r a t i o n a l  pe rcep t ion  of  the  f i t n e s s  o f  an ac t ion  in  r e l a t i o n  
to  the  agents and ob jec ts  involved in  i t s e l f  makes the 
a c t io n  an o b l ig a t io n .  For example, John Balguy says th a t  
i f  the  "Moral F i tness  of c e r t a i n  Actions be not a Reason 
fo r  the  doing o f  them, I see  not  how any Thing can be a 
Reason fo r  any Thing." Richard P r i c e  says ,  "Obligation 
to a c t io n ,  and r ig h tn e ss  o f  a c t io n ,  a re  p l a in ly  coincident  
and i d e n t i c a l . "  And Samuel Clark says ,  "Some th ings  are  
in  t h e i r  own na tu re  Good and Reasonable and F i t  to  be done; 
. . . th e se  rec e iv e  not t h e i r  o b l ig a to ry  power, from any 
Law or  A uthor i ty ,  but a re  only dec la red ,  confirmed and 
in forced  by p e n a l t i e s ,  upon such as would not perhaps 
be governed by r ig h t  Reason only."  Immorality fo r  the 
r a t i o n a l i s t s  i s  not ac t ing  in  accord with what reason 
recognizes  to  be th e  r ig h t  course o f  a c t io n .  Therefore ,  
i t  i s  necessa ry  fo r  reason to c o n tro l  passions i f  one 
would be moral .
One sometimes fo rge ts  t h a t  the  debate between the 
r a t i o n a l i s t s  and the  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  i s  a b icke r ing  with in  
a s i n g l e  camp, and both camps valued both reason and 
benevolence, but  in  varying degrees .  The s e n t im e n ta l i s t s
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never d isagreed with th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  aspect  o f  the
r a t i o n a l i s t s '  p o s i t io n ;  we should always t r y  to  bring
about the  g r e a t e s t  good fo r  the species  as a whole.
Joseph B u t le r ,  who seems to f i t  e i t h e r  school because i t
i s  a m at ter  of  l i t t l e  importance to him whether the  moral
f a c u l ty  i s  r a t i o n a l  o r  sen t im en ta l ,  serves to  remind us
what the  two schools had in common and to  provide a
t r a n s i t i o n  from one to  the  o th e r .  In  D i s s e r t a t i o n  I I :
Of the  Nature o f  V ir tue  (1736) he says:
That which renders beings capable  o f  moral judgment, i s  
t h e i r  having a moral n a tu re ,  and moral f a c u l t i e s j o f  _  
pe rcep t ion  and of  a c t io n .  . . .  I t  i s  m anifes t  / t h a t  a_/ 
g rea t  p a r t  of common language, and o f  common behavior 
over the  world, i s  formed upon su p p os i t ion  of  such a 
moral f a c u l ty ;  whether ca l led  conscience ,  moral reason, 
moral sense ,  o r  d iv ine  reason; whether considered 
as a sentiment o f  the  unders tanding  o r  a pe rcep t ion  of  
the  h e a r t ;  o r ,  which seems the  - t ru th ,  as inc lud ing  both .  
Nor is i t  a t  a l l  d o ub t fu l ,  in the  g e n e ra l ,  what course 
o f  a c t io n  t h i s  f a c u l ty ,  or  p r a c t i c a l  d i sce rn in g  power 
w ith in  us ,  approves, and what i t  d isapproves .  For as 
much as i t  has been disputed wherein v i r t u e  c o n s i s t s ,
. . . ye t  th e re  i s  in  r e a l i t y  an u n i v e r s a l l y  acknowledged 
standard o f  i t .  ( I ,  245-246)
We have a l ready  t r e a t e d  Shaf tesbury ,  but  a b r i e f  
c o n t r a s t  of  him to the  r a t i o n a l i s t s  w i l l  not be r e p e t i t i o u s .  
Shaftesbury argues t h a t  the  f ee l in g  o r  motive a person has 
in  doing an a c t ,  not th e  a c t io n  i t s e l f ,  determines whether 
the  person i s  good o r  n o t .  As has been poin ted  ou t ,  a 
person is  good o r  bad according as he has n a tu r a l  a f f e c t i o n s .
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o r  benevolence, and s e l f - a f f e c t i o n s ,  o r  s e l f - l o v e ,  in  the  
r i g h t  p ro p o r t io ns .  Francis  Hutcheson r e s t a t e s  Sha f tesbury 's  
s tandard  fo r  moral a c t io n  thus :  "We never c a l l  t h a t  Man
benevolent ,  who i s  in  f a c t  u s e f u l  to  o th e r s ,  but  a t  the 
same time only in tends h is  own I n t e r e s t ,  without any 
u l t im a te  d e s i r e  o f  the  Good o f  Others .  I f  the re  be any 
benevolence a t  a l l ,  i t  must be d i s i n t e r e s t e d ;  fo r  the  
most u se fu l  Action imaginable, lo se s  a l l  appearances of 
Benevolence, as soon as we d isce rn  t h a t  i t  only flowed 
from Self-Love, o r  I n t e r e s t .
The r a t i o n a l i s t s '  answer to  t h i s  p o s i t io n  as l a t e  
as 1758 was:
Benevolence, i t  has been shewn, i s  o f  two k inds,  
r a t i o n a l  and i n s t i n c t i v e .  Rat ional  benevolence e n t i r e l y  
coincides with r e c t i t u d e ,  and the  ac t ions  proceeding 
from i t ,  with  th e  ac t ions  proceeding from a regard 
to  r e c t i t u d e .  . . . But i n s t i n c t i v e  benevolence is no 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  v i r t u e ,  nor a re  any ac t ions  flowing 
merely from i t  v i r tu o u s .  As f a r  as t h i s  in f luences ,  
so f a r  something e l s e  than reason and goodness 
in f luence ,  and so much I th in k  is  to  be sub trac ted  
from the  moral worth of  any a c t io n  o r  c h a ra c te r .  . . . 
WTierever the  inf luence  o f  mere n a tu r a l  temper o r  
i n c l i n a t i o n  appears , and a p a r t i c u l a r  conduct i s  known 
to  proceed from hence, we may, i t  i s  t rue ,  love the  
person,  as we commonly do the  i n f e r i o r  c rea tu re s  when 
they d iscover  mildness and t r a c ta b le n e s s  o f  d i s p o s i t i o n ;  
but  no regard  to him as a v i r tu o u s  agent w i l l  a r i s e  
w i th in  u s . 33
Of course,  Bernard Handevil l e ,  who was much c lo s e r  to 
Samuel B u t le r  in  s t y l e  and to Hobbes in  theory than to any
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o f  th e  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  moral ph i lo sophers ,  debunked 
the  very idea of man having a moral na tu re  and de l ivered  a 
d e l i g h t f u l  and c a lc u la te d ly  n as ty  s a t i r e  on both schools 
o f  e th i c a l  theory as e a r ly  as 1705 in  The Grumbling Hive, 
which was expanded to The Fable o f  Bees in  1714. Mandeville 
a s s e r t s  t h a t  the  s t a t e  emerged n o t ,  as Hobbes and Locke 
suggested,  from so c ia l  c o n t ra c t  in  which a l l  men p a r t i c i p a t e  
as equa ls ,  but  from the  ingenious m anipula t ion  by a few 
techn ic ian s  of  the  f r a i l t y  of o t h e r s .  " S k i l l f u l  p o l i t i c i a n s  
a re  th e  tamers o f  man; they  teach  him s o c i a b i l i t y  by 
f l a t t e r i n g  him in to  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e ,  t h a t  i s ,  by o f fe r in g  
him a more e x q u is i t e  mental g r a t i f i c a t i o n  than  the  senses 
can a t t a i n . "^4 Some i c o n o c la s t i c  s ta tements  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  Mandeville are  th a t  th e  "moral v i r t u e s  a re  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
o f f s p r in g  which f l a t t e r y  begat  upon p r id e , "  t h a t  "Sagacious 
m o r a l i s t s  draw men l i k e  ange ls ,  in  hopes th a t  t h e  pr ide  
a t  l e a s t  of some w i l l  put ' em upon copying a f t e r  the  
b e a u t i f u l  o r ig in a l s  which they a re  rep resen ted  to  be,"  
and t h a t  Shaf tesbury 's  "not ions  . . . a re  generous and 
r e f in e d , "  a "high compliment to human-kind," capable  of  
i n s p i r in g  us with a high sense o f  the  d ig n i ty  o f  human 
nature--"What a p i t y  i t  i s  t h a t  they a re  not t r u e . " ^ ^  
Because o f  Mandevil le 's  s t y l e  and h i s  unconvent iona l .
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discouraging,  sardonic views, the  a f f e c t  o f  The Fable 
of  Bees was to s t i r  the  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  to  g re a te r  vehemence, 
j u s t  as Hobbes had s t i r r e d  his  opponents, and thereby to  
fu r th e r  the  acceptance of sen t im enta l  moral theory.
However, Mandeville, even more than Hobbes, a t tacked the  
very foundation of  R es to ra t ion  and e igh teen th -cen tu ry  
moral philosophy by a s s e r t in g  t h a t  n e i t h e r  soc ie ty  nor 
m ora l i ty  has i t s  bas is  in  na ture  un less  i t  i s  in  the  
s e l f i s h  na tu re  of  men. He be l ieved  th a t  moral v i r t u e  and 
s o c ia l  s t a t e  were c rea ted  by human a r t  ( l a r g e ly  by the  
a r t f u l  manipulat ion of  the  masses by the  percep t ive  and 
s k i l l f u l l y  deceptive p o l i t i c i a n s ) . And j u s t  as many of  
Hobbes' ideas became acceptable  when espoused by Locke, 
many of Mandevil le 's  ideas were f u r t h e r  accepted when 
espoused by Hume and Adam Smith.
U n t i l  Hume's T re a t i s e  of  Human Nature (1738) the  
r a t io n a l i sm  of such moral philosophers as Locke and Samuel 
Clarke remained dominant in  e th i c a l  theory .  The wide 
acceptance,  some of  i t  unconscious,  of deism is one 
m an i fes ta t ion  of t h i s  dominance. I t  was gen e ra l ly  held 
th a t  th e re  was a r e l i g io n  of n a tu re ,  capable  of purely 
r a t i o n a l  demonstration,  though i t s  r e l a t i o n  to revealed 
r e l i g io n  and the  e s tab l ished  creed was never  c le a r ly
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unders tood.  But Hume destroyed the  base o f  the  r a t i o n a l i s t s  
th eo ry  and the d e i s t i c a l  system and provided a convincing 
defense  of  the  sen t im en ta l  v i e w s . H e  argues convincingly 
t h a t  reason is  not a dependable guide in  making moral 
judgments o r  in  unders tanding phys ica l  n a tu r e .  In Book 
One o f  A T r e a t i s e  of  Human Nature (1738), he says concerning 
the  p hys ica l  world, o r  the  "Not-Ourselves, t h a t  i f  the re  
i s  a r e a l  "n a tu re ,"  a r e a l  order  o f  exper ience ,  we cannot 
know whether our ideas  of  i t  are c o r rec t  o r  d i s to r t e d .
Reason can never show any connection of  one ob jec t  to 
ano th e r  o r  the  r e l a t i o n  between ideas and th in g s .  All 
our reasoning about connections,  as of cause and e f f e c t ,  
i s  merely due to custom opera t ing  on our imaginat ions .
The c r i t e r i o n  fo r  judging  between t r u e  and f a l s e  ideas 
about the  phys ica l  world i s  su b je c t iv e ,  and th e  only 
o b j e c t i v e  s tandard f o r  approval o r  d isapproval  is  a 
consensus among average educated men.
Hume t r e a t s  reason  s im i la r ly  in h is  moral theory.
In  Book Two of  the  T r e a t i s e  he proves in theo ry  th a t  
reason can n e i t h e r  produce or prevent  any a c t io n  or  a f f e c t io n .  
Ear ly  in  Book Three he argues t h a t  morals do inf luence  
a c t io n s  and a f f e c t i o n s  and, t h e r e f o re ,  morals cannot be 
der ived  from reason.  "As long as i t  i s  a l lo w 'd ,  th a t
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reason has no in f luence  on our passions and a c t io n s ,
’t l s  In va in  to  p retend,  t h a t  m ora l i ty  I s  discovered only 
by a deduct ion of  reason."  For Hume, moral judgment, 
l i k e  b e l i e f  In Ideas,  " Is  more p roper ly  an ac t  o f  the  
s e n s i t i v e ,  than of  the  c o g n i t iv e  p a r t  of our n a tu r e s , "
" Is  more p roper ly  f e l t  than ju d g ’d of."3&
Hume, l i k e  Shaftesbury,  contends th a t  man has n a tu ra l  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  and motives t h a t  cause him to  approve o f  
c e r t a i n  th in g s .  Man has a f e e l in g  o f  approval with regard 
to benevolent ac t ions  because th e re  Is a n a tu ra l  pass ion  
In human n a tu re  to approve of  these  a c t io n s .  Also l i k e  
Shaf tesbury ,  Hume b e l iev es  t h a t  motives, or  a f f e c t io n s  
or  p a ss io n s ,  a re  the causes o f  ac t ions  and a re  the  u l t im a te  
o b jec ts  of  p r a i s e  and blame. " 'T l s  ev ident ,  t h a t  when we 
p r a i s e  any a c t io n s ,  we regard only the  motives th a t  
produced them, and cons ider  th e  ac t ions  as s igns  or  In d ica t io n s  
of  c e r t a i n  p r in c ip le s  In the  mind and t e m p e r . A n d  when 
th e re  Is  no motive to do a c t io n s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o r t ,  no 
moral p r a i s e  o r  blame Is a t t ac h ed  to  a person fo r  doing or 
not doing ac t io n s  of t h a t  s o r t .
However, un l ike  Shaf tesbury ,  Hume recognizes t h a t  
t h e re  a r e  no n a tu ra l  motives to  do many of  the  ac t ions  to  
which men have assigned the  Ideas of  v ice  and v i r t u e .
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Therefore ,  Hume has to  account f o r  a r t i f i c i a l  motives.
His argument runs something l i k e  t h i s :  Human needs f a r
exceed human a b i l i t i e s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  men find i t  advantageous 
to  organize into s o c i e t i e s  and a re  induced to observe the  
ru les  of j u s t i c e ,  p roper ty ,  and promises from s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  
As so c ie ty  grows in to  a t r i b e  o r  na t io n ,  men lo se  s igh t  
o f  the i n t e r e s t  they  have in  main tain ing  order  and may 
follow t h e i r  l e s s e r  and more p resen t  i n t e r e s t s ,  but they 
"never f a i l  to observée th e  p re ju d ic e  we rece ive ,  e i t h e r  
mediately  or immediately,  from the  i n j u s t i c e  o f  o thers ."
Even when i n j u s t i c e  i s  a t  a d is tan ce  and can in  no way 
a f f e c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  d i sp lea s in g  because 
i t  is " p r e ju d i c i a l  to  human s o c ie ty ,  and pernic ious to 
every one tha t  approaches th e  person g u i l t y  of i t . "  Men 
share each o t h e r ' s  "uneasiness  by sympathy; and as everything, 
which gives uneas iness  in  human a c t io n s ,  upon the  general  
survey, i s  c a l l ' d  Vice, and whatever produces s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
in  the  same manner, i s  denominated V i r tue ;  t h i s  is the  
reason why the sense of  moral good and e v i l  follows upon 
j u s t i c e  and i n j u s t i c e .  . . . Thus s e l f - i n t e r e s t  is the 
o r ig in a l  motive t o  th e  es tab l ishm ent  of  j u s t i c e ,  but a 
sympathy with pub l ic  i n t e r e s t  i s  the  source of moral 
approbation,  which a t t e n d s  t h a t  v i r t u e .
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Sympathy i s  f o r  Hume, then ,  "a sent imental  i n t u i t i o n  
of customary motives and a t t i t u d e s . "  That which is  moral 
is  not d iscoverab le  through reason  alone but "an imaginat ive  
in s ig h t  through th e  a s s o c ia t io n  of  ideas . . .  i s  necessary  
to achieve  t h i s  knowledge. As we perce ive  ac t ions  in  o thers  
s im i la r  to  our own, we form an idea  of the  emotions of o th e rs ,  
and the  idea is  t ransformed in to  an impression,  and becomes 
through a s s o c ia t io n  with ourse lves  a r e a l  passion of  our 
own. . . . Man i s  always a s o c i a l  be ing ,  n e i th e r  e g o i s t i c  
or  s e l f l e s s  but always in  some sympathetic  r e l a t i o n  ( i n  
normal b e h a v io r ) . Reason being not an a c t iv e  f a c u l ty ,  becomes 
the s la v e  of p a s s io n s ,  in  the  respec t  t h a t  reason can do 
nothing without p a ss ion a l  i n t u i t  ion .
Hume sums up h i s  own p o s i t i o n  and i t s  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t s :
. . when you pronounce any ac t ion  or  c h a ra c te r
to  be / v i r t u o u s  o r /  v i c io u s ,  you mean nothing, but th a t  
from the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of your na tu re  you have a f e e l in g  
or  sent iment of  approval o r  blame from the contemplation 
of  i t .  Vice and v i r t u e ,  th e r e f o r e ,  may be compar'd to  
sounds, c o lo u rs ,  heat  and co ld ,  which according to 
modern philosophy,  a re  not  q u a l i t i e s  in o b je c t s ,  but  
p e rcep t ions  in  t h e  mind: And t h i s  discovery in  morals ,
l i k e  t h a t  o th e r  in  phys ics ,  i s  to  be regarded as a 
cons iderab le  advancement of  the  specu la t iv e  sc iences  ; 
t h o ' ,  l i k e  t h a t  too,  i t  has l i t t l e  o r  no in f luence  on 
p r a c t i c e .  Nothing can be more r e a l ,  or concern us more, 
than  our own sent iments o f  p lea su re  and uneas iness ;  
and i f  these  be favourable  to  v i r t u e ,  and unfavourable  
to v ic e ,  no more can be r e q u i s i t e  to the  r e g u la t io n  
of our conduct and b ehav iour .^2
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The c o n t r ib u t io n ,  i f  i t  can be c a l le d  t h a t ,  which 
Hume makes to  moral philosophy is of profound importance.
The r a t i o n a l i s t s '  b e l i e f  in  reason as a moral guide r e s t s  
on t h e i r  f a i t h  in th e  "nature  of th in g s" ;  Sha f tesbu ry 's  
b e l i e f  in  " a f f e c t io n s"  or  sentiments as a guide r e s t s  on 
h is  f a i t h  in  the  n a tu re  of man as a p a r t  o f  and in  harmony 
with the  na tu re  of  th in g s ;  but Hume, though he recognizes 
t h a t  man has the  n a tu r a l  motives of  benevolence and s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t ,  can find no bas is  fo r  much o f  moral i ty  except 
custom. Hume c e r t a i n l y  belongs to the  "sent imenta l  school ,"  
fo r  he b e l iev es  th a t  man does have a sense of v i r t u e ,  but 
j u s t  as with  ideas about physical  r e a l i t y ,  i t  is  condit ioned 
by s o c ia l  s tandards and customs. Basi l  Willey says t h a t  
before  Hume"Nature and Reason go hand in  hand; a f t e r  him. 
Nature and F e e l i n g . T h i s  i s  no doubt t r u e ,  but more
important fo r  us i s  t h e  fac t  th a t  before  Hume both the
r a t i o n a l i s t s  and the  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  thought they had 
discovered an abso lu te  bas is  fo r  m ora l i ty ,  for  an 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  answer to  the  quest ion "Wliat should I  do?"
But Hume concludes, much l i k e  Hobbes, t h a t  moral i ty  i s  
r e l a t i v e ,  a human a r t i f i c e .
Adam Smith’s moral philosophy is  in d ic a t iv e  of  the
d i r e c t i o n  sent imenta l  e th ic s  takes a f t e r  Hume. Smith
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was a f r i e n d  and s tudent  o f  Hume and he succeeded Hutcheson, 
the  g re a t  d i s c i p l e  and po p u la r ize r  o f  Shaftesbury,  as 
p ro fe s so r  of moral philosophy at  the U n ive rs i ty  of  Glasgow. 
In The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments (1759) he says th a t  
the  conscience ,  as B u t le r  c a l l s  i t ,  o r  the  moral sense,  
as Shaf tesbury  and Hutcheson c a l l  i t ,  o r  " the demigod 
w i th in  the  b r e a s t - - t h e  g rea t  a r b i t e r  of  conduct," as 
Smith h im se l f  c a l l s  i t ,  is  b u i l t  up psycho log ica l ly  by 
means o f  sympathy. But to sympathize does not mean the  
same th in g  to Smith as i t  did to Hume. Sympathy is  the  
c en te r  o f  Sm ith 's  moral theory and means, among o ther  
th in g s ,  " fe l low  fee l ing"  or our fee l in g s  for  o th e r s ,  
our s e n s i t i v i t y  to o th e r s '  opinions o f  us and our conduct,  
and our acceptance o f  t h e i r  way o f  eva lua t ing  the  p ro p r ie ty  
o f  our a c t i o n s .  Smith 's  theory becomes very complex and 
though he t a l k s  a g rea t  deal  about sympathy, approbat ion,  
u t i l i t y ,  and p r o p r i e t y ,  h is  standard o f  m ora l i ty  never 
becomes c l e a r .  Louis Bredvold i s  s t a t i n g  at l e a s t  a 
h a l f - t r u t h  when he says th a t  " the demigod tu rns  out to  be 
merely seeing ou rse lves  in  the  m irror  o f  our neighbors '  
op in ions  o f  u s .  . . . I t  seems th a t  conscience i s  a f t e r  
a l l  the  s t i l l  small  vo ice  th a t  t e l l s  us only t h a t  someone 
i s  watching us."^'^ And Smith 's  ideas do seem very s im i l a r
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a t  po in ts  to  the  Darwinian no t ion  th a t  o n e 's  conscience 
i s  formed by th e  p r a i s e  and blame o f  h i s  fel low men.
But even though Smith recognizes tha t  t h e  s tandards  of 
conduct are  formed by the  ordinary  opin ions  of  the  world, 
sympathy, which he cannot account fo r  c l e a r l y ,  a f f e c t s  
conscience and causes the  spontaneous moral sentiments 
to c o n t r ib u te  b l in d ly  to  promote the g r e a t e s t  poss ib le  
amount o f  happiness fo r  m a n k i n d . T h e  awareness of 
o th e r s '  f ee l in g s  and op in ions ,  then, i s  not  a d e te rm in i s t ic  
in f luence  but a c r e a t i v e  one in  that  i t  allows the  imagination 
to form a p ic tu r e  of  o th e r s '  sorrows and jo y s ,  and thereby 
makes p oss ib le  the  sympathetic  involvement o f  one person 
with another .  Thus, in  Smith 's  e th ica l  theo ry ,  m ora l i ty  i s  
based on n a tu r a l  sympathy and an awareness of  the  ord inary  
customs and opinions of  the  world.
Thus, as the  century  progressed, the  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s  
won th e  f i e l d  in  e t h i c a l  theory .  The p ro g res s io n  seems 
to have been from a m o ra l i ty  based on God's commandments, 
to a m o ra l i ty  based on n a tu re ,  to a m o ra l i ty  based on 
custom and so c ia l  op in ion .  In the  Cambridge P l a to n i s t s  
and L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s ,  in  Shaftesbury, Hume, and Smith, 
sen t im enta l  e th ic s  had a continuous development. All  these  
w r i t e r s ,  except fo r  th e  " r a t i o n a l ” P l a t o n i s t s ,  placed t h e i r
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t r u s t  in the  immediate and i n s t i n c t i v e  moral sent iment 
o r  impulse as the  supreme guide to  happiness and 
goodness.  And, as Hume poin ted  out  concerning h is  own 
th eo ry ,  the  d i f fe rences  in  th e  moral theory of  these  men 
should have no p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  on the  conduct o f  the  
good man. However man acquired h i s  sentiments they are 
s t i l l  the  u n f a i l in g  guide to a l l  t h a t  is  m e r i t o r i o u s .
This i s  not  to say t h a t  the  Good-Natured Man whose ch a rac te r  
i s  based on the  sen t im enta l  e th i c s  o f  the  L a t i tu d in a r ian s  
and Shaftesbury  i s  t r e a t e d  in  l i t e r a t u r e  the  same way as 
a good man whose c h a ra c te r  i s  based on the  sen t im enta l  
e th i c s  of  Hume and Smith. The s h i f t  of  the base  o f  
m o ra l i ty  from na tu re  to custom, th e  evolu t ion  o f  sentiment 
o r  f e e l i n g  from being the  means o f  pe rce iv ing  moral d i s ­
t i n c t i o n s  toward being goodness i t s e l f ,  the  gradual  
degenera t ion  of  th e  Good-Natured Man in to  merely the  
Man o f  S e n s i b i l i t y , ^ ^  a l l  have profound e f f e c t s  on the 
t rea tm en t  of  the  Good-Natured Man i n  l i t e r a t u r e .
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sense which w i l l  be defined more c l e a r l y  l a t e r  on in  the paper,
Chapter I I  
The Good-Natured Man: An Ideal
The Good-Natured Man became prominent in  l i t e r a t u r e  
in consequence of  changes in  e th i c a l  th e o r i e s .  But the  
t rea tm ent  of  him in English  l i t e r a t u r e  was condit ioned by 
the l i t e r a r y  t r a d i t i o n  which in  tu rn  was a f fec ted  by the  
s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  in f luences  of th e  t ime. We w i l l  not 
define  t h i s  general  background as we did the  e th ic a l  
background on the  assumption t h a t  i t  i s  more f a m i l i a r .
The Good-Natured Man and the  themes and emotions assoc ia ted  
with him are  given t h e i r  a r t i s t i c  f u l f i l lm e n t  in  the novel; 
t h e r e f o r e ,  the  p r in c ip a l  works discussed in t h i s  paper w i l l  
be nove ls .  However, t h e  new e th i c a l  theory was r e f l e c te d  
in  o th e r  genres ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  the  drama and p e r io d ica l  
l i t e r a t u r e ,  before  i t  was in  th e  novel.  As good nature  
became a more and more dominant v i r t u e  in  the  l a t e  
seventeenth and ea r ly  e ig h tee n th  c e n tu r ie s ,  i t  received 
more t rea tm ent  in  l i t e r a t u r e  and good-natured ch arac te rs  
graduated from the t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  o f  comic b u t t s  to the  
r o le  of  p ro ta g o n i s t s .  The major charac te rs  sympathetical ly  
portrayed  in  the  following works w r i t t e n  before  1740 are
43
44
benevolent :  Colley C ibber 's  Love's Last S h i f t  (1696)
and The Provoked Husband (1728), Farquhar 's  Twin Rivals 
(1702) and Constant Couple (1700), S t e e l e ' s  C h r i s t ia n  
Hero (1701) and Conscious Lovers (1722), Addison and 
S t e e l e ' s  The de Coverley Papers (1710-1712), Theophilus 
C ibber 's  The Lover (1730), L i l l o ' s  The London Merchant 
(1731), John K e l le y 's  The Married Philosopher (1732), 
William Popp le 's  The Double Deceit ; o r  A Cure fo r  
Jealousy  (1735), Joseph Dorman's S i r  Roger de Coverley; 
or  The Merry Christmas (1740), many of  F i e l d i n g ' s  p l a y s , 
and th e  l i s t  could go on including p la y s , ope ras ,  sermons, 
p e r io d ic a l  essays ,  and C h r is t ian  t r a c t s  which p resen t  the  
Good-Natured Man as hero .  All the  "sen t im enta l"^  comedy, 
t ragedy,  and non-dramatic  l i t e r a t u r e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  before  
1740, compose the  l i t e r a r y  background of th e  more complete 
p o r t r ay a l  and t rea tment  given the Good-Natured Man in  the  
novel.  For sen t im enta l  l i t e r a t u r e ,  l ik e  the  cha rac te r  
of  the  Good-Natured Man, grew out of an underly ing  
p h i lo so p h ica l  b e l i e f  in  benevolence as a law o f  nature  
and a n a tu r a l  human emotion.
The a p p e l l a t io n  "Good-Natured Man" has both general  
and p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n t s ,  and we must d i s t in g u i s h  between 
the  r e f e r e n t s  j u s t  as we d is t in gu ish  between comedy in
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g en e ra l ,  sen t im en ta l  comedy, and a s p e c i f i c  p lay ,  or  
poetry  in g e n e ra l ,  ep ic  poe try ,  and a s p e c i f i c  poem.
Of course,  only the  e s s e n t i a l  f ea tu res  and a t t r i b u t e s  a re  
included in  a d e f i n i t i o n  of the  type .  The p a r t i c u l a r  
r e f e r e n t s  o r  recurrences  of the  type a re  never i d e n t i c a l  
and the  d u p l ic a t io n  of  c e r t a in  e s s e n t i a l  f e a tu re s  and 
a t t r i b u t e s  a re  always in a s h i f t i n g  context  of  non- 
e s s e n t i a l s  .
The genera l  category o r  c h a rac te r  type which I c a l l  the 
Good-Natured Man has been p a r t i a l l y  defined in  the  preceding 
c h ap te r .  The term "good nature"  un l ike  "sen t im en ta l , "  
never l o s t  i t s  p o s i t i v e  moral connotation in  the e igh teen th  
cen tu ry .  As a genera l  and a b s t r a c t  concept, i t  included 
in i t s  meaning a complex of  ideas having to do with the  
moral m an--pass ions , judgment, v i r t u e ,  e t c .  Of course,  
the a t t i t u d e  toward good na tu re  and the Good-Natured Man 
f lu c tu a te d  with  the  emphasis given to the  term. l-Tnen 
aspec ts  of good n a tu r e ,  l i k e  th e  ideas of " the  n a tu r a l , "  
o f  innocence and u n s o p h i s t i c a t io n ,  and of  f e e l in g ,  a re  
exaggerated out  of  proper p ropor t ion ,  the  term was, as 
John Hughes poin ted  out  in  th e  Specta tor  f o r  November 1, 
1712, "rendered Suspicious ,  and in danger o f  being 
t r a n s fe r r e d  from i t s  o r i g in a l  Sense, to so d i s t a n t  an
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idea as th a t  o f  F o l ly . "  F ie ld in g  a l s o  shared the  concern 
t h a t  "Several  words in  a l l  Languages have, with grea t  
I n j u s t i c e  been wrested and p e rve r ted  . . . , and by long 
Use and Corruption,  been brought to Convey ideas fore ign  
to t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  S i g n i f i c a t i o n . "  In h is  essay on good 
na tu re  in the  Champion for  March 27, 1740, he attempted 
to  expose th e  fa l s e  meanings t h a t  th rea tened  to  d i s c r e d i t  
the  c o n c e p t . O n e  evidence t h a t  good n a tu re  escaped being 
"wrested and perver ted"  from i t s  " o r ig in a l  S ig n i f ic a t io n "  
is  t h a t  when F ie ld in g  wrote h i s  s a t i r i c a l  essay in  the  
Covent- Garden Journal  fo r  January 14, 1752, in  which he 
included a "Modern Glossary" o f  terms "a t  p resen t  g rea t ly  
in  Use," he did not l i s t  good na tu re  along with such words 
and d e f i n i t i o n s  as Temperance, "want-of S p i r i t " ;  Vir tue  
and Vice, "Subjects  o f  Discourse" ;  Gallantry ,  "Forn ica t ion  
and Adultery";  Worth, "Power, Rank, Wealth."^
In  the  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  e ig h tee n th -cen tu ry  England, the 
Good-Natured Man is  always presen ted  sym pa the t ica l ly ,  but 
he r a r e l y  i f  ever  embodies f u l l y  the  moral id ea l  o f  the 
author  or o f  the  c h a ra c te r  h im se l f .  This i s  c e r t a i n l y  
t r u e  in  the  works o f  Henry F ie ld in g ,  v;ho without a doubt 
was the  preeminent a r t i s t  of  good na tu re .  I t  is  abundantly 
c l e a r  in  h is  d i s c u r s iv e  w r i t in g  th a t  he was well  aware of
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the  d i f f e r e n c e  between "goodness a lone,  unsupported by 
so c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o r  prudence or  the  h igher  moral 
imperative of  r e l ig io n "  and t r u e  g rea tn es s ,  the  "t ru e  
Sublime in  Human Nature" which i s  " the  Union of  a good 
Heart with a good Head."^ This concept of the "t ru e  
Sublime in  Human Nature" is both a moral and, in  F i e ld i n g ' s  
mind, s o c i a l  i d e a l .  And in much of  what F ie ld ing  says 
about "good breeding" in  the Essay on Conversation and 
what he says about "good-nature" in  "Of True Greatness ,"
"Of Good-Nature," M  Essay on the  Knowledge of the 
Characters  of  Men, and the  essay fo r  March 27, 1740, in  
the  Champion, he seems to  have th i s  i d e a l  in  mind, not 
simply good na tu re  without  " p a r t s . "  Thus, i t  i s  p oss ib le  
to draw from these  works a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  idea l  Good- 
Natured Man. J u s t  as Shaftesbury brought toge the r  the  
l a t i t u d i n a r i a n  ideas about benevolent  human na tu re ,  the  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  view of  e th i c s ,  and the  new world-view of 
sc ience  and incorpora ted  them in to  h is  e th i c a l  theory.  
F ie ld ing  draws on the  c l a s s i c a l  ph i losophers ,  the  
L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s , and th e  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  moral 
phi losophers  f o r  h is  concept o f  good n a tu re .  Thus, he 
provides b e t t e r  than anyone e l s e  a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  c l e a r  
concept o f  good n a tu re  by which a l l  good-natured cha rac te r s
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can be both i d e n t i f i e d  and judged.
The following passages are o f fe red  to  provide a
working d e f i n i t i o n  of good nature , not a comprehensive
one. In  the  wake of the  exce l len t  c r i t i c a l  s tu d ies  tha t
have t raced  F i e l d i n g ' s  conception of  good nature  to  i t s
var ious  sources in  the  l a t i tu d i n a r i a n - b e n e v o l i s t  t r a d i t i o n , .
the  co n ven t io n a l i ty  and indebtedness o f  F ie ld ing  in  these
sta tements  seems p a te n t ly  o b v i o u s T h e r e f o r e ,  I  o f fe r
them without comment.
In the poem (verse  essay) "Of Good-Nature" Fie ld ing
t r i e s  to  def ine  the  essence of good n a tu re ,  the  t ru e
mark of t h i s  v i r t u e ,  so th a t  i t  can be d is t in gu ish ed
from feigned good n a tu re :
IVhat by the  Name, then ,  sh a l l  be understood?
What? but the  g lo r io u s  Lust o f  doing Good?
The Heart t h a t  f inds  i t  Happiness to p lease .
Can fee l  a n o th e r ' s  Pain ,  and t a s t e  h is  Ease.
The Cheek t h a t  with ano ther 's  Joy can glow,
Turn pa le ,  and s icken  with a n o th e r ' s  Woe;
Free from Contempt and Envy, he who deems 
J u s t l y  o f  L i f e ' s  two opposite  Extremes.
Who to make a l l  and each Man t r u l y  b l e s t .
Doth a l l  he can, and wishes a l l  the  res t?^
In M  Essay on the  Knowledge of the  Characters  o f  Men
Fie ld ing  says: "Good-nature is t h a t  benevolent and amiable
temper o f  mind, which disposes us to  f e e l  the misfor tunes ,
and enjoy the  happiness of  o thers ;  and consequently ,  pushes
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us on to promote the  l a t t e r ,  and prevent the  former; 
and th a t  without any a b s t r a c t  contemplation on the beauty 
o f  v i r t u e ,  and without the  allurements  or  t e r r o r s  of 
r e l i g i o n . A n d  in  the essay in  the  Champion fo r  March 
27, 1740, Fie ld ing  defines  good na tu re ,  p a r t l y  by negation 
in  order  to  counter f a l s e  meanings, as ”a Delight in the  
Happiness o f  Mankind, and a Concern at t h e i r  Misery, 
with  a Desire ,  as much as p o ss ib le ,  to procure the  former, 
and aver t  t h e  l a t t e r ;  and t h i s ,  with a constant  regard to 
D e s e r t . ” I t  " i s  not th a t  weakness, which, without D i s t in c t io n ,  
a f f e c t s  both the Virtuous and the  Base," nor i s  i t  " tha t  
cowardice which prevents  us from re p e l l in g  or  resen t ing  
an in ju ry . "  And he con t inues ,  "As good-nature requires  
a d i s t in g u is h in g  f a c u l ty ,  which i s  another  word fo r  judgment, 
and i s  perhaps the  so le  boundary between wisdom and f o l ly ;  
i t  i s  impossible fo r  a fo o l ,  who hath no d i s t in gu ish in g  
f a c u l ty ,  to  be good-natured."^^
These passages provide a f a i r l y  concise  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  good na ture  as an a b s t r a c t  i d e a l .  That t h i s  idea l  is  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e ,  in  a v i t a l  and v iab le  way, in the  e ighteenth  
cen tury  i s  a t t e s t e d  to in th e  following d iscuss ions  of  
o th e r  w r i t e r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  Goldsmith and Sterne  who also 
s e t  fo r th  t h e i r  e th i c a l  theory  and moral idea l ism  in
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exposi tory  w r i t in g .  This id e a l  i s  im p l i c i t  in many imagi­
n a t iv e  l i t e r a r y  works but not  f u l l y  embodied in any s in g le  
c h a rac te r ,  un less  perhaps in  the  n a r r a t o r .  As a " rea l"  
f i c t i o n a l  c h a ra c te r  in  e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  novels ,  p lays ,  
and essays the  Good-Natured Man type is  defined by two 
extremes. At one extreme th e  Good-Natured Man is  an 
innocent,  simple, warm-hearted, generous,  unsuspecting 
c h a rac te r  u t t e r l y  devoid o f  v a n i ty  and a f f e c t a t i o n .
Like Adam before  the  f a l l ,  t h e r e  is  no e v i l  in him and 
no unders tanding o f  e v i l .  Because he does not recognize 
a r t i f i c e  o r  unders tand the  t r u e  na tu re  of  h i s  so c ie ty ,  
h is  values and ac t io ns  a re  o f t e n  inap p ro p r ia te ,  according 
to a s o c i a l  code, to h is  r e a l i t y .  At the  o th e r  extreme 
is  the  "a f fec ted"  Good-Natured Man who is  not  t r u ly  good 
in any moral sense and who i s  not d is t in gu ish ed  by his  
humanity and u n iv e r s a l  f r i e n d s h ip ,  but who i s  r a th e r  a 
sent imenta l  foo l  who goes about indulging h i s  emotions 
purely for  s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n .  His " s e n s i b i l i t y "  i s  no 
longer  moral consciousness o r  awareness of the  fee l ings  
of o thers  but merely an o ve r ly  acute  s e n s i t i v i t y  to h i s  
own emotions
Most, i f  not a l l ,  of  th e  c h a rac te r s  in e igh teen th-  
century English  l i t e r a t u r e  who a re  descr ibed  as being
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good-natured could be arranged on a continuum between 
these  two extremes. At the  former extreme the  Good- 
Natured Man lacks pe rcep t io n  of  h i s  own r e a l i t y ,  but he 
embodies a s e t  o f  va lues which evokes our admira t ion .
He represen ts  a moral id ea l  and u su a l ly  funct ions  as a 
s tandard by which to  judge s o c ie ty .  At the l a t t e r  extreme 
the  Good-Natured Man does not embody values we admire, 
and he is  s t r i c t l y  the  ob jec t  o f  our judgment, never the  
s tandard .  The Good-Natured Man in e igh teen th -cen tu ry  
English l i t e r a t u r e  may be seen as a type which develops 
in ch a rac te r  and fu nc t ion  from the  former extreme to the  
l a t t e r .
When we conceive o f  a l l  the  s p e c i f i c  good-natured 
charac te rs  in  e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  English  l i t e r a t u r e  
arranged on a continuum between th e  two extremes defined 
above rep re se n t in g  the  development of the Good-Natured 
Man as a type,  we d iscover  th a t  four major s tages  of  the  
Good-Natured Man's development a re  depicted and t r e a te d  
e x tens ive ly  by se v e ra l  a r t i s t s .  These four s tages  o f  
development I  d e s ig na te  as the  Good-Natured Man as Naif ,  
the  Good-Natured Man as Humorist, the  Good-Natured Man as 
Paragon and th e  Good-Natured Man as Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y .
The f i r s t  and l a s t  s tag es  a re  the  two extremes p a r t i a l l y
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defined above.
The s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe ren c e s  between each of  the four 
subtypes o f  t h e  Good-Natured Man a re  determined by th ree  
b a s ic  v a r i a b l e s :  m ora l i ty ,  th a t  i s ,  the  e th i c a l  theory
on which the  c h a r a c t e r  i s  based;  p e rcep t io n ;  and a r t .
I f  the  e t h i c a l  id ea ls  in  the  work wherein the  Good-Natured 
Man appears a re  s i m i l a r  to those  of  the  L a t i tu d in a r ia n s  
and Shaftesbury ,  the  Good-Natured Man's c h a r i ty ,  benevolence, 
and n a tu r a l  a f f e c t i o n s  w i l l  be j u s t i f i e d  and motivated 
by h is  moral n a tu r e  ac t ing  in  harmony with C h r is t ian  
b e l i e f  and the  na tu re  of  t h i n g s . I f  the  e th i c a l  idea ls  
of  the  work a re  s i m i l a r  to those  of  the  r a t i o n a l i s t s ,  
the  Good-Natured Man's c h a r i ty ,  benevolence,  and na tu ra l  
a f f e c t i o n s  a re  l i k e l y  to be rendered cu lpab le  i f  they are  
not always subord ina te  to  reason.  I f  the  e th i c a l  ideals  
a re  s im i l a r  to  those  of  Hume and Smith, the  Good-Natured 
Man may be por t rayed  as e c c e n t r i c  o r  absurd s ince  his  
f e e l in g s  o f  approba t ion  or  d isapproba t ion  have no abso lu te  
b a s i s  o r  san c t io n  in  the  n a tu ra l  o r  su p e rn a tu ra l .  For 
the  express ion  of  f ee l in g s  which do not c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  
to something beyond themselves becomes merely exhib i t ionism. 
For example, th e  n a i f  (who almost in v a r ia b ly  is measured 
a g a in s t  e th ic s  l i k e  those  o f  the L a t i t u d in a r i a n s  and
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Shaftesbury) and the  Man o f  S e n s i b i l i t y  (who i s  f requen t ly  
measured a g a in s t  e th i c s  l i k e  those of Hume and Smith) 
may both be f o o l s ,  but  the  n a i f  i s  a fool  f o r  God's sake, 
o r  for  goodness'  sake ,  or  fo r  m o ra l i ty ' s  sake and i s  
worthy of  some admira t ion ,  but the  Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y  i s  
a fool fo r  no good cause and is  merely r i d i c u lo u s .
I t  ha rd ly  needs to be said again t h a t  once goodness 
and fee l in g  have been separated from the  no t ions  o f  
benevolence and c h a r i t y  held by L a t i tu d in a r ian s  and 
Shaftesbury even a morally s e n s i t i v e  c h a ra c te r  may be 
content  with the  f e e l in g ,  which is  proof of h i s  good 
n a tu re ,  and lo se  the  d e s i re  to act  ou ts ide  h im se l f .
From here  i t  i s  only  a short  s tep  to  the  a f f e c t a t i o n  of 
sympathetic  f e e l in g s  in  o rd e r  to appear good-natured.
I t  i s  not necessary  to delve into the moral b a s is  
o f  every a r t i s t ' s  work in o rder  to determine the  e th ic s  
behind a c h a r a c t e r .  I t  is  r e a d i ly  apparent from the  t r e a t ­
ment of a c h a r a c t e r  in  a s p e c i f i c  work whether h i s  good 
n a tu re  is  genuinely  h i s  unaffec ted  s e l f  and whether h is  
"goodness" i s  v in d ica ted  by an absolute  s tandard o f  
m ora l i ty  in  God's w i l l  or the  na ture  of th in g s ,  o r  whether 
h i s  "goodness" i s  a f fe c te d  or  a t  bes t  r e l a t i v e ,  l a rg e ly  
determined by h i s  s o c i a l  condit ioning .  As Sheldon Sacks
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has convincingly argued in F ic t io n  and the Shape of B e l i e f , 
i t  is  the  n o v e l i s t ,  r a t h e r  than th e  s a t i r i s t  o r  apo log is t ,  
from whom the  g r e a t e s t  degree of  e t h i c a l  r ev e la t io n  is  
demanded. "Apart from any moral i n t e n t io n  he has, he 
must, i f  he wishes to wri te  a good novel,  judge cha rac te r s ,  
a c t s ,  and thoughts as part  o f  h is  r e p re s e n ta t io n ,"  and 
thereby expresses h is  own b e l i e f s ,  opinions ,  and prejudices
The second v a r i a b l e  which accounts for  d i f fe rences  
among the  four  subtypes of Good-Natured Man i s  the 
pe rcep t iveness  of  the  ch a rac te r ,  t h a t  i s ,  the  degree to  
which he unders tands s o c ie ty .  I f  he does not understand 
so c ie ty ,  he i s  e a s i l y  duped and h is  actions a re  f requent ly  
fo o l i s h  and i n e f f e c t u a l ;  i f  he has some understanding of  
so c ie ty ,  he can b e t t e r  p ro tec t  h is  own i n t e r e s t s  and more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  achieve h i s  benevolent g oa ls .  The names o f  
the  f i r s t  and t h i r d  subtypes of Good-Matured Man serve as 
an index to  th e  s o c i a l  awareness o f  the  charac te rs  in  those 
c a t e g o r i e s .
A t h i r d  v a r i a b le  is  the  a r t  o f  a c h a rac te r ,  tha t  i s ,  
the  degree to which a charac te r  who understands so c ie ty  
can con tro l  h im sel f  and the s i t u a t i o n s  in  which he f inds  
h im se l f .  I f  a c h a ra c te r  is  slow of  w i t ,  or i f  h is  emotions 
c o n s i s t e n t ly  ov e r ru le  h i s  considered judgment, o r  i f  he
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i s  co n t ro l le d  by h i s  "humour," h i s  unders tanding of  soc ie ty  
does not s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f f e c t  h i s  behaviour ,  though i t  
f requ en t ly  a f f e c t s  h is  a t t i t u d e .  On the  o th e r  hand, i f  
a c h a rac te r  can act  p rudent ly  and a r t f u l l y  without f o r f e i t i n g  
h i s  goodness, he i s  worthy o f  admirat ion by both moral and 
so c i a l  s tandards .  Of course, these  v a r i a b le s  may change 
in  the development of  a s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r .  In a moral 
romance, fo r  example, the  Good-Natured Man may beg in  as 
innocent and ignorant and may, through a journey or o ther  
r i t u a l i s t i c  experience,  ga in  unders tanding  of s o c ie ty .
But the  change i s  u sua l ly  a l a s t  page t rans fo rm a t io n  and 
the  r e a d e r ' s  acquaintance with the  c h a ra c te r  s tops  a t  the  
same time the  change i s  culminated,  as with  Tom Jones.
Thus, s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rences  among the  var ious  genuinely 
good-natured c h a ra c te r s ,  excluding those  who a f f e c t  good­
n a tu re ,  can be t raced  to t h e i r  unders tanding  o f  and 
adap ta t ion  to  so c ie ty .  The a t t r i b u t e  t h a t  they a l l  
i n v a r iab ly  share i s  of  course t h e i r  n a t u r a l  goodness.
All  a re ,  in  varying degrees , morally  admirable.
Obviously, the  Good-Natured Man as a type,  l i k e  f i c t i o n  
as a genre, i s  an a b s t r a c t i o n ,  a category imposed upon a 
group of  somewhat s im i la r  th ings  in  o rd e r  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
unders tanding .  These terms have meaning only in  r e l a t i o n
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to  s p e c i f i c  works. To say t h a t  the  Good-Natured Man as 
a type develops in  the  p a t t e r n  defined above i s ,  o f  course,  
to  impose an organizing concept upon a group o f  c h a rac te r s ,  
f o r  the  type  i t s e l f  is  nothing more than an organizing 
concept. C er ta in ly  th e re  i s  some c o r r e l a t i o n  between the  
p r e c i s e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of a s p e c i f i c  Good-Natured Man 
and the  t ime he appears ,  but the  concept of a. developing 
type,  not chronology, i s  the  o rgan iz ing  p r in c ip le  informing 
t h i s  s tudy.  VJhen t h i s  concept i s  used in r e l a t i o n  to 
s p e c i f i c  c h a ra c te r s ,  i t  does add c l a r i t y ,  j u s t  as the  
concept o f  the  p ro tag on is t s  of  the  Leathers tocking  Tales 
as one developing c h a ra c te r  adds c l a r i t y  to th a t  s e r i e s  
even though i t  v i o la t e s  the  chronology of  the  various  
c h a r a c t e r s '  appearances.
In  th e  fol lowing chapters  the  c h a ra c te r  of  the Good- 
Natured Man at  each s tag e  of  development w i l l  be descr ibed ,  
the  themes which seem inherent  in  the  Good-Natured Man 
and h i s  c o n f l i c t s  a t  each s tage  of development w i l l  be 
d iscussed ,  and th e  func t ion  of  the  Good-Natured Man at  
each s tage  o f  development both as a type and as a main 
c h a ra c te r  in  a s p e c i f i c  l i t e r a r y  work w i l l  be defined .
Notes to  Chapter II
^Of course, many of  t h e  aspec ts  of l i t e r a t u r e  th a t  
have become a s so c ia ted  with "sentimentalism" have no source 
in or r e l a t i o n  to sen t im en ta l  e th i c a l  theory or  good na ture .
In the  1740 's the word "sen t im enta l"  f i r s t  came in to  usage 
as a d e r i v a t i v e  o f  the  English  word "sentiment ."  "Sentiment" 
was f r eq uen t ly  employed by moral philosophers  and p e r io d ica l  
e s s a y i s t s  to  denote "a thought ,  a mental a t t i t u d e  of  approval 
or  d isapprova l ,  an op in ion  o r  view as to what is  r ig h t  o r  
ag reeab le ,"  and to connote a moral eva lua t ion ,  an a t t i t u d e  of  
approval or  d isapproval  from a moral point  o f  view. 
"Sentimental"  o r i g i n a l l y  meant "thought" p lus "moral," o r  
a r e f l e c t i v e  concern fo r  moral conduct or  f e e l in g .  In the  
1750's "sen t im enta l"  underwent gradual change. The h e a r t ,  
not the  head, came to be looked upon as the  p r in c ip a l  guide 
to man's v i r tuous  conduct,  and "sent imenta l"  became more 
c lo s e ly  a s so c ia te d  with  f e e l in g  and the  h e a r t  than with 
r e f l e c t i o n  and the  mind. In the  1760 's the  main connotation 
became fe e l in g  r a t h e r  than  th ink ing  morally ; "sentimental"  
came to mean c h a ra c te r i z e d  by or  exh ib i t ing  ref ined  and 
e levated  f ee l in g .  Since e x h ib i t in g  fee l in g  became the  
in d ic a t io n  o f  moral goodness, the  p re s e n ta t io n  in  l i t e r a r y  
works of  f ee l in g  la b e le d  as "sentimenta l"  which was a ffec ted  
or  indecorous to and unwarranted by r e a l i t y  crea ted  the 
p e jo r a t i v e  meaning fo r  the  term. (Erik  Erametsa, A Study 
of the  Word "Sent im enta l" and Other L in g u is t i c  C h a r a c te r i s t i c s  
of  E ighteenth  Century' Sentimentalism, in England ^/Helsinki: 
Hels ingin  L i ik e k i r j a p a in o  Gy, 1951_/, pp. 23-51 and passim.)
When the  des ig n a t io n  " sen t im enta l  comedy" came into  
usage in the  1750's ,  i t  meant "comedy dep ic t ing  a moral way 
of  th ink ing  and a c t i n g . "  In the  modern c r i t i c a l  use of 
"sen t im enta l"  as a l a b e l  f o r  a work or group of works, e . g . ,  
sen t im enta l  comedy, i t  could mean one or a l l  of severa l  
th in g s :  t h a t  the work or  works support  sent imenta l  e th i c a l
theory ,  t h a t  they deal  with  a moral problem, th a t  they 
appeal to the  emotions more than  to the  i n t e l l e c t ,  th a t  
they con ta in  the  idea o f  e s s e n t i a l  goodness o r  p e r f e c t a b i l i t y  
of  human n a tu re ,  t h a t  they e x h ib i t  p r iv a te  v i r t u e s  r a th e r  
than expose v ices ,  t h a t  they s o l i c i t  t e a r s  and admiration 
fo r  the  su f fe r in g s  and a c t io n s  o f  the  good and v i r tu o u s ,
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th a t  they par take  o f  the  a r t i f i c i a l ,  the exaggerated, or  the  
inprobable .  (Arthur Sherbo, English  Sentimental Drama 
_/East Lansing: Michigan S ta te  Univers i ty  P re s s ,  1957_/, p. 13.) 
In o th e r  words, the  terra could apply to the  theme, c h a r a c te r s ,  
s t r u c t u r e ,  and tone of  a work or works o r  to  any one of  these .
For purposes o f  t h i s  paper ,  when the  word "sentimental"  
i s  used in r e l a t i o n  to  a work, i t  r e f e r s  to  the  tone o f  the  
work ( the  a t t i t u d e  o f  the  author)  o r  to the  romantic n a r r a t iv e  
s t r u c t u r e  ( the  un i ro n ic  p o r t r a y a l  of  the d e s i rab le  and the  
i d e a l  as the  a t t a i n a b l e  and r e a l ) . To the  extent  th a t  the  
tone of a work u n i r o n i c a l l y  supports  sent imental  e th ics  in  
i t s  ch a rac te r s  and themes i t  i s  " sen t im en ta l" ;  to  the ex ten t  
t h a t  i t  r i d i c u l e s  sen t im en ta l  e th ic s  in i t s  t reatment of  
c h a rac te r s  and themes i t  i s  s a t i r i c a l  or i r o n i c .  Usual ly, 
however, " sen t im enta l"  w i l l  be defined in  con tex t .
2The S p e c ta to r , ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon 
P re s s ,  1965), IV, 370.
^The Champion, January 12, 1739/1740, in  William 
Ernest  Henley, ed . ,  The Complete Works of Henry F ie ld in g ,
Esq. (New York: Croscup and S t e r l i n g ,  1902; r p t .  New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1967),  XV, 150.
^Works, XV, 256-260.
5Works, XIV, 88-92.
^Preface to M i s c e l l a n i e s , by Henry F ie ld ing ,  Esq.; in 
Three Volumes (3v . ,  London, 1743), I ,  x x v i i i -x x ix ,  quoted 
in  Henry K. M i l le r ,  Essays on F ie ld in g ' s  Miscellan ies  
(Pr inceton :  P r ince to n  U n iv e rs i ty  Press ,  1961), p. 47.
^The s tu d ies  I  have in  mind are :  R. S. Crane’s
"Suggest ions Toward a Genealogy of  the  ' Man of  F e e l in g '" ;
James A. Work's "Henry F ie ld in g ,  C h r i s t ia n  Censor," in  
The Age of  Johnson: Essays Presented to Chauncey Brewster
Tinker (New Haven: Yale U n iv e rs i ty  Press ,  1949), pp. 139-148;
Martin  C. B a t t e s t i n ’s The Moral Basis of F ie ld in g ' s  Art :
A Study o f  Joseph Andrews ; Henry K. M i l l e r ' s  Essays on 
F i e ld i n g ' s  M isce l lan ie s  ; S tu a r t  M. Tave's The Amiable 
Humorist : A Study in  the  Comic Theory and Cri t ic ism  of  the
Eighteenth  and Early N ine teenth  Centuries (Chicago: Chicago 
U n iye rs i ty  P re ss ,  1960).
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^M i s c e l l a n i e s , I ,  16, quoted in H. K. M i l le r ,  pp. 56-57.
^Works, XIV, 285.
The s ta tement th a t  good na ture  disposes us to promote 
the  happiness o f  o thers  without the '’a l lurements  and t e r r o r s  
of r e l i g i o n , "  quoted in  the  present  context might lead one 
to assume t h a t  F ie ld in g ,  l ik e  Shaftesbury and o th e r  moral 
ph i lo sophers ,  be l ieved  in  the autonomy of  e th i c s .  H. K.
M i l le r  in  Essays on F ie ld in g ' s  M isce l lan ies  and o ther  c r i t i c s  
have shown t h a t  F ie ld ing  "never doubted th a t  the  C h r i s t i a n  
r e l i g i o n  as he understood i t  was the u l t im a te  b as is  of  
moral behav ior .  . . . Good-nature (or ,  in  e f f e c t ,  v i r t u e ,  
benevolence,  c h a r i ty )  and r e l i g io n  were complimentary 
moral fo rce s ,  to g e th e r  c o n s t i tu t in g  the  very ’bands of  
c i v i l  s o c ie ty '  ; and of  the  two, r e l i g i o n  went beyond good­
n a tu re ,  both in  g iv ing  promise of  a l i f e  to come and 
in s p i r in g  a more sublime moral i ty  than could any mere human 
pass ion ."  F ie ld in g  did share many of th e  b e l i e f s  he ld  by 
Shaftesbury ,  most notably  tha t  man had a sense of  r i g h t  
and wrong, an tecedent  to r e l ig io u s  b e l i e f ,  but whereas 
Shaftesbury argued th a t  t h i s  moral sense ex is ted  independ­
e n t ly  of  r e l i g i o n .  F ie ld ing  held tha t  t h e  o r ig in a l  notions 
had been implanted by God and were thus i d e n t i f i e d  with 
r e l i g io u s  im pera t ives .  (Henry K. M i l le r ,  Essays on F i e ld in g ' s  
M i s c e l l a n i e s , pp. 71-72.)
^°Works, XV, 258.
^^Paul E. P a r n e l l ' s  d e f in i t i o n  of the  " s e n t im en ta l i s t "  
as b a s i c a l l y  an e g o i s t i c  ch a rac te r  who i s  cons tan t ly  r a t i o n ­
a l i z i n g  h i s  moral ly  ambiguous ac t ions  and exclaiming over 
the  b eau t ie s  o f  v i r t u e  in  order  to be ab le  to th in k  of 
himself  as v i r tu o u s  f i t s  the Good-Natured Man a t  t h i s  l a t t e r  
extreme, and only  a t  t h i s  extreme ("The Sentimental  Mask," 
PMLA. 78 A 9 6 3 / ,  529-535) .
t^The i t a l i c i z e d  words are  c a r e f u l ly  chosen so as not 
to imply d i r e c t  in f luence  or a one to one r e l a t i o n s h i p .  By 
1740 the  benevolent  view of man and the ideas of  good na tu re  
sumimarized in  Chapter One of t h i s  paper had become widely 
disseminated and could be picked up without  ever reading 
any of the  d iv ines  o r  phi losophers .  Moreover, I  am not 
i n t e r e s t e d  a t  p re sen t  in t r ac in g  the sources of the e th i c a l  
conceptions o f  t h e  w r i t e r s  discussed in  t h i s  paper.
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l ^F ic t io n  and the  Shape of B e l i e f ; A Study of Henry 
F ie ld ing  (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n iv e rs i ty  o f  C a l i fo rn ia
P re ss ,  1964), p. 271.
Chapter II I
The Good-Natured Man as Naif :  The Moral Aspect
The very t i t l e  good-natured n a i f  i n d ic a t e s  the 
s t reng ths  and weaknesses of  the  c h a rac te r s  to  which i t  
r e f e r s .  The n a i f s  a re  innocent,  simple ,  warm-hearted, 
generous, unsuspec t ing ,  u t t e r l y  devoid of v a n i ty  and 
a f f e c t a t i o n ,  and, in  s h o r t ,  have " th a t  open D ispos i t ion ,  
which is  the  su re s t  I n d ic a t io n  o f  an honest and upright  
H e a r t . T h e i r  a c t io n s  a re  unashamedly generous, 
spontaneous, and u n a f fe c te d ,  and s ince  they can understand 
in  o thers  only t h a t  which they con ta in  in themselves,  they 
have no unders tanding o f  e v i l  and do not recognize  a r t i f i c e .  
Therefore, they unconscious ly  p resen t  both th e  moral and 
naive q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e i r  good na tu re  with g la r in g  boldness.  
Among the four  types of  the  Good-Natured Man t r e a te d  in  
t h i s  study th e  n a i f  i s  the  most f requent  in  occurrence,  
most v e r s a t i l e  in fu n c t io n ,  and most ambiguous in treatment.
F ie ld ing  c rea ted  more f u l l y  developed, memorable, 
and lovable  good-natured n a i f s  than any o th e r  w r i t e r .
He a sse r ted  in  the  p re face  to the  M isc e l lan ie s  th a t  
"Benevolence, Honour, Honesty, and Char i ty ,  make a good
61
62
Man; . . . P a r t s ,  courage, a re  the  e f f i c i e n t  Q u a l i t i e s  of  
a Great Man."^ IVhatever the  reason,  and many have been 
convincingly  proposed. F ie ld in g  l im i t s  h imself  in  h i s  
w r i t in g  to c rea t in g  v a r i a t i o n s  on th e s e  two c la sses  of 
men and never t r i e s  to  embody in  a s in g l e  c h a ra c te r  h i s  
id e a l  o f  " t ru e  g r e a t n e s s " - - th e  man both good and g rea t  
which he defines in h is  ve rse  essay "Of True Greatness"  
and elsewhere.  This i d e a l ,  defined  in  the  preceding 
c h ap te r ,  i s  im p l ic i t  in  a l l  o f  F i e l d i n g ' s  works. Mr. 
Boncour, H ear t f ree ,  Joseph i\ndrews, Parson Adams, Tom 
Jones ,  Squire Allworthy, Booth, and Dr. Harrison a re  a l l  
good-natured men who f a l l  sho r t  o f  the  " t ru e  Sublime in 
Human Nature" p a r t l y  because the  id ea l  is incapable  of  
being t r a n s l a t e d  in to  the  r e a l ,  but mainly because they 
la c k  s u f f i c i e n t  q u a l i ty  of " g re a tn e s s , "  th a t  i s ,  " P a r t s . "  
Obviously, Squire Allworthy and Dr. Harrison have more 
s o c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  knowledge, and a r t  than do any o f  
the  o th e r  c h a rac te r s ,  and they w i l l  r ece ive  f u l l e r  
t rea tm ent  in another chap te r .  The o th e r  charac te rs  are  
n a i f s .
Obviously th e re  a re  numerous o th e r  good-natured 
ch a ra c te r s  in e ig h teen th -cen tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e  who f i t  the  
n a i f  subtype. And s ince  F i e l d i n g ' s  ch a rac te r s  and works
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have rece ived  so much c r i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n ,  I choose to 
concen tra te  in  t h i s  chapter  p r im ar i ly  upon ones th a t  
more r e a d i ly  y ie ld  up f resh  in s ig h t s  as well  as a 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  c h a ra c te r  and func t ion  of  the  good- 
natured n a i f .
The Good-Natured Man appears ,  with few exceptions
3
in comic n a r r a t i v e s .  Reasons fo r  t h i s  a re  no doubt 
m u l t i tu d in o u s .  Some probable  causes a re  t h a t  the  divines 
and phi losophers  presented th e  Good-Natured Man as a comic 
hero in  t h e i r  polemics, t h a t  drama had a long t r a d i t i o n  
of employing ch a rac te r s  s i m i l a r  to  the  Good-Natured Man 
in minor comic ro le s  (buffoons,  r u s t i c s ,  country bumpkins), 
and t h a t  the  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  emphasis on the  un iversa l  
r a th e r  than the  p a r t i c u l a r ,  on so c ie ty  r a t h e r  than the  
in d iv id u a l ,  caused the  comic mode which r e f l e c t s  the 
permanence and the  t y p i c a l i t y  o f  human experience to f lo u r i sh  
b e t t e r  than the  t r a g i c  mode which r e f l e c t s  the  f i n a l i t y  and 
uniqueness o f  human experience.  Wliatever the  reasons, the  
f a c t  remains.  I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, the  cha rac te r  type in  
n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry  American l i t e r a t u r e  which R. W. B. Lewis 
labe ls  the  American Adam^ i s  very s im i l a r  to the good- 
natured n a i f  but almost in v a r ia b ly  appears in  a t r a g i c  
n a r r a t i v e .  The e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  English  ch a rac te r  has
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never,  so fa r  as I  know, been recognized as an influence 
on th e  shaping of th e  n in e tee n th -ce n tu ry  American charac te r ,  
but the  s t r i k in g  resemblance between them leads one to 
suspect  th a t  the re  a re  debts ye t  to  be acknowledged.
F ie ld in g ’ s Joseph Andrews (1742),  Tom Jones (1749), 
and Goldsmith 's  The Vicar  o f  Wakefield (1766) a re  comic 
n a r r a t iv e s  and t h a t  a lone is  s u f f i c i e n t  in d ic a t io n  that  
th ese  works a re  not p r im a r i ly  about the " l i f e  and opinions" 
of  the  charac te rs  mentioned i n  t h e  t i t l e s ,  but about the  
meaning of  l i f e  which a r i s e s  from the  s t a t i c ,  c en t ra l  
c h a r a c te r s '  encounters with s t a t i c ,  t y p ic a l  s o c i e t i e s .
Maynard Mack has expressed well  the  e f f e c t  of  the  comic 
po in t  o f  view upon ch a rac te r s  : "We are usu a l ly  aware with
comic charac ters  t h a t  we are  looking around them as well 
as a t  them," because "comedy p re sen t s  us with l i f e  apprehended 
in  the  form of  sp e c ta c le  r a t h e r  than in the  form of  experience."  
Our po in t  of  view i s  "not in s id e  the charac te r  but ou ts ide  
him, in  a p os i t io n  t h a t  compels us to  observe d iscrepancies  
between the  persuas ive  su r faces  o f  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  as they 
see  themselves and th e se  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  as they a re .  Thus 
the  po in t  of  view t h a t  ours must be continuous with in 
comedy is  not the c h a r a c t e r s ’ but  the  a u th o r ' s .  . . . The 
comic a r t i s t  subordina tes  the  p re s e n ta t io n  of  l i f e  as
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experience,  where the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  between ourselves and 
the  c h a ra c te r s  experiencing  i t  is  th e  primary one, to 
the p re s e n ta t io n  of  l i f e  as sp e c ta c le ,  where the primary 
re l a t i o n s h ip  i s  between h imself  and us as onlookers ."
In comic n a r r a t iv e s  t h e  na i f  may be t r ea te d  e i t h e r  
se n t im en ta l ly ,  or i r o n i c a l l y ,  or  bo th .  The good-natured 
n a i f  is  almost always to some degree an ob jec t  of  s a t i r e  
because he is  something o f  a m is f i t  in  h is  soc ie ty  and 
i s  unaware t h a t  he is  d i f f e r e n t  from anyone e ls e .  Of 
course,  the  very f a c t  t h a t  he does appear somewhat 
r id ic u lo u s ,  i s  in p a r t  a condemnation of soc ie ty  and 
makes i t  the  c h ie f  ob jec t  of  r i d i c u l e .  Fie lding has 
pointed out in  h is  p re face  to  Joseph Andrews, as has 
Congreve in  h i s  d e d ic a t io n  to  The Way of the  World, and 
Shadwell in  d e d ica t io n  to The V ir tuoso , th a t  "The only 
source o f  the  t ru e  Ridiculous  . . .  i s  a f f e c t a t i o n , "  
which proceeds from van i ty  and hypocrisy .^  Therefore,  
the good-natured n a i f  evokes laugh te r  and sympathy and 
un l ike  so c ie ty  never simply scornful  r i d i c u l e .  However, 
one must confine  h imself  to  a very narrow d e f i n i t i o n  of  
r i d i c u l e  i f  he argues t h a t  the  good-natured n a i f  is never 
the  ob jec t  of r i d i c u l e  in F ie ld ing .  A workable d e f i n i t i o n  
of  r i d i c u l e  i s  provided by Adam Ferguson in I n s t i t u t e s  of
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Moral Philosophy (1769), "R id icu le  is  a sentiment of 
d isapprobat ion ,  mixed with m ir th  and p le a sa n t ry .  A s  the  
sentiment of  d isapprobat ion  predominates, r i d i c u l e  approaches 
to  scorn. As the  sentiment of p lea sa n t ry  predominates, i t  
approaches to m ir th  and may even be mixed with tenderness ."^
Since the proper e v a lu a t io n  of and a t t i t u d e  toward 
th e  good-natured n a i f  i s  the  one held by the  author ,  i t  is 
impossible  to a r r i v e  a t  a c o r r e c t  unders tanding ,  o r  a 
j u s t  a p p ra i s a l ,  o f  a work in  which the  n a i f  i s  a major 
f ig u re  without f i r s t  a s c e r t a in in g  the w r i t e r ' s  a t t i t u d e  
toward h is  c h a ra c te r .  However, the re  has been much 
disagreement over F i e ld i n g ' s  and Goldsmith 's  a t t i t u d e s  
toward t h e i r  good-natured comic heroes.  Because of  various 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  the  tone in  The Vicar of  Wakefield, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  a u th o r ' s  a t t i t u d e  toward Dr. Primrose, 
t h e r e  have been d iverse  and co n t ra d ic to ry  sta tements about 
the  funct ion  of  the  Good-Natured Man and consequently about 
the  a r t i s t i c  q u a l i ty  o f  the  work. The same is  t r u e  in  
regard  to Goldsmith 's  p lay .  The Good- Natur 'd  Man (1768).
Almost a l l  c r i t i c i s m  o f  The Good-Natur 'd  Man and 
The Vicar  of  Wakefield has analyzed and evaluated them, 
not as separa te  and complete ve rba l  s t r u c tu r e s  whose 
i n t e r n a l  meanings a re  more important than t h e i r  ex te rna l
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meanings, but as i l l u s t r a t i o n s  o f  or u n i t s  in  Goldsmith 's  
campaign a g a in s t  sen t im ent .  Yet, the  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n  of both works i s  t h a t  they are  sen t im en ta l .^  The 
t r a d i t i o n a l  c r i t i c a l  judgment, then ,  i s  t h a t  s ince  his  
p r a c t i c e  c o n t r a d ic t s  h is  dramatic  theory and h is  customary 
a n t i - s e n t im e n ta l  s tan ce ,  Goldsmith has f a i l e d  to accomplish 
h is  purpose and h is  worka lac k  cons is tency .
More re c e n t ly  the s a t i r i c a l  elements of  the  works 
have been s t r e s s e d .  Robert B. Heilman and W. F. Gallaway, 
J r .  have argued t h a t  the  sen t im enta l  elements o f  The 
Good Matur 'd  Man a re  included to  be r i d i c u l e d  and t h a t ,  
as the  t i t l e  implies .  Goldsmith 's  fundamental purpose i s  
to r i d i c u l e  extravagance d isgu ised  as g e n e ro s i ty  and 
g u l l i b i l i t y  masked as u n iv e r s a l  benevolence.^  Robert H. 
Hopkins has argued t h a t  readers  have been m is in te r p re t in g  
The Vicar o f  Wakefield f o r  over  175 years and t h a t  the  work 
is  a s a t i r e  of Dr. Primrose and his  family from beginning 
to e n d T h e s e  gentlemen provide much needed c o r r e c t iv e s  
to the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  these  works. Of course ,  they 
discover much more a r t i s t i c  u n i ty  than the  e a r l i e r  c r i t i c s  
had. But they a re  c o n t ro l le d  in  t h e i r  analyses by the  
b e l i e f  t h a t  an a n t i - s e n t im e n ta l  hab i t  of  mind e x i s t s  
throughout Goldsmith 's  works and th a t  the  presence  of  any
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sentiment in  h is  work would mean t h a t  he "had not s u f f i c i e n t  
con tro l  of  h is  m a te r ia l s  to avoid the  very th ing  he 
a t t a c k e d . T h e y  f ind no sen t im ent .  This e i t h e r / o r  
choice between a sen t im enta l  ( i . e . ,  un ironic)  and a 
s a t i r i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  has co n t in u a l ly  hampered c r i t i c a l  
study of The Good N atu r 'd  Man and The Vicar of Wakefield .
I  r e a d i ly  agree  t h a t  Dr. Primrose and Young Honeywood 
a re  s a t i r i z e d  throughout The Vicar  of Wakefield and The 
Good N atur 'd  Man. I  a lso  a s s e r t  th a t  Joseph Andrews,
Parson Adams, Tom Jones and many o the r  good-natured n a i f s  
are  s a t i r i z e d .  The f o l l i e s  fo r  which the good-natured 
n a i f  is  r i d i c u le d  r e s u l t  from h is  f a u l ty  percep t ion .
Because he does not understand the  t rue  nature  o f  his  
so c ie ty ,  h i s  values and a c t io n s  a re  inappropr ia te ,  according 
to  the  s o c i a l  code. He never quest ions whether h i s  id e a ls  
a re  workable o r  whether h i s  techniques ,  his  means of. 
r e a l i z i n g  h is  id ea ls  in  r e a l i t y ,  a re  e f f i c i e n t .  But s ince  
th e  good-natured n a i f  na ive ly  b e l ieves  th a t  everyone e l s e  
shares h is  idea ls  and h i s  open and honest means of achieving 
them, he i s  completely out of  s tep with s o c i e ty .  He rea c t s  
to  appearance as h i s  good na tu re  and s e n s i b i l i t y  d i c t a t e  
in  a so c ie ty  where one succeeds by co n t ro l l in g  r e a l i t y  by 
a r t  and i n t e l l e c t .
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Not only does th e  good-natured n a i f  not understand 
s o c ie ty ,  he does not unders tand h im self .  He cannot 
pe rce ive ,  as those around him may, t h a t  h is  unconscious 
motives are  f r e q u e n t ly  in c o n s i s te n t  with h is  a c t io ns .  
Honeywood recognizes h i s  own in c o n s is te n c ie s  a t  the  end 
of  The Good Natur 'd  Man: " I  now too p la in ly  perceive  my
e r r o r s .  My v an i ty ,  in  a t tempting  to  p lease  a l l ,  by fearing 
to offend any. My meanness in  approving f o l l y ,  l e s t  fools 
should disapprove.  Henceforth,  th e re fo re ,  i t  sh a l l  be 
my study to reserve  my p i ty  fo r  r e a l  d i s t r e s s ;  my f r i e n d ­
ship fo r  t r u e  m er i t ,  and my love fo r  he r ,  who f i r s t  taught
T O
me what i t  is  to be happy .” And Robert Hopkins f inds
s u b s t a n t i a l  evidence to  support  h i s  argument tha t  Dr.
Primrose is  very m a t e r i a l i s t i c .  Dr.-Primrose con s i s ten t ly
1equates e a r th ly  p r o s p e r i t y  with God's grace.  And he gets 
a g rea t  deal  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and s e c u r i t y  from the verse  
in Psalms which he g ives  in  p lace  o f  money to his  son 
George when he sends him away from home, " I  have been 
young, and now am o ld ;  yet never saw I the r ighteous man 
forsaken,  or  h is  seed begging t h e i r  b read” (IV, 26).
Thus, the  good-natured n a i f  i s  open to r i d i c u le  fo r  h is  
incons is tency  not only with the  s o c i a l  code but a lso  with 
h i s  own moral code. But th e re  i s  no ind ic a t io n  t h a t  any
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of  the  na i f s  ever consciously  ac t  from unworthy motives. 
Therefore ,  they a re  gen tly  s a t i r i z e d  for  being morally 
in co n s is te n t  but a re  not judged to be ev i l  persons who 
consciously  cover base motives with the  appearance of 
r ig h te o u sn e s s .
Thus, both the  so c ia l  and moral s tandards for  
judging the good-natured n a i f  show him to  lack  perception .
But the  soc ia l  code measures h is  e f f i c ie n cy  and judges 
him to be a foo l ,  and the  moral code evaluated h is  conscious 
motives and judges him to be a man o f  good c h a rac te r .
Robert Heilman and Robert Hopkins assumed th a t  the 
purpose of  The Good Natur 'd  Man and The Vicar o f  Wakefield 
was merely to make the  Good-Natured Man r id ic u lo u s  when 
measured by the s o c i a l  code o r  by his  own moral code. For 
t h a t  reason n e i th e r  has seen the  happy endings o f  these 
works o r  the a t t i t u d e s  of the  prudent and admirable 
paragon f igures  toward the good-natured n a i f  to be s ig n i f ic a n t  
I contend th a t  these  aspects  of  the  works a re  c r u c i a l  to an 
understanding of th e  a r t i s t i c  un i ty  and consequently  of the 
themes of  both works.
The happy endings have been accounted for  in  various  
ways, but never, to  my knowledge, have they been seen as 
a p a r t  of  the n a tu r a l ,  organic development of  the  works.
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For example, fo r  some the  conventional  s t r u c t u r e  of comedy 
i s  adequate explanat ion  fo r  the  ending of The Good Natur 'd  
Man, and th e  au th o r ’ s d e s i r e  to  p le a se  the  sent im enta l  
t a s t e s  of h is  readers i s  adequate reason fo r  the  ending 
o f  The Vicar  of  Wakefield . I agree t h a t ,  as is ty p ica l  
of  comic n a r r a t i v e ,  t h e r e  is no d i r e c t  causal  connection 
between th e  ac t ions  of  the  good-natured n a i f  and the  happy 
endings.  But the  endings are  j u s t i f i e d  by and grow n a tu r a l ly  
out o f  the  n a r r a t iv e ,  fo r  i t  i s  th e  s o c i a l  hero ,  the  Good- 
Natured Man as paragon, who has th e  a b i l i t y  to  recognize 
th e  f o l l y  o f  th e  good-natured n a i f  and to unders tand and 
c o n tro l  r e a l i t y  who comes to the  r escue .  The appropr ia te  
ques t ion  i s  not whether o r  not th e  endings a re  probable, 
but  r a t h e r  how the endings a f f e c t  the  meaning of the  works.
The f a c t  th a t  the  most admirable c h a rac te r s  in  the  
works ( S i r  William T hornh i l l  i n  The Vicar  of Wakefield and 
S i r  William Honeywood in  The Good N atur 'd  Man) respec t  and 
help  rescue  the  good-natured n a i f  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  to  the  
theme of both works in  two ways. F i r s t ,  i t  rea f f i rm s  the 
i d e a l s  and values o f  th e  good-natured n a i f .  S i r  William 
Honeywood i s  more reserved t h a t  S i r  William Thornh i l l  in  
h i s  p r a i s e  of the  n a i f ' s  v i r t u e s .  He acknowledges th a t  
Young Honeywood's f a u l t s  a re  "so n e a r ly  a l l i e d  to  excellence .
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t h a t  we can scarce weed out the  v ice  without e rad ica t in g
th e  v i r tu e "  (V, 20), but he does not b e l i e v e ,  as Miss
Richland does, that  "his  tende rness ,  h i s  humanity, h is
u n iv e r s a l  f r iendsh ip ,  may atone fo r  many f a u l t s "  (V, 51).
He te l ls-Young Honeywood in  th e  rescue  scene th a t  p a r a l l e l s
the  one in The Vicar o f  Wakefield :
. . . S i r ,  you a re  su rp r i sed  to see me; and I own th a t  
a d e s i r e  of  co r re c t in g  your f o l l i e s  led  me h i t h e r .  I  
saw, with ind igna t ion ,  th e  e r r o r s  of  a mind th a t  only 
sought applause from o th e r s ;  t h a t  eas iness  of d i sp o s i t io n ,  
which, tho ' i n c l i n ’d to th e  r i g h t ,  had not courage to 
condemn the  wrong. I  saw with r e g r e t  those  splendid 
e r r o r s ,  t h a t  s t i l l  took name from some neighboring duty. 
Your c h a r i ty ,  t h a t  was but i n j u s t i c e ;  your benevolence, 
t h a t  was but weakness; and your f r i en d sh ip  but c r e d u l i t y .
I  saw, with r e g r e t ,  g rea t  t a l e n t s  and ex tensive  lea rn ing ,  
only employed to  add s p r i g h t l i n e s s  to e r r o r ,  and encrease 
your p e r p l e x i t i e s .  I  saw you mind with a thousand 
n a tu r a l  charms: but  the  g rea tn ess  of i t s  beauty served
only to heighten my p i t y  fo r  i t s  p r o s t i t u t i o n .  (V. 80)
Thus, S i r  William Honeywood not only r ea f f i rm s  the values
o f  tend e rn ess ,  humanity, and u n iv e r s a l  f r i e n d sh ip ,  but a lso
c o r r e c t s  mistaken notions about them and gives ope ra t iona l
d e f i n i t i o n s  of  them. He not only rescues  the  n a i f  from
e x p lo i t a t i o n  but from being u n w i t t in g ly  the  instrument of
i n j u s t i c e .
I'Jhen S i r  William T h o rn h i l l  comes to  a id  Dr. Primrose, 
he t e l l s  George, "I am now come to see  j u s t i c e  done a 
worthy man, fo r  whom I have th e  most s in c e r e  esteem. I
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have long been a d isgu ised  s p e c t a t o r  of thy  f a t h e r ' s  
benevolence. I  have a t  h is  l i t t l e  dwelling enjoyed 
respec t  uncontaminated by f l a t t e r y  and have received th a t  
happiness th a t  courts  could not  g iv e ,  fo r  the  amusing 
s im p l i c i ty  around his  f i r e s i d e "  (IV, 168, i t a l i c s  mine). 
Thus, the  most admirable c h a ra c te r  i n  the  s to r y  by e i t h e r  
so c ia l  o r  moral s tandards has a " s in c e r e  esteem" for  the  
good-natured n a i f  and apprec ia te s  h i s  benevolence, openness, 
and s im p l i c i t y .  Moreover, the  a c t io n s  of  S i r  William 
Thornh i l l  up to  the  time of  t h i s  speech support his 
a s s e r t i o n  th a t  he has come, not  to do a benevolent ac t ,  
but to see j u s t i c e  done. And every evidence ou ts ide  the  
work in d ica te s  th a t  th e  word " j u s t i c e "  i s  c a r e f u l ly  chosen. 
In 1759 Goldsmith published h i s  essay  "On J u s t i c e  and 
Generosity" which defined j u s t i c e  in  a way th a t  amplifies 
the  meaning of S i r  William T h o r n h i l l ' s  s ta tement :  " Ju s t ice
may be def ined ,  t h a t  v i r t u e  which impels us to give to 
every person what is h i s  due. In t h i s  extended sense of 
the  word, i t  comprehends the  p r a c t i c e  of  every v i r tu e  which 
reason p resc r ib es  or  so c ie ty  should expect.  Our duty to 
our maker, to each o th e r ,  and to o u rse lv es ,  a re  fu l ly  
answered, i f  we give them what we owe them. Thus, j u s t i c e ,  
p roperly  speaking, is the  only v i r t u e ,  and a l l  the r e s t  have
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t h e i r  o r ig in  in i t "  ( I ,  406) .
Secondly, the  rescue  of  the  good-natured n a i f  by the 
s o c ia l  hero who wishes to see j u s t i c e  done tu rn s  the 
r i d i c u l e  back upon s o c ie ty .  Thus, to i n t e r p r e t  these  works 
merely as s a t i r e s  on sentiment i s  to impose a theme upon 
them. The theme which is  o r g a n ic a l ly  a p a r t  o f  the  s t r u c tu r e  
and tone of both The Good N a tu r 'd  Man and The Vicar  of 
Wakefield is  concerned with va lu e s .  Goldsmith upsets  our 
sense of  values by f i r s t  showing th a t  p resen t  r e a l i t y  
makes the  good-natured n a i f  absurd and then t h a t  the 
good-natured n a i f  makes so c ie ty  v i l l a i n o u s .  Two ways of  
l i f e  con tro l led  by two s tandards  of conduct a re  shown 
to be in  c o n f l i c t .
The c en t ra l  theme, then ,  i s  concerned with the  f a t e  
o f  goodness in modern r e a l i t y ,  and because of t h e  many 
v a r i a b le s  and in f luences  th a t  a f f e c t  the  f a t e  o f  goodness, 
both works, e sp e c ia l ly  The Vicar  of Wakefie ld, a re  ambiguous 
and ambivalent. Obviously, the  conclusions r e a f f i rm  th a t  
goodness is po ss ib le  fo r  those ,  l i k e  S i r  William Thornhil l  
and S i r  William Honeywood, who have both prudence and 
benevolence, a r t  and worthy i d e a l s ,  i n t e l l e c t  and good 
n a tu re .  But i f  the  S i r  Williams had not been p resen t  to 
render  t h e i r  s e rv ic e s ,  the  good-natured n a i f  would not
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have been judged by a moral code which judges one on the 
b a s i s  of  h i s  charac ter  and conscious motives, but  he would 
have been judged and condemned by a s o c i a l  code which 
judges one on the bas is  of h is  e f f i c i e n c y  (percep t ion  and 
a r t )  and i s  too complex fo r  the  man with  simple goodness 
and ignorant  innocence to unders tand .  The Primrose family 
would have been destroyed and Young Honeywood would have 
l e f t  the  country in  de fea t .  And the  im prob ab i l i ty  of the 
endings o f  both the  play and the  novel po in t  out  the  
im probab i l i ty  of simple goodness su rv iv ing  in  the  respective 
s o c i e t i e s ,  of  moral i ty  without i n t e l l e c t  being rewarded.
These g e n e r a l i t i e s  may be app l ied  with equal v a l id i ty  
to  Tom Jones and Joseph Andrews. However, in s tead  of  being 
rescued by a paragon within the  s to r y ,  they a re  rescued by 
the  s t o r y t e l l e r ' s  comic manipulat ion o f  p l o t .  But the  
im probab i l i ty  and th e  meanings o f  the  r e s o lu t io n s  are  
much the same. F ie ld ing  says concerning Tom Jones near  
th e  end of the novel, "so d e s t i t u t e  i s  he now of  f r ien ds ,  
and so persecuted by enemies, t h a t  we almost d e sp a i r  of 
br ing ing  him to any good" (XVII, i ;  V, 248). But Fielding, 
th e  omniscient  n a r r a to r ,  the  god and c r e a t o r  of  the  novel, 
manipulates the p lo t  so th a t  the  p r i so n  doors open for  
Tom and th e  charges aga ins t  him o f  murder, i n c e s t ,  and
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u n fa i th fu ln e s s  a r e  found to be g ro u nd les s . F ie ld in g  
takes p r ide  in  the  fac t  t h a t  he uses  " n a tu ra l  means" 
both to c r e a t e  i l l u s i o n s  in  the  minds o f  h i s  c h a rac te rs  
and audience and to s t r i p  them away, but he acknowledges 
repea ted ly  t h a t  th e  s to ry  i s  completely h is  own f a b r i c a t i o n .  
Thus, when Tom Jones ( l ik e  Joseph Andrews) d iscovers  t h a t  
he i s  a gentleman by b i r t h ,  i t  i s  implied th a t  he has 
proved h imself  to  be worthy of  t h a t  rank. Since comic 
manipulat ion o f  p lo t  makes the  discovery p o ss ib le ,  the  
im probab i l i ty  of the  discovery is  ev ident ,  and F i e ld i n g ' s  
r o l e  in seeing j u s t i c e  done is  analogous to Squire T h o r n h i l l ' s ,  
F ie ld ing  i s  f i rm ly  and s e r io u s ly  in  con tro l  of the moral 
s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  h i s  p lo ts  and charac te rs
Except in  comedy, the  way of  l i f e  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by 
s im p l i c i t y ,  innocence, and benevolence i s  doomed to 
d e s t ru c t io n  by a so c ie ty  t h a t  judges man by a s o c i a l  code 
r a t h e r  than a moral code, t h a t  values a r t  more than good 
c h a rac te r ,  t h a t  i s  dedicated  to  m a te r ia l  r a th e r  than 
a b s t r a c t  i d e a l s .  But the f a t e  of  the  n a i f  in  comic works 
i s  commensurate w ith  h is  moral d e s e r t .  The n a i f  is a ssoc ia ted  
with normal s o c i e ty  in  c o n f l i c t  with absurd so c ie ty ,  moral 
conduct in c o n f l i c t  with immoral conduct, a simple, n a tu r a l ,  
country s t y l e  of  l i f e  in  c o n f l i c t  with a c h a o t ic ,  a r t i f i c i a l .
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c i t y  s t y l e  o f  l i f e .  The comic r e s o l u t i o n  rea f f i rm s  both 
the  values a s so c ia ted  with the  n a i f ,  and preserves  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  escape from absurd, co rrup t  s o c i e ty .
Thus, the  good-natured n a i f  in th e s e  works i s  both 
a s tandard  and an ob jec t  of  s a t i r e .  To the  degree th a t  his  
moral goodness i s  emphasized, the  good-natured n a i f  is 
resp ec ted ;  to  the  degree- that  h i s  n a iv e te  i s  emphasized, 
he i s  s a t i r i z e d  f o r  h i s  many imperfec t ions  and dé f ic ie n ce s ,  
fo r  having f a l l e n  sh o r t  of f u l f i l l i n g  his  human c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  l i k e  that  between saying, "He has his  
im perfec t ions ,  but  he i s  a good man," and saying "He is  a 
good man, but he i s  woefully u n f i t  f o r  t h i s  world."
The dual he ro ic  and i ro n ic  r o l e  o f  the  n a i f  is  evident 
in  almost every confron ta t ion  between the n a i f  and a blocking 
f i g u r e .  IVhen Adams goes to Parson T r u l l i b e r  to borrow the  
meager funds necessary  for him, Joseph,  and Fanny to re tu rn  
home, h i s  simple f a i t h  in mankind s e t s  him up fo r  d isap p o in t ­
ment, but h is  unwavering f a i t h  in  h i s  b e l i e f s  is  h i s  armor 
a g a in s t  T r u l l i b e r  and the weapon by which he even tua l ly  
reduces th e  parson to a blind fury  and to the  poin t  of 
proving he i s  a C h r i s t i a n  by f i g h t i n g  Adams. Time and 
time again  the  n a i f  encounters the  s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  
and r e l i g io u s  g ia n t s  and d e f l a te s  t h e i r  puffed up.
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p re ten t ious  egos with h is  innocence. Thus, to the  de l igh t  
o f  the  audience, the  n a i f  unw i t t ing ly  breaks through the  
facades and a r t i f i c i a l i t y  of p re te n t io u s  so c i e ty .  Each 
encounter provides th e  author  with an oppor tun i ty  to 
a t t a c k  s t rong ly  those  persons,  ideas ,  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  
th a t  a re  in h is  view e v i l .  Attack upon so c ie ty  fo r  moral 
f a i l u r e  predominates in  Joseph Andrews, Tom Jo n e s , and 
The Vicar  of Wakefield a t  the  same time t h a t  sent imenta l  
e th ic s  are  t e s te d  fo r  t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l i t y .  In most encounters 
both the  n a i f  and the  blocking f ig u re  a re  l o s e r s .  The n a i f  
f a i l s  to achieve h is  goal  because he i s  inept  s o c i a l l y ;  
the  blocking f ig u re  r ev ea ls  h is  immorali ty. But s ince  i t  
i s  the  moral i ty  o f  the  charac te r s  about which we are  made 
to  care ,  the  n a i f  is  admirable , the  blocking c h a ra c te r  
despicable .
When the good-natured n a i f  i s  a country parson,  l ik e  
Dr. Primrose o r  Parson Adams, whose r o l e  i t  is to  exemplify 
and preach m o ra l i ty ,  the  emphasis is  c l e a r l y  on his  moral 
goodness. I f  he p r a c t i c e s  what he preaches ,  he i s  l i k e ly  
to be predominately an ob jec t  of admirat ion in s p i t e  of his 
n a iv e te .  F ie ld ing  says much the same when he s t a t e s  in his 
p reface  to Joseph Andrews t h a t  he made Abraham Adams a 
clergyman "s ince  no o th e r  o f f i c e  could have given him so
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many o p p o r tu n i t i e s  of d isp lay ing  h i s  worthy i n c l i n a t io n s "
(p.  11), F ie ld ing  in troduces Adams in  Chapter Three:
Mr. Abraham Adams was an e x c e l l e n t  s c h o la r .  He was a 
p e r f e c t  master  of the  Greek and L a t in  languages;  to 
which he added a g rea t  share  o f  knowledge in  the  
o r i e n t a l  tongues, and could read and t r a n s l a t e  French, 
I t a l i a n ,  and Spanish. He had app lied  many years  to 
the most severe s tudy,  and had t r e a su re d  up a fund . 
of  lea rn in g  r a r e ly  to  be met with in  a u n i v e r s i t y .  He 
was besides  a man of good sense ,  good p a r t s ,  and good 
n a tu re ;  but was a t  t h e  same time as e n t i r e l y  ignorant  
of t h e  ways of t h i s  world as an in fa n t  j u s t  en tered  into  
i t  could poss ib ly  be. As he had never  any i n t e n t io n  
to deceive ,  so he never suspected such a des ign  in  
o th e r s .  He was generous,  f r i e n d l y ,  and brave to an 
excess;  but  s im p l i c i ty  was h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  (pp. 22-23)
His l ea rn in g  comes from books, not experience;  h i s  idealism
is  founded on s c r ip tu r e  and the  c l a s s i c s .  He i s  a very
capable , bu t  very innocent man. However, h is  r o l e  as parson
j u s t i f i e s  a l l  of t h i s . His very name (as well  as h i s  good
na tu re  and na ive te )  provides a v i s i o n  of  innocence and
i l l u s t r a t e s  the  t r u t h  of what he p r e a c h e s - - th a t  man can be
emancipated from time, from the  s i n s ,  g r i e f s ,  and e v i l
consequences o f  past  human experience.  His r o le  makes i t
r ig h t  fo r  him to be an i d e a l i s t ,  to  embrace the  a b s t r a c t
and r e j e c t  the  concre te ,  to  embrace t h e  "o the r  world"
and r e j e c t  t h i s  one, to  embrace the  s p i r i t u a l  and r e j e c t
the  p hy s ica l ,  to  embrace f a i t h  and r e j e c t  skep t ic ism .
S tu a r t  Tave says of Adams, "not to  apprehend the
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ex is ten ce  of such passions as malice and envy is  a 
cons iderab le  imperfection, weakening, as i t  does, the  
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  of v i r t u e ;  th e  innocence t h a t  i s  unaware of  
the  c o n f l i c t  between i t s  own idea l  motives and the r e s i s t a n t  
r e a l i t y  of  th e  world in  which i t  must ac t  i s  in  a con t inua l  
s t a t e  of  b l ind  c o n f u s i o n . T a v e  i s  p lac ing  the emphasis 
not upon Adam's moral goodness but upon th e  l im i ta t io n s  
and r i g i d i t y  of  h is  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  goodness,  and judging 
him by a s o c ia l ,  pragmatic s tandard .  This i s  not the
emphasis in  the  novel.  Innocence does not  seem to be such
a "cons iderab le  imperfection" when we see Adam's approp r ia te  
r o le  as an example and preacher r a t h e r  than  as p h i l a n th ro p i s t .  
C e r ta in ly  fo r  Adams h imself  h is  innocence i s  no unmixed 
b l e s s in g ,  but for Adams as parson h is  d i s t o r t e d  percep t ion  
of  r e a l i t y  preserves h is  e s s e n t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  v i r t u e  
and ideal ism, by preventing a too b r u t a l  c o l l i s i o n  o f  h is
id ea l  world with the  r e a l  one, a t  l e a s t  in  h i s  own
consciousness .  Society  may judge Adams to  be " in  a continual  
s t a t e  of  b l ind  confusion,"  but  Adams i s  never  aware o f  
confusion.  I f  his  id e a ls  c o n t ra d ic t  r e a l i t y ,  then r e a l i t y  
is  wrong and ought to  be a l t e r e d  or  condemned. Adams is  
unshaken as an inv inc ib le  and indomitable  i d e a l i s t  who 
th inks  b e t t e r  o f  h imself  and his  ac t ions  and b e t t e r  o r
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worse o f  h i s  world than is  j u s t i f i e d  by r e a l i t y .  And we 
love him fo r  i t ,  for  h i s  ignorance i s  harmless to anyone 
but h im se l f  s ince  his  only involvement in the  l iv e s  of 
o th e r s  i s  an ac t ive  c h a r i ty  prompted by benevolent motives, 
and h is  a u th o r i ty  e x i s t s  only in  the  s p i r i t u a l ,  a b s t r a c t  
realm of  b e l i e f ,  va lues ,  and id ea s .
When a t t e n t i o n  is  focused on the  n a i f  as the  object  
o f  s a t i r e ,  the  major theme which i s  inheren t  i s  th a t  of 
innocence versus knowledge o r  experience  and passion versus 
p r u d e n c e . T h i s  theme is  most obviously t r e a t e d  in  the 
c o n t r a s t s  between the  n a i f  and the  Good-Natured Man as 
paragon,  between Tom Jones and Squire  Allworthy, Dr.
Primrose and S i r  William T h o rn h i l l .  There a re  s im i la r  
c o n t r a s t in g  charac te rs  in  F i e l d i n g ’ s,  The F a t h e r s ; or  
The Good- Natured Man, G oldsm ith 's ,  The Good N atur 'd  Man, 
and L i l l o ' s ,  The London Merchant to  mention only a few.
And where th e re  i s  no c h a ra c te r  t h a t  more n e a r ly  approximates 
the  i d e a l  Good-Natured Man with both a good h e a r t  and a good 
head, th e  idea l  is  always im p l ic i t  as a c o n t r a s t  to the 
shortcomings o f  the n a i f .  The b roades t  s ta tement of  t h i s  
theme i s  the  idea l  versus the  r e a l .
When a t t e n t i o n  is  focused on th e  n a i f  as the  standard 
of  s a t i r e ,  the  major theme i s  n a t u r a l l y  c h a r i ty  versus
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v a n i ty ,  o r  i t  might be s t a t e d  v a r io u s ly  as goodness versus 
g re a tn e s s ,  impulsive goodness versus cold prudence, 
benevolence versus  s e l f - l o v e ,  good nature  without a r t  versus 
a r t  without good n a tu re .  The theme i s  developed in 
innumerable p a i re d  c h a r a c t e r s .  The con tras t  between Tom 
Jones and B l i f i l  is  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e .  The theme i s  also 
r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  geographica l  c o n t r a s t  of country and c i t y .  
The broades t  s ta tement  o f  t h i s  theme is  a form of the  r e a l  
versus the  r e a l ,  r e a l  m o ra l i ty  versus rea l  s o c ie ty .  None 
o f  the  c o n t r a s t in g  id ea s ,  persons ,  o r  places i s  id e a l ,  but 
given the  choice between the  two c o n f l i c t in g  r e a l i t i e s .  
F ie ld in g ,  Goldsmith, S m o l le t t ,  Sarah F ie ld ing ,  and a l l  
o the rs  who p o r t r a y  the  n a i f  choose simple, impulsive, 
benevolent  good n a tu re  and the  country  every time. For, 
as they see i t ,  u l t i m a t e l y  the  c o n f l i c t  i s  between o rder  and 
confusion in  the  r e l a t e d  spheres of  m oral i ty ,  s o c ie ty ,  and 
language.
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s a t i r i s t  in  a work i n  which r i d i c u l e  of  c h a ra c te r  t r a i t s ,  
ideas ,  o r  manners is  of primary i n t e r e s t  (Mack uses Pope's 
s a t i r e s  to  i l l u s t r a t e  h is  p o i n t s ) .  Tom Jones and Parson 
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(The Hague, Netherlands:  Mouton and Company, 1967).
l ^ The Amiable Humorist, p. 141.
l^Soine good d iscussions  of  t h i s  theme a re :  Glenn
W. H a t f i e l d ’ s " 'The Serpent and the  Dove':  ' 'Prudence' 
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Chapter IV
The Good-Natured Man As Humorist; The C o n s t i tu t io n a l  Aspect
The theory o f  "humours" and the  c e rv a n t ic  dep ic t io n  of 
Quixot ian  obsess ions with ideas were p a r t  o f  the  l i t e r a r y  
t r a d i t i o n  t h a t  inf luenced the p o r t r a y a l  o f  the  Good-Natured 
Man. These inf luences  are  n o t ic e a b le  but i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  
t h e  good-natured n a i f .  They a re  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  because in  
t h e  c h a ra c te r  and func t ion  of t h e  good-natured n a i f  the  
emphasis i s  always upon m o ra l i ty ,  whether the  n a i f  i s  the  
o b je c t  o r  the  standard of  e i t h e r  s a t i r e  o r  eva lua t ion ,  and 
th e  theme which develops in  a work in  which he i s  a c en t ra l  
c h a r a c t e r  i s  t h a t  o f  good versus  bad, o r  moral versus 
immoral, o r  m ora l i ty  versus s o c i e ty ,  e t c .  The constant  
and unchanging element in  the  c h a r a c t e r  of  the  n a i f  is  
h i s  " n a tu r a l  goodness." This ,  o f  course ,  r e f l e c t s  the 
a r t i s t ' s  unwavering f a i t h  in  a n a tu r a l  b a s is  for  m ora l i ty .  
Even though F ie ld ing  emphasized good judgment when defin ing 
"good-nature" or in  d iscuss ing  th e  proper  a l l o c a t io n  of  
c h a r i t y ,  he had an ove rr id ing  f a i t h  in  th e  "na tu ra l"  
f e e l in g s  as guides to v i r t u e . ^  In  s h o r t ,  h i s  e th ic s  a re  
s i m i l a r  to  those o f  th e  L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s  and Shaftesbury,
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and h i s  themes a re  m o r a l i s t i c .
But in  the  c h a r a c t e r  and func t ion  of  the  Good-Natured 
Man as humorist th e  emphasis s h i f t s  from th e  moral to t h e   ^
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  aspec t  of c h a r a c t e r .  Again, anyone who 
has a t tended c a r e f u l l y  to what F ie ld ing  and his  charac ters  
have to  say about moral educa t ion  o r  has t r i e d  to account 
f o r  the  d i f fe ren c e s  between Tom Jones and young B l i f i l  is 
aware th a t  th e  good-natured n a i f  is  c o n t ro l le d  by his 
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The n a i f ,  and a l l  o th e r  good-natured 
ch a rac te r s  fo r  t h a t  m a t te r ,  can reason but from what they 
a re  by na tu re  and educa t ion ,  and they a t t r i b u t e  to  others 
th e  q u a l i t i e s  they value  and recognize  in  themselves 
un less  experience makes t h a t  im poss ib le .^  As a device fo r  
s a t i r e ,  the  n a i f  i s  the  e t h i c a l  a n t i t h e s i s  to the  vanity  
and hypocrisy of s o c i e ty ;  as a comic hero ,  the n a i f  overcomes 
th e  l i m i t a t i o n  of  h is  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  good na tu re .  The 
avowed purpose of  many of  F i e l d i n g ' s  essays and novels is  
to teach prudence and wisdom to  the  good man, to  a l t e r  h i s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  so t h a t  i t  i s  l e s s  l im i t i n g .  F ie ld ing  found 
th e  n a i f  an adequate c h a ra c te r -d e v ic e  f o r  t r e a t i n g  
s e r io u s ly  moral themes because he never doubted t h a t  th e  
good man's n a tu ra l  sense o f  r ig h t  and wrong, though 
antecedent  to  r e l i g io u s  b e l i e f ,  "had been implanted by
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God and J y a s _ !  thus to  be i d e n t i f i e d  with r e l i g io u s  
im pe ra t ives ."^
The t r a d i t i o n a l  theory of humors, because i t  i s  a 
f a m i l i a r  and func t io n a l  vocabulary fo r  g iv ing  express ion 
to p h y s io lo g ic a l -p sy c h o lo g ic a l  r e a l i t y ,  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in 
works which focus upon th e  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s  o f  the  
Good-Natured Man. "Humor" has a long etymology and many 
d e f i n i t i o n s .  S tu a r t  Tave provides a comprehensive study 
of the  term i n  h is  work The Amiable Humorist . I  wish to 
merely c a l l  a t t e n t i o n  to th e  major ideas which an e ighteenth-  
century  w r i t e r  would have a ssoc ia ted  with humor.
Ben Jonson 's  concept of  humor i s  a development of  
the  medieval theory whereby the  body was composed of  
four f l u id s  whose p a r t i c u l a r  mixture in  an ind iv idua l  
determined h i s  ba s ic  temperament or  c h a ra c te r  type.  At 
the  beginning of Every Man Out of  His Humour, Ben Jonson 
d is t ing u shes  two kinds o f  humor in  the  metaphorical  sense, 
the  sense in  which i t  a p p l ie s  to d i s p o s i t io n :  t r u e  humor
in  which a p e c u l i a r  q u a l i t y  a c tu a l ly  possesses a man, 
drawing a l l  h i s  physica l  a f f e c t s ,  s p i r i t s ,  and powers to 
run one way; and a f f e c te d  humor in  which a man goes out 
of h i s  way to  appear d i f f e r e n t  in  fash ions ,  manners or  
nature . '^  Congreve f e l t  about t r u e  humor as he did about
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n a tu r a l  f o l l y  or  physical  d e fe c t s ;  they a re  from na tu re  
and cannot be changed and, t h e r e f o re ,  should never be the  
su b jec t  of r i d i c u l e .  Jonson and Congreve a re ,  of course, 
i n t e r e s t e d  in  the  humorist as a comic c h a rac te r  in  l i t e r a t u r e .  
But th e  concept o f  humor i s  pervasive  in  w r i t ings  of  p o l i t i c a l  
s o c i a l ,  and moral na ture  as well  and i s  inf luenced by 
a t t i t u d e s  and values in  th e se  a re a s .
A f te r  th e  Glorious Revolut ion of  1688, Whig th in k e rs  
l i k e  S i r  William Temple, Joseph Addison, and Richard 
S te e le  who were upholders o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e s  g l o r i e d  in  England's  r e p u ta t io n  fo r  
possess ing  an abundance o f  humorous and eccen t r ic  c h a ra c te r s .  
Humor became synonymous with  p e c u l i a r i t y  and ind iv idua lism  
and took on p o s i t iv e  conno ta t ions  of"innocence and n o b i l i t y .  
These w r i t e r s  a sso c ia te  the  odd i ty  and i r r e g u l a r i t y  of  
English  ch a rac te r s  with the  i r r e g u l a r i t y  of c l im ate .
The d o c t r in e  of the  ru l in g  passion r e f l e c t s  a le s s  
p o s i t i v e  view of  the hum oris t .  The ru l in g  passion theory 
i s  ev iden t  in  works throughout the  Age o f  Reason and was 
popular ized by Pope in the  Essay on Man. The theory saw 
man's reason as always tending  to be enslaved by the  pass ions ,  
u su a l ly  by one passion which a lso  dominated the  o ther  
p a s s i o n s .
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Locke in  h i s  Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
r e j e c t s  a l l  no t ions  o f  innate  ideas or p r in c ip le s  but 
gives a new e x p la n a t io n  fo r  t h e  ru l ing  passion  psychological  
theory .  In Book Two Locke says th a t  " the re  i s  scarce  any 
one t h a t  does not observe something th a t  seems odd to 
him, and is  i t s e l f  r e a l l y  ex travagant ,  in  the  opinions,  
reasonings ,  and a c t io n s  of  o th e r  men." The reason for  
t h i s ,  according to  Locke, is  t h a t  through chance, custom, 
and education, ideas which "of themselves a re  not a t  a l l  
of  k in ,  come to be . . . un i ted  in some man's minds," 
and once any f a l s e  o r  a r b i t r a r y  connection has been made, 
one idea "no sooner a t  any time comes in to  the  understanding,  
but  i t s  a s so c ia t e  appears with i t . "  These a sso c ia t ion s  
o f t e n  become the  roo ted  bas is  of  indiv idual  behavior 
s ince  "once s e t  agoing" they "continue in  the  same s teps  
they have been used t o ;  which by o f ten  t read ing ,  a re  worn 
in to  a smooth pa th ,  and the  motion in  i t  becomes easy, 
and as i t  were n a tu r a l
Those who account fo r  humors by the medieval 
phys io log ica l  theo ry ,  or  by th e  e f f e c t  o f  the  English 
c l im ate ,  or  by th e  ru l in g  pass ion  theory ,  o r  by the 
a s so c ia t io n  o f  ideas  a re  a l l  t r y in g  to  expla in  why o r  how 
the  thoughts and a c t io n s  o f  an ind iv idua l  a re  uniquely
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a t  va r iance  with th e  s tandard  concept of  man as a r a t i o n a l ,  
moral be ing .  That i s ,  they a re  a l l  a ttempting to  account 
fo r  charac te r  and p e r s o n a l i t y .  And they would probably 
a l l  accept a genera l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  humor as "any whimsical 
Oddity or Fo ib le ,  appearing in  t h e  Temper o r  Conduct of 
a person in  r e a l  L i f e , "  and of a humorist  as a person 
"O bst ina te ly  a t tached  to s e n s ib l e  p e c u l ia r  Oddit ies of
h i s  own genuine Growth "7
S tu a r t  Tave d e f ines  almost a l l  good-natured charac te r s  
as "amiable h u m .o r i s t s " - - th e i r  good n a tu re  being t h e i r  
c o n t r o l l i n g  humor. Although good na tu re  sometimes 
funct ions  l i k e  a "humour," t h e  ideo log ies  behind t h e  two 
terms are  independent of  each o th e r  and fo r  purposes of 
c l a r i t y  in  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  I  choose not to use the  terms
g
in te rchangeab ly .  Because "humour" i s  a ssoc ia ted  with 
body chemistry, c l im a te ,  h e r e d i ty ,  and s o c i a l  environment, 
i t  has d e te r m in i s t i c  and amoral conno ta t ions .  But when 
t h i s  term i s  a pp l ied  to  th e  Good-Natured Man who c h a r a c te r ­
i s t i c a l l y  s t r i v e s  to be v i r t u o u s ,  th e  term becomes p e jo ra t iv e .
I t  i s  very d i f f i c u l t  to  de f ine  the  good-natured humorist 
as a type because each humoris t  i s  s u i  g e n e r i s . But a few 
g e n e r a l i t i e s  about him a re  p o s s ib l e .  The Good-Natured Man 
as humorist e i t h e r  a f f e c t s  a humor while h is  good n a tu re
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ru le s  him o r  has a f a v o r i t e  pass ion ,  obsess ion ,  o r  i n t e r e s t  
which f r eq u e n t ly  in te rp oses  with and usurps con tro l  over 
h i s  good n a tu re ,  or both.  In  any case the  emphasis is  
p r im a r i ly  upon a pa r t  o f  t h e  good man's c o n s t i t u t i o n  
(pass ion ,  pe rcep t ion ,  o r  w i l l )  as an o b s ta c le  to  cons is ten t  
moral conduct . All good-natured humoris ts  are  "lovable  
e c c e n t r ic s "  but a l l  a re ,  i n  varying degrees,  inadmirable 
fo r  allowing themselves to be c o n t ro l le d  by t h e i r  respec t ive  
humors, whether the h ea r t  o v e r ru le s  the  judgment of the 
head o r  whether the  head r u l e s  a t  times without consult ing 
the  h e a r t .
The Good-Natured Man as humorist i s  not an id ea l  by 
any s tandard .  Shaftesbury had sa id  th a t  "To have the  
Natu ra l  Affec t ions  (such as a re  founded on Love, Complacency, 
Goodwill,  and in a Sympathy with the  Kind o r  Species) is 
to  have the  c h i e f  means and power o f  Self-Enjoyment"
/ i t a l i c s  min^/,  but he had complemented t h a t  by saying th a t  
moral goodness depends on a proper ba lance  between the  
"Natura l  Affec t ions"  and th e  "S e l f -A f fe c t io n s . "  He said 
t h a t  moral va lue  l i e s  in  th e  immediate a f f e c t i o n  or  r e l i s h  
fo r  th e  good, but he q u a l i f i e s  th a t  by saying goodness or 
v i r t u e  c o n s i s t s  " in  a c e r t a i n  ju s t  D i s p o s i t i o n , or  
p ro p o r t io n a b le  a f f e c t i o n  of  a r a t i o n a l  Creature  towards
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t h e  moral Objects of  Right and Wrong / i t a l i c s  mine./.
Franc is  Hutcheson, who ga thers  most of S h a f te sb u ry ' s  
q u a l i t i e s  of  goodness and v i r t u e  under the  term "un iversa l  
benevolence," says ,  " I f  t h e r e  be any Benevolence a t  a l l ,  
i t  must be d i s i n t e r e s t e d ;  fo r  the  most u s e f u l  Action 
imaginable, loses  a l l  appearance of  Benevolence, as soon 
as we d iscern  t h a t  i t  only flowed from Self-Love, or  
I n t e r e s t . "  Obviously,  the  very concept o f  "humour" implies 
an absence of  S h a f te s b u ry ' s  "proper  balance" anc Hutcheson's 
" d i s in te r e s t e d "  benevolence.  The r a t i o n a l i s t s ,  on the  
o th e r  hand, r e j e c t e d  i n s t i n c t i v e  benevolence,  and Richard 
P r i c e  gives what would be a r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  
toward the  good-natured n a i f  and the good-natured humorist.  
"Wherever the  in f lu e n ce  of  mere n a tu ra l  temper o r  i n c l i n a t io n  
appears ,  and a p a r t i c u l a r  conduct is  known to  proceed from 
hence,  we may, i t  i s  t r u e ,  love the person, as we commonly 
do the  i n f e r i o r  c r e a tu r e s  when we d iscover  mildness and 
t r a c ta b l e n e s s  of  d i s p o s i t i o n ;  but no regard fo r  him as a 
v i r tu o u s  agent w i l l  a r i s e  w i th in  us ."  But "Rational  
benevolence e n t i r e l y  coincides with r e c t i t u d e ,  and the  
ac t io ns  proceeding from i t ,  with the  ac t io n s  proceeding from 
a regard fo r  r e c t i t u d e . B u t  the Good-Natured Man as a 
humoris t ,  a c h a r a c te r  with a ru l in g  pass ion  i s  never
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capable  o f  c o n s i s t e n t " ra t io n a l  benevolence” rega rd less  of 
how much he be l ieves  in  i t  and preaches the  n e c e s s i ty  of  
i t  as a p r i n c i p l e  of v i r t u e .
Thus, the  Good-Natured Man as humorist lacks a proper 
ba lance  between n a tu ra l  a f f e c t i o n s  and s e l f  a f f e c t i o n s ,  
i . e . ,  benevolence and s e l f - l o v e ,  or th e  proper  "union of  
the  good head and good h e a r t , "  i . e . ,  reason and fe e l in g - -  
good o r  v ic io u s .  The deviance and in co n s is te n cy  of  the 
good-natured humorist i s  caused by h i s  c o n t r o l l i n g  humor, 
ru l in g  pass ion ,  o r  dominant obession which provides an 
opposing force  e i t h e r  to n a tu r a l  goodness o r  to p ruden t ia l  
goodness. Each o f  the  good-natured humoris ts  se lec ted  fo r  
d is c u s s io n  in  t h i s  chap ter  ( the  Man in  Black, Matthew 
Bramble, and Uncle Toby) is  con tro l led  by a d i f f e r e n t  
pa r t  o f  th e  human c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  that  i s ,  each has a d i f f e r e n t  
humor. Moreover, the  c o n f l i c t  between humor and good na tu re  
i s  unique in kind and in  e f f e c t  in each c h a ra c te r .  On the  
o th e r  hand, the  th ree  c h a rac te r s  are a l ik e  in  th a t  they 
in co rp o ra te ,  to some degree,  in  t h e i r  c h a ra c te r s  the values 
s e r io u s ly  held by e igh teen th-cen tury  so c ie ty ;  as humorists 
they share  f u l l y  in  the  human condit ion .  The good-natured 
humorist  i s  by f a r  the  most be l ievab le  of  the  four types 
o f  Good-Natured Man discussed in  th is  s tudy.
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Thomas P res ton  defines  Goldsmith 's  Man in  Black and 
S m o l le t t ' s  Matthew Bramble as Benevolent Misanthropes 
because they a f f e c t  misanthropy.^^ The Benevolent Misanthrope 
was once a na i f  but has gained a b e t t e r  understanding of 
h imself  and of h is  so c ie ty  and recognizes th a t  un iversa l  
benevolence f i n a l l y  renders one incapable  of doing good 
to  anyone and t h a t  goodness is not rewarded, yet he is 
s t i l l  unable to con tro l  h is  good n a tu re .  Because the 
Benevolent Misanthrope sees and is  angered by the  wickedness 
o f  the  unfee l ing  world, and because he a l s o  has a benevolent 
n a tu re  and a d e l i c a t e  sense of morals , he a f f e c t s  misanthropy 
in  order to  p ro tec t  h im self  from the  dece i t  and imposition 
o f  the  world. Like the  e i ron  f i g u r e  A r i s t o t l e  defines in 
h i s  E th i c s , he deprecates  h im sel f ,  pretends to be les s  
than  he i s ,  in o rde r  to  make h imself  invu lnerab le .  He 
preaches prudence while h is  hear t  ru les  him and causes 
h i s  ac t ions  to be in co n s is te n t  with his f e e l in g s ;  he 
a f f e c t s  misanthropy and ac ts  benevolen t ly .  Since his  
good na ture  continues to  c o n tro l  h is  a c t io n s ,  h is  invec t ive  
ag a in s t  soc ie ty  does not  c o n s i s t e n t l y  h ide  his  compassion 
any more than the  a f fe c te d  concern of  a h ypocr i te  hides 
h i s  malice or  in d i f f e r e n c e .  His repeated at tempts and 
f a i l u r e s  to hide h is  t ru e  na tu re  provide humor and make
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him a lovable  e c c e n t r i c .
But the comparison between Matthew Bramble and 
the Man in  Black s tops he re .  For th e  s l i g h t  knowledge 
they have of  the  "dark" s id e  of  l i f e ,  knowledge which 
separa tes  them from the  good-natured n a i f ,  a f f e c t s  each 
d i f f e r e n t l y .  Also, our regard fo r  them as v i r tu o u s  agents 
and t h e i r  funct ions in  the  r e s p e c t iv e  works in wh'.c.a they 
appear d i f f e r s .
Goldsmith rep e a te d ly  demonstrates t h a t  un tu tored  and 
unchecked benevolence alone cannot in su re  moral conduct 
in  so c ie ty  and i s  un w i t t ing ly  prone to  i n j u s t i c e .  Natural  
fee l ing  in  an unna tura l  ( i n  the sense  of  man-made) soc ie ty  
i s  not an adequate guide to  moral a c t i o n - - j u s t i c e  or  cha r i ty ,  
Goldsmith learned t h i s  from exper ience .  He wrote to  his  
b ro the r  Henry in January, 1759, " I  had l e a r n 'd  from books 
to  love v i r t u e ,  be fore  I  was taught  from experience the 
n e ce ss i ty  of  being s e l f i s h .  I had co n t ra c ted  the  hab i t s  
of  a Phi losopher ,  while  I  was exposing myself  to  the  
in s id ious  approaches of  cunning; and o f t e n ,  by being even 
from my narrow f inances c h a r i t a b l e  to  excess ,  I  forgot  the 
ru les  of  j u s t i c e ,  and placed myself in  the  very s i t u a t i o n  
o f  th e  wretch who thanked my bounty."  The Man in Black 
revea ls  to  Altangi  t h a t  h is  benevolence,  which Altangi  had
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a lready witnessed to  be i n d i s c r im in a t in g ,  i s  " r a th e r  the  
e f f e c t  o f  a p p e t i t e  than reason:" "We / c h i l d r e n /  were to ld  
t h a t  u n iv e rsa l  benevolence was what f i r s t  cemented soc ie ty ;  
we were taught  to  cons ider  a l l  the  wants of  mankind as our 
own; to regard  the  human face d iv ine  with a f f e c t i o n  and 
esteem; he _/Drybone' s fathe_r/ wound us up to  be mere 
machines o f  p i t y ,  and rendered us incapable  of  withstanding 
the  s l i g h t e s t  impulse made e i t h e r  by r e a l  o r  f i c t i t i o u s  
d i s t r e s s ;  in a word, we were p e r f e c t l y  in s t r u c t e d  in  the  
a r t  of  g iving away thousands,  be fo re  we were taught  the  
more necessary  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  g e t t i n g  a f a r th in g . "  
Burchel l ,  another  p e rc ep t iv e  Good-Natured Man, in  The 
Vicar o f  Wakefield g ives a s i m i l a r  a c c o u n t . ^
Of p a r t i c u l a r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  here  is  t h a t  Goldsmith 
does not j u s t i f y  u n iv e r s a l  benevolence as n a tu r a l ,  but 
r a t h e r  blames ear ly  educa t ion  and co nd i t ion ing  fo r  over 
s t r e s s i n g  t h i s  va lue  to the ex ten t  t h a t  i t  (as Shaftesbury 
had warned) "des t roys  i t s  own end." Goldsmith never 
a s s e r t s  th a t  benevolence is  not  j u s t i f i e d  by God or  the 
n a tu re  of  th in g s ,  and he never a t tempts  to undercut 
benevolence as a v i r t u e ;  r a t h e r  he a t tempts  to show th a t  
the  n a tu r a l l y  good man must be taught  to understand soc ie ty  
and adapt h is  values to s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  i f  he i s  to be
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t r u l y  good. Asem’ s v i s i t  to  another world showed him
what a h o r r i b l e  world i t  would be i f  u n iv e r sa l  benevolence
were p ra c t ic e d  by everyone. However, Asem's d iscovery
was th a t  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h a t  idea l  by everyone would be
the  same as benevolence p ra c t ic e d  by no one. Therefore
what i s  d e s i r a b l e  is  benevolence con t ro l le d  by prudence,
12by i n t e l l e c t .
Goldsmith does f r eq u e n t ly  undercut what appear to 
be good ac t ions  by rev e a l ing  unworthy motives.  The Man 
in  Black i s  taken in  by appearance,  as is  the  n a i f ,  p a r t l y  
because he cannot t e l l  whether th e  need i s  r e a l  o r  a f f e c te d ,  
and th e r e f o r e  he i s  l i g h t l y  r i d ic u le d  because he i s  unable  
to act p ruden t ly  in  a dissembling so c ie ty .  But he i s  
p r im a r i ly  r i d i c u le d  because A l t a n g i , . t h e  n a r r a t o r ,  rev ea ls  
t h a t  the  Man in Black gives to th e  var ious  a p p l ica n ts  fo r  
a s e l f i s h  pu rpo se - - to  r e l i e v e  "h is  own uneasy se n sa t io n s . "  
Thus, th e  Man in  Black i s  no more v i r tuous  th a t  Lysippus 
in  Goldsmith 's  essay  "On J u s t i c e  and G eneros i ty ,"  who i s  
p ra ised  by a l l  t h e  world f o r  h is  generos i ty :  " th e re  i s
only one s o r t  o f  people ,  who complain of  h is  conduct. 
Lysippus does not pay h i s  deb ts .  . . .  In paying h is  debts 
a man b a re ly  does h is  duty, and i t  i s  an a c t io n  a t tended 
by no s o r t  o f  g lo ry .  Should Lysippus s a t i s f y  h is  c r e d i t o r s .
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who would be a t  the  pains o f  t e l l i n g  the  world /?
Thus, the  Man in  B lack 's  a f f e c t e d  humor, misanthropy, 
causes him to  see a f f e c t a t i o n  everyivhere, even where i t  is 
n o t .  Because his  misanthropy i s  caused by a small  amount 
o f  s o c ia l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and implies t h a t  he is  becoming 
adept in  the  ways o f  the  world, he i s  not h a rsh ly  r id icu led  
f o r  h is  a f f e c t a t i o n .  But, because o f  the  d isp ropor t iona te  
s t r e n g th  o f  f ee l in g  in  Drybon e ' s r e a l  c h a rac te r ,  what 
appears to  be good n a tu re  i s  nothing more than a t rue  
humor. Goldsmith may a llow us to  love  him fo r  h is  
"mildness and t r a c ta b l e n e s s  of  d i s p o s i t i o n , "  but his 
fundamental purpose in  h is  p o r t r a y a l  o f  Drybone i s  to 
r i d i c u l e  "extravagance d isgu ised  as generos i ty  and 
g u l l i b i l i t y  masked as u n iv e r sa l  benevolence."^^ "Mere 
machines o f  p i ty"  a r e  not au to m at ica l ly  men of v i r t u e .
Goldsmith 's  sympathetic  p o r t r a y a l  of  charac te rs  who 
possess th e  spontaneous g e ne ros i ty  and the s e n s i t i v e  
humanity o f  n a t u r a l l y  good man in  The Vicar of Wakefield. 
The Good Matur’d Man, "The Deserted V i l la g e ,"  and the 
L e t te r s  from _a C i t i z e n  o f  th e  World in d ic a te s  t h a t  he, 
l i k e  F ie ld in g ,  found the  genuineness and honesty of these  
ch a rac te r s  f a r  more admirable than the  charac te rs  in his  
works who adhere to  empty s o c i a l  and l i t u r g i c a l  forms in
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o rd e r  to appear good-natured.  But, in  th e se  same works, 
he "was too keenly awake to the  r e a l i t i e s  o f  l i f e  to  c r e d i t  
t h e i r  success anywhere short  of  the  New Jerusalem."
Moreover, he never equated n a tu r a l  goodness with human 
kindness o r  t r u e  i n t e g r i t y  with ignorant innocence.
Goldsmith 's  moral id ea l  i s  represented by S i r  William 
T hornh i l l  and S i r  William Honeywood, who a re  t r e a te d  in 
the  next chap ter .
On the  o ther  hand, Matthew Bramble’ s n a tu r a l  goodness 
i s  never quest ioned.  The major func t ion  of h is  p r iv a te  
good deeds is to provide proof of  h is  goodness. However, 
he d i f f e r s  from the  n a i f  in  th a t  instead of  being merely 
a device fo r  s a t i r e ,  he i s ,  by v i r t u e  o f  having a modicum 
of  so c i a l  awareness, a s a t i r i s t .  Thomas P res ton  has said 
t h a t  " In  Matthew Bramble, Smollet t  f i n a l l y  c rea ted  an 
accep tab le ,  nonmalicious s a t i r i s t  who could express 
benevolently  and yet  v i r u l e n t l y  the  s a t i r e  he had been 
s t r i v i n g  to  w r i te  in h is  e a r l i e r  n o v e l s . H o w e v e r ,  
in  S m o l le t t ' s  e a r l i e r  novels i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  he is s a t i r i z i n g  
what he se r io u s ly  f e e l s  to be wrong with the  world. But 
in  Humphrey Clinker the  e x p l i c i t  s a t i r e  i s  aimed a t  super­
f i c i a l  f a u l t s .  And Bramble's d ia t r ib e s  cannot be taken 
se r io u s ly  because he is  predisposed to  see  co r ru p t io n
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everywhere he looks.  Bramble’s invec t ive  aga in s t  soc ie ty  
is  undercut by the d i s p a r i t y  between h i s  d e sc r ip t io n s  and 
those of  the  o ther  c h a r a c te r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  J e ry  and Lydia, 
and by J e r y ' s  statement upon discovery t h a t  George Dennison 
is  not a "wretched s t r o l l e r "  but "one of the  most accomplished 
young fel lows in England." This s tatement a t  the  climax of 
the s to ry  i s  the only overt  express ion of  the  appearance 
versus r e a l i t y  theme and i t  r e f l e c t s  on th e  ac t io ns  of  a l l  
four  of the  l e t t e r  w r i t e r s  in  the  novel.  "I  am . . . 
m or t i f ied  to  r e f l e c t  what f l a g r a n t  i n j u s t i c e  we everyday 
commit, and what absurd judgments we form, in  viewing ob jec ts  
through the  f a l s i f y i n g  medium of p re jud ice  and pass ion .
I do agree with P res ton  t h a t  Bramble's misanthropy 
represents  a s a t i r i c  v i s io n  o f  man and the  world, fo r  i t  
springs from personal  experience o f  the  world’s fraud and 
d e c e i t . l - J h a t  Bramble r e f l e c t s  equa l ly  on h imself  and
soc ie ty .  Society  i s  f a t a l  to the  Good-Natured Man. Bramble 
hides h i s  in na te  goodness and benevolence under a facade of 
misanthropy to  p ro te c t  h imself  from e x p lo i t a t i o n .  Thus 
soc ie ty  is  im p l i c i t ly  r i d i c u l e d .  On the  o th e r  hand, the re  
i s  something unadmirable and r id ic u lo u s  about Bramble's 
good na tu re ,  not because o f  shortcomings in  m ora l i ty  as 
with the Man in  Black, but because i t  makes a weakling of
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him. Again, the  emphasis i s  on good na tu re  as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
r a t h e r  than  moral.  His v a le tu d ina r ian ism  and misanthropy 
a re  caused by h is  tender  h ea r t  and d e l i c a t e  sense of  morals. 
Bramble wrote Dr. Lewis, "Everything th a t  discomposes my 
mind, produces a correspondent d iso rd e r  in  my body" (p. 154), 
and the  wickedness of  the  world provides ample cause fo r  his  
mind to  be discomposed. His v a le tu d in a r ia n ism  and misanthropy, 
h i s  d iscomfort  a t  Bath and London, and h i s  r e t r e a t  from the 
busy haunts  o f  men fo r  t h i r t y  y e a r s ,  a l l  imply t h a t  good 
na tu re  renders  one u n f i t  fo r  l i f e  in  so c ie ty ,  which i s  to  
say in  the  f i n a l  a n a ly s i s ,  u n f i t  fo r  l i f e .  Moreover, we 
cannot admire Bramble because he i s  not p o t e n t i a l l y  t r a g i c .
He i s  a v ic t im  of  good na tu re ,  not  a champion o r  devotee 
o f  i t .  I-Jhen h i s  good na tu re  comes in to  c o n f l i c t  with 
s o c i e ty ,  he damns soc ie ty ,  but walks away from the  c o n f l i c t .
He i s  not  about to  lay down h is  l i f e  fo r  h i s  personal  
d ig n i ty ;  r a t h e r  he r e t r e a t s  to escape pain  or  h u m i l ia t io n .
Because of  Bramble's prominent ro le  in  the  novel as the  
most p r o l i f i c  l e t t e r  w r i t e r  and as the  head o f  the  family,  
and because the  novel p ro g re s s iv e ly  d is c lo s e s  h is  c h a ra c te r ,  
one expects  Bramble to f ig u re  prominently in developing 
th e  themes in the  comic p l o t .  However, h i s  c h a ra c te r  is  
not  a good device fo r  the  se r ious  t rea tm ent  o f  e i t h e r  the
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wrongs of so c ie ty ,  the  value of  good n a tu r e ,  o r  the  moral 
l i m i t a t i o n s  of  good n a tu re .  All  th e se  ideas  a re  t r ea ted  
because  they a l l  grow n a tu r a l l y  out of  Bramble's charac te r ,  
but  th e  treatment of  them never ge ts  beyond being e n te r ­
t a i n i n g ,  amusing. The most common unfavorable  c r i t i c i s m  
of Humphry Clinker i s  t h a t  i t  con ta ins  no se r io u s  treatment 
o f  theme, and th e r e  i s  no ser ious  t rea tm en t  of theme p a r t ly  
because  of the  c h a ra c te r  o f  Bramble. The "nonmalicious 
s a t i r i s t  who could express  _/satir_e/ benevo len t ly  and yet 
v i r u l e n t l y "  i s  nonmalicious because he i s  in  r e a l i t y  a 
g e n t l e ,  f e a r f u l  c r e a t u r e  who goes about roa r ing  loudly 
in  hopes th a t  no one w i l l  d iscover  how tender  and weak he 
i s .  His benevolence i s  undercut because i t  makes him to 
be a r id ic u lo u s  v a le tu d in a r i a n ;  h i s  v i r u le n c e  i s  undercut 
because i t  is p a r t  of  h i s  narrow-minded, a f f e c te d  misanthropy. 
Bramble is  co n t ro l le d  by f e e l in g ,  but  h i s  a c t ion s  reveal 
t h a t  the  fee l ings  a re  p re ju d ice  and pass ion  more of ten  
than  they are  benevolence.  Moreover he d i s t r u s t s  h is  
f e e l in g s  and p laces  h i s  f a i t h  in  h i s  s o c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
( h i s  reason) as a guide to  v i r t u e  and happ iness ,  but at 
th e  same time his  n a tu r a l  temper determines to a la rge  
ex ten t  h is  pe rcep t ion  o f  r e a l i t y ,  and he i s ,  th e re fo re ,  
incompetent fo r  h i s  r o l e  as guardian of  v i r t u e  in  the novel
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and unsu i ted  fo r  the  ro le  of s a t i r i s t .  We may love him 
and applaud the  comic r e s o lu t io n  o f  h i s  expedit ion,  but 
we have no regard fo r  him as a v i r tu o u s  a g e n t .
S t e r n e ' s  Uncle Toby in T r is t r a m  Shandy i s  also a 
good-natured humoris t.  Our regard  fo r  him as v ir tuous 
agent i s  a f fe c te d  by his  " t ru e  humour." His hobbyhorse 
sometimes runs roughshod over h i s  good na tu re ,  but he, 
u n l ik e  Drybone and Bramble, i s  unaware of  the  c o n f l i c t  
between h is  head and h is  h ea r t  which is  obvious to everyone 
e l s e .  He is  not judged ha rsh ly  fo r  h is  incons is tenc ies  
because he lacks percept ion;  he is  devoid of  a f f e c ta t io n ,  
and when he i s  not r id ing  h is  hobbyhorse, he is  admirable 
fo r  h i s  good n a tu re .  Uncle Toby i s  an eccen t r ic ,  and he 
has h i s  own unique "humour" t h a t  i n d iv id u a l i z e s  him. But 
S te rn e ,  more su cce ss fu l ly  than Goldsmith o r  Smollet t,  is 
ab le  to r a i s e  ind iv idu a l  humor and a c t io n  in to  the realm 
o f  idea and type and u n iv e r sa l .
A l tangi  says th a t  Drybone i s  a "humorist in a na t ion  
o f  hum oris ts ,"  but Uncle Toby in  the  world of  Tris tram 
Shandy is  a humorist in  a so c ie ty  in  which l i t e r a l l y  
every c h a rac te r  i s  a humoris t.  All the  humorists in  
T r is t r a m  Shandy a re  not good-natured,  but Yorick, W al te r , 
Trim, and T r is t ram  could c e r t a i n l y  be defined as such.
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I  have chosen to concen tra te  on Uncle Toby because h is  
i n s t i n c t i v e  good na ture  has an important funct ion  in  the 
novel as the  a n t i t h e s i s  of  the  attempts of  reason to impose 
order  upon the  f lux  of  r e a l i t y .  This n a tu re  versus a r t  
comedy permeates Tr is t ram  Shandy. The c h a ra c te r s ,  the  
themes, th e  d e sc r ip t io n  of  the  ac t ion ,  the  very form of 
the  novel,  a l l  witness to  the  im p o ss ib i l i ty  of  imposing 
a r t  on n a tu re .  T r is t ram  is  f r u s t r a t e d  because he l iv e s  
364 t imes f a s t e r  than he w r i t e s ,  and a t  one point f inds 
h im self  on th ree  d i f f e r e n t  journeys a t  once. W alter 's  
th e o r i e s  and plans a l l  go awry in r e a l i t y ,  and so on.^^
This a n t i t h e s i s  i s  apparent  in  Toby's i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  
c o n f l i c t s .  But i n  o rder  to understand th e  c h a rac te r  and 
func t ion  of  Toby i t  i s  h e lp fu l  to know something of the 
e th ic s  o f  S terne.
Arthur  Cash, among those  who have s tud ied  S te rn e 's  
sermons, a s s e r t s  th a t  "Sterne  was a s in c e re  man of r e l i g io n  
and an honest teache r  of  m oral i ty ,  . . . u n t i l  his  death 
he thought  of h is  sermons as rep resen t ing  h i s  b e l i e f s . "  
S te rn e ' s  e th i c s ,  as revealed  in  his sermons, are  sentimental  
r a t h e r  than r a t i o n a l i s t i c ,  but he is  c lo s e r  to Hume than 
to the  L a t i tu d in a r i a n s  and Shaftesbury.  He be l ieves  tha t  
man has n a tu r a l  i n s t i n c t s - - b o t h  benevolent and s e l f i s h - -
106
which motivate  him. Those a c t io ns  prompted by benevolence 
and guided by reason are  morally  admirable.  In sermons . 
arguing for  the  na tu ra lness  of benevolent  i n s t i n c t s
22Sterne  sounds very much l i k e  a L a t i t u d i n a r i a n  d iv ine .
He counters  the  Hobbesian and Mandevil lian e g o i s t i c  view 
of  man by giving examples of  man's d i s i n t e r e s t e d  conduct.
In "The Vindication of Human Nature" Sterne descr ibes  the  
conduct of  a t y p ic a l  person as evidence of man's n a tu ra l  
benevolence.  He depic ts  him f i r s t  as a youth: "how warmly,
how h e a r t i l y  he enters  in to  f r iendsh ips , - -how  d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  
and unsuspicious in  the choice o f  them,--how generous and 
open in  h is  profess ions ;- -how s in c e r e  and honest in  making 
them good." The only c r i t i c i s m  th e  youth deserves i s  fo r  
being f o o l i s h ly  generous. S terne  points  out t h a t  he learns  
cau t ion  as he grows o lder  but t h a t  the  "same benevolence 
of h e a r t  _/is/ a l t e r e d  only in  i t s  c o u r s e . " S t e r n e  
i m p l i c i t l y  acknowledges here  t h a t  h i s  a t t i t u d e  toward the 
n a iv e te  o f  a young Good-Natured Man would be s im i l a r  to  
t h a t  of  F ie ld ing  toward Tom Jones.  But Sterne does not 
w r i t e  about young people.
Benevolence and compassion a re  v i r tu e s  emphasized in 
S t e r n e ' s  sermons. "Philanthropy Recommended," dea l ing  
with t h e  s to ry  of the  good Samaritan, emphasizes d i s i n t e r e s t e d
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good works as a C h r i s t i a n  v i r t u e .  "There i s  something in  
our nature  which engages us to take par t  in  every accident  
to  which man i s  s u b je c t . "  When we choose to  help others  
in  calamitous s i t u a t i o n s  we do so "from a g e ne ro s i ty  and 
tenderness  o f  n a tu re  which disposes us fo r  compassion, 
a b s t rac te d  from a l l  cons idera t ions  o f  s e l f S t e r n e  i s  
not b l ind  to  the  f a c t  th a t  s e l f - l o v e  is as n a tu r a l  as 
benevolence and t h a t  the p r i e s t  and the L ev i te  walked by 
the  man who had f a l l e n  among th ieves  before  the  Samaritan 
stopped to he lp  him. But he p resen ts  h i s  sermons a 
" b a s ic a l ly  o p t i m i s t i c  view of man's na ture  and the  human 
l o t ,  s t r e s s i n g  th e  benevolent  and p h i la n th ro p ic  aspects  
of  man's c h a r a c te r ,  and tending to expla in  a l l  apparent  
i n c o n g ru i t i e s  in  terms o f  the  p ro v id en t ia l  design of 
benef icen t  C rea to r ."
However, S te rne  never judges moral a c t io n  o r  c h a rac te r  
on the  b a s i s  of a f f e c t io n s  alone.  "When he speaks, in  the  
sermons, of good o r  v ic ious  pass ions ,  he means only to  
i n d ic a te  t h e i r  gen e ra l  tendency toward v i r tu o u s  or  e v i l  
a c t s  ; but the  moral worth o f  the  ac t  is  determined by some 
s tandard ou ts ide  th e  emotional c o n s t i t u t io n - - b y  the  law of  
God o r  the  pronouncements o f  reason.  . . . Judgments o f  
moral ch a rac te r  t a k e  account of  the  whole p e r s o n a l i ty .
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not of ind iv id ua l  i n s t i n c t s ,  which a re  always innocent 
j u s t  because they a re  mechanical ."  Sterne,  l i k e  Hume, 
b e l iev e s  t h a t  although reason alone is  not adequate as a 
guide to moral a c t io n ,  one should gain  knowledge through 
experience so t h a t  h i s  sen t im enta l  i n t u i t i o n  is  condit ioned 
and informed by an awareness o f  the  customary motives and 
a t t i t u d e s  o f  men in  h is  s o c ie ty .  Goodness not  only does 
not depend upon th e  spontaneous i n s t i n c t i v e  response or  
the  p lea su re  i t  b r in g s ,  i t  may a lso  be harmful unless  
supported by co n s id e ra t io n  of the  needs of  s o c i e ty  a t  l a r g e .  
"A good man makes a p r a c t i c e  o f  reasoning out  the  needs 
of  h i s  whole so c ie ty  and looks upon the need of  a p a r t i c u l a r  
person in terms of i t s  l a rg e  e f f e c t s .
In  t h e  r o l e  o f  country parson Sterne  holds up h i s  
moral id ea l  f o r  emulation and im i ta t io n .  He does not take  
the  old humor psychology s e r io u s ly .  He b e l iev e s  t h a t  
whichever n a tu r a l  i n s t i n c t s  a re  indulged grow strong and 
dominant in  th e  p e r s o n a l i ty .  To develop a benevolent 
temper, "a s e t t l e d  p r i n c i p l e  of  humanity and v i r t u e , "  
r equ i re s  r igorous  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  the  
v ic ious  i n c l i n a t i o n s  with which we a re  born have been 
c u l t i v a t e d  and made s t ro n g e r  by h a b i t  and custom. IVhen a 
v ic iou s  pass ion  grows dominant in  a p e r s o n a l i ty ,  S terne
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does r e f e r  to i t  as a " ru l ing  p ass io n ,"  thus a s so c ia t in g  
i t  w i th  a humor. But one can a l t e r  o r  break the  h ab i t  of 
indulging a ru l in g  passion.  I d e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  he would 
d isag ree  with Congreve and o thers  who s t r e s s e d  the  
im p o s s ib i l i t y  of  changing one 's  humor. Although the  
benevolent temper or th e  ru l ing  pass ion  has a bas is  in  
n a tu r a l  i n s t i n c t ,  i t  i s  the r e s u l t  of  the  o rd e r  and 
o rg an iz a t io n  a person has allowed h i s  impulses.
The grea t  end and design of  our holy r e l i g io n ,  
next to  the  main view of  r e c o n c i l in g  us to  God, was to  
r e c o n c i l e  us to each o th e r ; - - b y  teach ing  us to subdue 
a l l  those  un fr ien d ly  d i sp o s i t io n s  in  our na tu re ,  which 
u n f i t  us for happiness , and th e  s o c i a l  enjoyment of 
th e  many b less ings  which God has enabled us to partake  
o f  in t h i s  world, miserable  as i t  i s ,  in  many r e sp ec t s .  
--Could C h r i s t i a n i ty  persuade the  p ro fe s so r s  of  i t  
in to  t h i s  temper, and engage u s ,  as i t s  doc tr ine  
r e q u i r e s ,  to go on and exal t  our  n a tu r e s ,  and, a f t e r  
t h e  subduction of the most u n f r ien d ly  o f  our pass ions ,  
to  p l a n t ,  in  the  room of  them, a l l  those  (more n a tu ra l  
to  the  s o i l )  humane and benevolent i n c l i n a t i o n s ,  which, 
in  im i ta t io n  of  t h e  p e r fe c t ion s  o f  God, should dispose 
us to extend our love and goodness to  our fel low- 
c r e a t u r e s ,  according to the ex ten t  o f  our a b i l i t i e s ; —in 
likemanner, as the  goodness o f  God extends i t s e l f  over 
a l l  the  works of  the  c rea t io n : - -C o u ld  t h i s  be accom­
p l i s h e d , - - t h e  world would be worth l i v i n g  in.%7
S t e r n e ' s  e th ic s  a re ,  obviously ,  convent ional  and h is
sermons reveal  the  in f luence  of and include passages borrowed
from th e  L a t i tu d in a r i a n  d iv ines .  The fac t  t h a t  he included
one sermon in  volume two of  T r is t ram  Shandy and published
two volumes of  sermons while the  T r is t ram  was s t i l l  in
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progress  in d ic a t e s ,  and th e re  i s  no evidence to the  contrary,  
t h a t  S t e r n e ' s  e th ics  had not changed between the  time he 
wrote the  sermons and the  time he wrote h i s  nove ls .  The 
moral idea l ism  o f  the  sermons is  the  ethos w i th in  which 
th e  good-natured cha rac te rs  and moral themes o f  Tr is tram  
Shandy and A Sentimental  Journey must be seen.
F ie ld in g  explains  t h a t  h is  f i c t i o n a l  cha rac te r s  are  
a l l  moral ly  imperfect because,  f i r s t l y ,  p e r f e c t l y  good 
o r  bad people a re  neyer met with in  r e a l  l i f e ,  and secondly, 
p e r f e c t  examples haye no p o s i t iv e  moral impact. But " i f  
t h e r e  be enough of  goodness in a c h a r a c te r  to engage the  
adm ira t ion  of a wel l-d isposed  mind . . . nothing can be 
o f  more moral use than the  imperfec tions which a re  seen 
i n  examples o f  t h i s  kind;  s ince  such^form a kind o f  su rp r i se ,  
more apt  to  a f f e c t  and dwell upon our minds, than  the  f a u l t s
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o f  very v ic iou s  and wicked persons.  F ie ld ing  also  says 
he w i l l  teach  by g iving examples r a t h e r  than by preaching.  
S te rne  might have said  exac t ly  the  same about h i s  own 
f i c t i o n .  However, S t e r n e ' s  purpose was f a r  d i f f e r e n t  from 
F i e l d i n g ' s .  F i e ld i n g ' s  purpose in  Tom Jones was to  make 
good men wise (prudent)  and to a t t a c k  th e  e v i l s  of  soc ie ty  
as he saw them. Because o f  the  t ru s tw o r th y ,  pe rcep t iv e ,  
a r t f u l ,  good-natured n a r r a t o r ,  F i e ld i n g ' s  d id ac t ic ism  is
I l l
c l e a r l y  evident  and his  moral id ea l  i s  ever -p resen t  to 
revea l  th e  inadequacies of  the  im perfec t ly  good charac te rs  
as they ,  s imultaneously,  reveal  t h e  f a u l t s  of so c ie ty .
But S te rne  s h i f t s  the  emphasis from the  ex te rn a l  to the  
i n t e r n a l .  In h is  f i c t i o n  S te r n e ' s  "g rea t  aim . . . was 
to g ive  as t ru e  a p ic tu re  as p o s s ib le  of  r e a l  human beings 
as they a re  in  themselves ."^9 We a re  always aware th a t  
S t e r n e ' s  ch a rac te r s  could be b e t t e r  o r  l e s s  absurd than they 
a re ,  bu t  S t e r n e ' s  purpose i s  not p r im a r i ly  to reveal  the  
e v i l s  of  so c ie ty  or  to measure h i s  cha rac te r s  agains t  h i s  
i d ea l  and r i d i c u l e  them fo r  f a l l i n g  s h o r t .  Rather S te rn e 's  
c h a ra c te r s  reveal  tha t  the  d i s p a r i t y  between the  idea ls  
man forms in  h is  mind and the  r e a l i t y  he experiences grows 
out of  h i s  insurmountable inadequac ies .
An anonymous c r i t i c  in  the  Times L i t e r a ry  Supplement 
(Apri l  9, 1949, p. 232) commented, "S terne  poised between 
th e  Age of  Reason and the Age of Fee l in g ,  i s  one of the  
l e a s t  sen t im enta l  w r i t e r s ,  fo r  he never confused the  h e a r t  
and th e  head.  . . . Real i ty  fo r  S te rne  was n e i th e r  reason
or\
nor f e e l i n g ,  but the  opposi t ion  o f  the  two." This 
s ta tement i s  app licab le  to S te rn e ' s  p r a c t i c e  in  h is  f i c t i o n ,  
not  to h i s  moral s tance in h is  sermons. In  none of S te rn e 's  
c h a ra c te r s  do reason and fee l in g  fu nc t ion  harmoniously
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to g e th e r  as they i d e a l ly  should. Yorick in  Tr is tram  Shandy 
comes the c lo s e s t  to embodying the  idea l  expressed in  the  
sermons, some of which a re  a t t r i b u t e d  to him, but  the  man 
who can express the  idea l  fo r  o th e rs  cannot l i v e  up to i t  
e i t h e r .  In r e a l i t y ,  man is  impelled one way then another 
by h is  head and h e a r t .  Each c h a ra c te r  provides a v a r i a t i o n  
on the  c o n f l i c t  but a l l  r e a f f i r m  th a t  man i s  g ross ly  inadequate 
f o r  h is  own id e a l s .
Sterne be l ieves  th a t  everyone has a ru l in g  passion,
which makes the  po ssess ion  o f  one seem in e v i t a b l e ,  but
he a lso  be l ieves  t h a t  the most innocent,  t r i v i a l  obsess ion
31can keep a c h a ra c te r  o f f  h i s  moral ba lance .  Uncle 
Toby's sympathetic good n a tu re ,  h i s  moral ch a rac te r ,  i s  
marred by h is  humor, j u s t  as W al te r 's  is  marred by h is  
weakness fo r  t h e o r i e s .  I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to demonstrate 
t h a t  Toby's hobbyhorse is  the  cause of  absurd and harmful 
a c t i o n s .
But the  indecorousness o f  the  ac t ions  o f  Uncle Toby 
n e i t h e r  rea f f i rm s  h i s  innocent good n a tu re ,  as i t  does 
with  the  n a i f ,  nor passes a fo rc e fu l  moral judgment upon 
him as with Goldsmith 's  Man in  Black. Rather the  
incons is tency  r e f l e c t s  Toby's i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  As a 
Good-Natured Man, Toby inco rpora te s  to some degree in  h i s
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c h a ra c te r  and in  h is  mind the  t r u e  va lues  of  e igh teen th -  
century s o c i e ty ,  and th e s e  values are  t r e a t e d  s e r io u s ly  
by S te rne .  As a hum oris t ,  Toby has h is  i n t e r r e l a t e d  p h ys ica l  
and psycholog ica l  l i m i t a t i o n s .  I t  i s  of  course an over­
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  to say t h a t  Toby's c o n f l i c t  i s  between h i s  
good n a tu re  and h i s  humor. But to  s t a t e  the  c o n f l i c t  
thus p o in ts  up the  f a c t  t h a t  the  d i s p a r i t y  Sterne revea ls  
is  not p r im a r i ly  between what Uncle Toby is  and what he 
should be,  but between what he i s  (good-natured, sympathetic , 
t ender ,  e t c . )  and what he i s  (obsessed with armies, 
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ,  and b a t t l e s ) .  The i l l  e f f e c t s  he br ings  
about a re  symptomatic o f  h i s  dominant hobby-horsica l  
c h a ra c te r  j u s t  as h is  ready sympathy i s  symptomatic o f  h i s  
genuine good n a tu re .  T r i s t r a m ' s  unna tura l  c ircumcision is  
i n d i r e c t l y  caused by Uncle Toby's obsess ion with h is  
m in ia tu re  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ,  which i s  i n d i r e c t l y  caused by 
the  wound to h is  g ro in  and h is  need to communicate the  
circumstances surrounding i t  to  o th e r s .  I f  we t r y  to 
follow th e  cause and e f f e c t s  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  implied in  
T r is t ram  Shandy, we u l t i m a t e l y  d iscover  t h a t  th ings f a l l  
out as they  do because people a re  what they a re  and a t  the  
same time cannot be he ld  respons ib le  fo r  being what they  a re .
Uncle Toby's humor, l i k e  the  monomania's of  the  o th e r
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Shandean c h a r a c te r s ,  has i t s  pyschologlcal  bas is  in Locke's 
theory  o f  the a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  ideas d iscussed e a r l i e r .
S te rne  found the  p ro p o s i t io n  t h a t  men know not r e a l i t y ,  
but only t h e i r  own exper ience ,  a basis fo r  h is  comic 
c h a r a c te r s ,  n a r r a t i v e  techn iques ,  and themes. He takes 
t h i s  p ro p o s i t io n  s e r io u s ly  and demonstrates i t s  v a l i d i t y  
in  the  a c t io n s  o f  h i s  ch a rac te r s  and the  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the  
novel.  John Traugo t t  sees a l l  of  th is  as c l e a r l y  as 
anyone but  concludes by saying,  "The po in t  i s  t h a t  
S terne  i s  concerned much l e s s  with C h r i s t i a n i ty ,  i f  we are  
to judge from the  space a l l o t t e d  i t ,  than with descr ib ing  
p re tenders  to wisdom, and l e s s  with descr ib ing  pre tenders  
to wisdom than in  making a r h e to r i c a l  and s a t i r i c  
demonstration of  human p a s s i o n . guc what makes the  
"demonstration o f  human passion" important i s  i t s  implica tions  
fo r  m o ra l i ty .  A l l  the  d isc u ss io n  about the  pass ions ,  reason, 
language, communication, education, or any o th e r  of  the  
themes i n  T r i s t r a m  Shandy have importance as they have 
im pl ica t ions  fo r  m o ra l i ty .  Sterne as a s incere  m o ra l i s t  
and parson consc ious ly  s t ro v e  to reconci le  us to  God and 
to each o t h e r . I n  f i c t i o n  Sterne  i s  concerned with m ora l i ty  
in  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Relat ionships in  T r is t ram  Shandy 
a re  as r e a l  as humors and the  q u a l i t i e s  which make them
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good a re  as r e a l  and obvious as those  which a re  de tr imenta l ,  
Uncle Toby possesses the  q u a l i t i e s  ( a l l  of which we may 
r e f e r  to  as "sympathy") which promote human understanding, 
communication, and love  as a ssu red ly  as he possesses a 
monomania which ac t s  i n  o p po s i t io n  to sympathy.
Much has been made of  S t e r n e ' s  treatment o f  time 
in T r i s t r a m  S h a n d y However,  T r is t ram ,  the  n a r r a to r ,  is 
the  only  c h a ra c te r  in  the  s to r y  who is  acu te ly  aware of 
and s t ru g g l in g  with t ime.  Because he has l ived  to see 
the  pass ing  o f  a l l  the  ch a rac te r s  he wri tes  about and is 
th rea tened  by death h im se l f ,  he causes us to see a l l  the 
ch a rac te r s  aga ins t  a background o f  t ransc ience  and f in i tu d e .  
This i s  pa r t  o f  the  reason why he can show us the  absurd i ty  
o f  l i f e  and make us eager  to  l i v e  i t  at the  same time.
He, l i k e  Thornton Wilder in  Our Town, makes us f e e l ,  "My, 
_/isn’_ t / l i f e  awful--and wonderful."  But Uncle Toby and 
the  o th e r  ch a rac te r s  a re  not  perceived under the aspect 
of  time and change, but  a re  s t a t i c  and complete. They 
reveal  themselves as more and more the  same in ac t ions 
th a t  e la b o ra te  t h i s  sameness s p a t i a l l y  r a th e r  than a l t e r  
i t . T h i s  too i s  important  fo r  i t s  moral implica t ion .
There i s  no i n d ic a t i o n  th a t  Toby or anyone e l s e  w i l l  
ever reso lve  the  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  and achieve the ideal
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which he himself  admires. Arthur Cash s t a t e s ,  ’’Knowing 
how impossible i t  would be to  f a b r i c a t e ,  in  a novel,  some 
pe r fec t  c h a ra c te r  who might serve as a measure o f  v i r t u e ,  
Sterne had Corporal Trim read aloud h is  bes t  moral sermon, 
'The Abuses of  Conscience Considered. '  We can ha rd ly  
doubt th a t  S te rne  regarded t h i s  d iscourse  as h is  major 
moral and r e l i g io u s  s t a t e m e n t . "^5 the  sermon is lo s t
upon the  audience;  the  id ea l  is  l o s t  upon the r e a l - -  
u n iv e r s a l ly  and e t e r n a l l y .
Thus, by see ing  th e  proper  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of S te rn e ' s  
s a t i r e  o r  demonstra tion of human pass ion ,  S te rne 's  moral 
id ea l ,  the  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  of  Uncle Toby, and the  s t a t i c  
na tu re  o f  t h i s  prominent Good-Natured Man, this  major 
(though imperfect)  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f -sen t im enta l  e t h i c s ,  
we should be ab le  to  see more c l e a r l y  the  a r t  o f  the  work. 
Without any ove r t  d idac t ic ism  Sterne bu i ld s  an a i r - t i g h t  
case fo r  the va lue  o f  sympathy. He borrows the ideas of 
Locke in  h is  d isc u ss io n  of  language and h i s  inquiry " in to  
the  o r i g i n a l ,  c e r t a i n t y ,  and extent  of  human knowledge."
Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  to  S te rne  i s  Locke's  notion t h a t  
the  working o f  one 's  mind, the  a s s o c i a t io n  of  ideas ,  
" separa tes  the  ind iv idua l  from r e a l i t y ,  including o th e r  
in d iv id ua ls ,  and even h im self  should he forget  h i s  past
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i d e a s , "  and t h a t  c e r t a i n  knowledge of inner  na tu re ,  
q u a l i t i e s ,  and r e l a t i o n s  i s  impossible. But he r e j e c t s  
Locke 's  conclusion t h a t  reason, though a l i t t l e  candle,  
must be our l a s t  judge and guide in  every th ing .  S te rne  
shows the  "weakness and im b ec i l i ty  of human reason" and 
t h a t  only sympathy can recon c i le  the  i s o l a t e d ,  e cc en t r ic
Of:
egos of  the  Shandean c h a ra c te r s .  J u s t  as Toby's humor
i s  explained by Lockean no t ions ,  h i s  good n a tu re  i s
explained by Humean not ions  about sympathy. Hume br idges
the  communication gap between people " through a sent imenta l
i n t u i t i o n  of customary motives and a t t i t u d e s . "
But an imaginat ive  in s igh t  through the  a s s o c i a t io n  of  
ideas . . .  i s  necessary  to achieve t h i s  knowledge.
As we perceive  ac t ions  in  o thers  s i m i l a r  to  our  own, we 
form an idea of th e  emotions of  o t h e r s ,  and th e  idea 
i s  transformed in to  an impression, and becomes through 
a s s o c ia t io n  with ourse lves  a r e a l  pass ion  of  our own. 
But s t i l l  the  emotion o r  passion i s  not d i r ec te d  toward 
o u rse lves ,  but r a t h e r ,  we f e e l  fo r  and with the  ob jec t  
of  our i n t u i t i o n .  . . . Man i s  always a so c ia l  being, 
n e i t h e r  e g o i s t i c  nor s e l f l e s s  but always i n  some 
sympathetic  r e l a t i o n  ( in  normal behav io r ) .  Reason, 
being not an a c t iv e  f a c u l ty ,  becomes th e  s lave  of the 
pass ions ,  in  the  respec t  th a t  reason can do nothing 
without pass iona l  i n t u i t i o n . 37
Hobby-horses, human reason,  i s o l a t i o n  o f  the  ind iv idua l  
and the  t o t a l  f a i l u r e  o f  r a t i o n a l  correspondence a re  a l l  
o f  a p iece  and a l l  support  a view th a t  sees man as a 
determined, absurd c r e a tu r e .  But the  good-natured humorists
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in  T r is t ram  Shandy, and by im p l ica t io n  mankind in g enera l ,  
a re  saved from being the  despicable  vermin t h a t  S w i f t ' s  
King o f  Brobdingnag sees them to be because of  t h e i r  
capac i ty  fo r  sympathetic  correspondence. Through sent imenta l  
i n t u i t i o n  they can and do share  one a n o th e r ' s  fee l ings  and 
know one a n o th e r ' s  motives.  Toby d o e sn ' t  understand and 
do esn ' t  ca re  to  unders tand  W al te r ' s  metaphysics ,  but he 
does unders tand W a l te r ' s  pass iona l  needs to  d iscover  h i s  
l i f e  in  r a t i o n a l l y  e x p l ic a b le  systems. He a lso  unders tands 
W al te r ' s  good w i l l  toward and a f f e c t i o n  fo r  him. Ifhen 
Walter was t ry in g  to a r r i v e  a t  some p h i lo so p h ic a l  s o lu t io n ,  
"My Uncle Toby would give  my f a th e r  a l l  p o ss ib le  f a i r  play 
in  t h i s  a t tempt;  and with i n f i n i t e  p a t ien c e  would s i t  
smoaking h i s  p ipe  fo r  whole hours t o g e th e r ,  w h i l s t  my 
f a th e r  was p r a c t i c in g  upon h is  head."  Toby gains no 
unders tanding of W a l te r ' s  so lu t io n s .  "Whether they were 
above my Uncle Toby's r e a s o n , - - o r  c on tra ry  to  i t , - - o r  t h a t  
h i s  b ra in  was l i k e  wet t i n d e r ,  and no spark  could poss ib ly  
take  h o l d , - - o r  t h a t  i t  was so f u l l  of  saps ,  mines, b l in d s ,  
c u r t i n s ,  and such m i l i t a r y  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  to  h is  seeing 
c le a r ly "  in to  the  s o lu t io n s ,  T r is t ram  does not say ( I I I ,  
xxxix, 176). However, a l l  a re  implied to  be the  cause.
Toby i s  depic ted c o n s i s t e n t l y  as a man with "very l i t t l e
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choice" in  words ( I ,  x x i ,  50). While he i s  recovering 
from h is  wound he t r i e s  to  t e l l  h i s  guests the  circumstances 
o f  h is  m isfor tune  but f inds  the  t a s k  impossible and extremely 
u p s e t t i n g .  T r is t ram  a s s e r t s  th a t  the  " t rue  confusion in  
my Uncle Toby's d iscourse"  arose from "the unsteady uses 
o f  words which have perplexed the  c l e a r e s t  and most exa l ted  
unde rs tand ings ."  "Twas not  by id e a s , - -b y  heaven: his
l i f e  was put  in  jeopardy by words" ( I I ,  i i ,  67). Toby's 
unders tanding  of  human r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s ,  however, emphasized 
as much as h i s  lack  of unders tanding  of words. He cannot 
bear  to  hear  the  family d isg race - -D in ah 's  elopement with the  
coachman--and any account o f  b é n é f ic ian t  ac t ions o f  one 
person f o r  another  moves him to t e a r s .  His s e n s i t i v i t y  to 
f e e l in g s  i s  expressed by h i s  i n a b i l i t y  to hurt  a f l y  and 
by h i s  w h is t l in g  o f  L i l l a b u l l e r o  as a r e s t ra ined  way of  
g iv ing  vent to  h is  pass ions  "when anything shocked or 
su rp r i se d  h im ;- -bu t  e s p e c i a l l y  when anything, which he deem'd 
very absurd was o f f e r ' d "  ( I ,  xx i ,  52).
Thus, Sterne  shows t h a t  "between the word and the 
th ing" ( t h e  ob jec t  with  which reason must work) " f a l l s  the  
shadow o f  human f a i l i n g ;  and in  the  darkness grope beings 
in  comic i s o l a t i o n . B u t  through the flow of  f ee l in g  
which i s  given express ion  by ges tu re s  and exclamations
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men are  un i ted  in to  a brotherhood.  Like F i e l d i n g ' s ,
S te rn e ' s  work i s  shaped p r im a r i ly  by c o n t r a s t s .  And the 
fundamental c o n t r a s t  i s  incorpora ted  with in  the  charac te r  
of  Uncle Toby. Because we a re  su p e r io r  to Toby in  our 
unders tanding o f  h i s  world,  we see th a t  he is  both a 
fool (because of  h is  l im i te d  percep t ion  and humor) and 
the hope of th e  world (because o f  h i s  f ee l in g  and good 
n a tu re ) .  But Toby's i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  f inds i t s  r e f l e c t i o n  
w ith in  every o th e r  good-natured c h a rac te r  in Tr is tram  Shandy 
and between Toby and o t h e r  c h a r a c te r s .
In works in  which t h e  Good-Natured Man as humorist 
i s  a c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a Good-Natured 
Man ac t ing  moral ly  in so c ie ty  i s  t e s t e d .  The focus is  
p r im ar i ly  on the  c o n f l i c t s  and inco n s is te n c ie s  with in  
the c e n t r a l  c h a r a c t e r  and secondar i ly  on the c o n f l i c t s  
between the humorist and s o c ie ty .  The c o n f l i c t s  and the 
themes which a r i s e  from them r e f l e c t  an ambivalence on 
the pa r t  of th e  au tho r  because o f  h i s  f a i t h  in ,  ye t  d i s t r u s t  
o f ,  n a tu ra l  f e e l in g s  as a guide to v i r t u e .  Consequently, 
the main themes t r e a t e d  a r e ,  in  very general  terms: 
na tu re  versus a r t ,  f e e l in g  versus reason, hear t  versus 
head. IVhen the  c o n f l i c t  i s  i n t e r n a l ,  a r t ,  reason, and 
head a re  synonymous with s o c ia l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and r a t i o n a l
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judgment, r a t h e r  than  hypocrisy ,  deception,  and van ity --  
meanings the  terms take  on when the  c o n f l i c t  is  external  
as is  almost always th e  case in  F ie ld in g .  Also when the 
c o n f l i c t  i s  ex te rna l  and th e re  i s  a c o n t r a d ic t io n  between 
the  behavior o f  the  good man and the  manners of the  world, 
the  world i s  morally wrong. But when the  c o n f l i c t  is  
i n t e r n a l ,  i n c o n s is te n c ie s  in  the  behavior  of  the  good man 
reveal  th a t  he has not f u l f i l l e d  his  human p o te n t i a l  and 
as a moral being i s  cu lpab le .
The Man in  Black and Matthew Bramble have enough 
percep t iveness  to r e a l i z e  th a t  t h e i r  knowledge o f  the  
world i s  l im i ted  and consequently t h e i r  moral goodness 
i s  th rea ten ed .  Uncle Toby may not be conscious th a t  his 
knowledge o f  the  world i s  l im i ted  or t h a t  h is  good nature  
i s  co n s tan t ly  besieged by armies, but T r is t ram  and Walter 
a re  and th e re fo re  the  reader  cannot help but be. The 
Man in Black i s  the  most ha rsh ly  judged because he i s  
unable to b e n e f i t  from the  l im i te d  percep t ion  he does 
have. He continues to  indulge h i s  benevolent fee l ings  
even when he suspects  he is  being the instrument of  i n ju s t i c e .  
But although Goldsmith saw the  good-natured humorist as a 
moral f a i l u r e ,  he saw the  humorist as a s tage  in  the  
development of  the Good-Natured Man on the  way to becoming
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an a r t i s t  and paragon, t h a t  i s ,  a man l i k e  Squire  Thornh i l l  
who is  m ora l ly  good, s o c i a l ly  p e rcep t ive ,  and ab le  to 
conduct h im se l f  so th a t  he is  praiseworthy by both moral 
and s o c i a l  s t a n d a rd s .  Matthew Bramble i s  not a moral 
f a i l u r e ,  but h i s  l im i te d  ins igh t  into r e a l i t y  tu rns  him 
in to  a s i c k ,  peev ish ,  unsoc iab le ,  defensive human being.
As I  have poin ted  ou t ,  th e  moral eva lua t ion  o f  Bramble 
i s  of  secondary importance to Smolle t t ,  and t h e r e f o re  
th e r e  is  no s e r io u s  t rea tment  of  theme in the work. Uncle 
Toby i s  not  judged h a rsh ly  fo r  h i s  shortcomings p a r t l y  
because he lacks  p e rcep t io n  of  h i s  own in co n s is te n c ie s  and 
because S te rne  d i d n ' t  be l ieve  t h a t  the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
th e  l e a s t  p e rc e p t iv e  man and the  most pe rcep t iv e  one was 
very g re a t  o r  very important .  Sterne  p resen ts  Uncle Toby's 
moral predicament as the  un iversa l  human predicament--  
human l i f e  i s  governed more by fortune and p a r t i c u l a r  humors 
than by genera l  p r i n c i p l e s .
In conc lu s io n ,  in  The Man in  Black, Matthew Bramble, 
Uncle Toby, and by extension  a l l  good-natured humoris ts ,  
we have a t e s t i n g  of  both r a t i o n a l  and sen t im en ta l  e th i c s ,  
i . e . ,  of  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  cons is ten t  moral behavior  by 
the  Good-Natured Man. Because reason and f e e l in g  and 
head and h e a r t  a re  cons tan t ly  in  c o n f l i c t ,  because of a
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humor o r  because of  inadvertent  f a u l t y  pe rcep t ion ,  
c o n s i s t e n t  moral conduct i s  d i f f i c u l t  and u l t im a te ly  
im poss ib le .  As with the  n a i f ,  the  f a t e  o f  the  humorist 
i s  commensurate with h i s  moral d e s e r t s .  Since th e  good- 
na tu red  humoris t has within  himself  both the  moral and 
th e  immoral, the  normal and the absurd,  the  o rd e r  and 
confus ion ,  th e re  i s  no f in a l  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of  c o n f l i c t  
o r  comic r e s o l u t i o n  t h a t  turns a l l  h i s  c o n f l i c t s  and 
problems in to  i l l u s i o n s .  He simply goes on being h im se l f .  
The humorist does not function as the  n a i f  does, as a 
means which allows the  author to a t t a c k  so c ie ty  and 
v i n d i c a t e  good n a tu re ,  but r a th e r  he funct ions  as a 
means to  d i sp la y  an a t t i t u d e  which accepts so c i a l  
conventions but s t r e s s e s  to le rance  and f l e x i b i l i t y  w i th in  
t h e i r  l i m i t s ,  which accepts the he ro ic  and i ro n ic  in  human 
n a tu re  but s t r e s s e s  acceptance and sympathy in human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
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Chapter V
The Good-Natured Man as Paragon: The Social  Aspect
A f te r  reading T r is t ram  Shandy one is  not prepared to 
f ind be l iev a b le  any f i c t i o n a l  c h a rac te r s  who approximate 
the  Good-Natured Man as th e  id e a l  defined in  F i e ld i n g ' s ,  
Goldsmith’ s ,  and S t e r n e ' s  d i s c u r s iv e  w r i t in g s .  But such 
b e l i e f  is n e i th e r  necessa ry  nor h e lp fu l  anyrvay, fo r  the 
Good-Natured Man as paragon is  an unabashedly idea l ized  
c h a ra c te r ,  an ap o theos is .  He is  a c h a ra c te r  with f in e  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  who c o n t ro l s  h im se l f  and the  s i t u a t i o n s  in  
which he f inds h im sel f  in  o rd e r  to achieve his  own ends. 
Morally he i s  as admirable as th e  n a i f ;  s o c i a l ly  he is 
as a r t f u l  as the t r u e  wit  o f  R es to ra t io n  comedy. He is 
thoroughly  schooled in  th e  conventions,  fashions,  r i t u a l s ,  
and appearances which a re  a p p ro p r ia te  according to the 
d i c t a t e s  o f  soc ie ty  fo r  r ev e a l in g  or  concealing m ora l i ty ,  
c u l t u r e ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  and emotions. And he knows soc ia l  
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  and r e p u ta t i o n  a re  determined by the  decorum 
of o n e 's  manners, ways, appearances,  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the 
s o c ia l  code and r e a l i t y .  On the  o th e r  hand, the Good- 
Natured Man as paragon i s  no s lave  to  so c ia l  s tandards and
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he dissembles only to achieve  worthy ends. Thus, he i s  
the  a n t i t h e s i s  o f  both the  " p o l i t i c i a n "  as charac te r ized  
by Hobbes and Mandeville and the  "witwoud" of Res to ra t ion  
comedy. As well as be ing a c r e a t u r e  of good na tu re ,  
unders tanding ,  and a r t ,  t h e  Good-Natured Man as a paragon 
almost always has weal th and a p o s i t io n  of influence in  
so c ie ty .
The above d e s c r ip t io n  i s  based on the dep ic t ion  of  
such cha rac te r s  as S i r  Charles Grandison, i n  Richardson 's  
novel. S i r  William T h o rn h i l l  in The Vicar o f  Wakefield ,
S i r  William Honeywood in  The Good Natur 'd  Man, S i r  Charles 
Allgood in James Nelson 's  The A ffec t iona te  Father  (1786), 
Bevil J r .  i n  S t e e l e ' s  Conscious Lovers (1722), and 
Hermsprong in  Robert Bage 's  Hermsprong, or Man as He Is  
Not (1796). But the  d e s c r ip t io n  is  very l ik e  what F ie ld ing
descr ibes  as h is  id ea l  in  th e  concluding stanza of  "Of
True Greatness" :
Lives t h e r e  a Man, by Nature form'd to p lea se .
To th ink  with D igni ty ,  express with Ease;
Upright  in  P r i n c i p l e ,  in  Council s trong.
Prone not to change, nor o b s t i n a t e  too long;
To whose b l e s t  Lot su p e r io r  Por t ions  f a l l .
To most o f  Fortune,  and of  T as te  to a l l .
Aw'd not by Fear,  by P re ju d ic e  not sway'd,
By Fashion led no t ,  nor by Whim be t ray 'd .
By Candour only b i a s ' d ,  who s h a l l  dare 
To view and judge and speak Men as they a re .
In  him, ( i f  such th e re  be) i s  Greatness shewn. . . .^
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The Good-Natured Man as paragon r e f l e c t s  the  attempt to  
t ranspose  the  idea l  d i r e c t l y  in to  the concre te ,  l iv in g  
and human.
Due to  the very n a tu re  o f  t h i s  at tempt the  Good- 
Natured Man as paragon is  very  l i k e  a " c h a r a c t e r ” such 
as was popular in  sermons, p e r io d ic a l  essays ,  r e l i g io u s  
and p o l i t i c a l  t r a c t s ,  and almost a l l  types o f  w r i t in g ;  
he i s  a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n  of  a concept, not a human being.
He seems to e x i s t  only to  i l l u s t r a t e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and, 
t h e r e f o re ,  functions as a simple  ( e a s i l y  recognized and 
understood) and nearly  p e r f e c t  p a t t e r n  o f  moral conduct. 
Because of t h i s  he i s  not in  h im self  very b e l ie v a b le ,  
i n t e r e s t i n g ,  lovable ,  o r  humorous, and he is  not v e r s a t i l e  
in func t ion .  He does not evoke r i d i c u l e  or  ambivalence; 
we a re  not supe r io r  to him in  our unders tanding o f  h is  
s i t u a t i o n  o r  h is  so c ie ty ;  we can only watch and admire him 
as he ac ts  s k i l l f u l l y ,  decorously ,  j u s t l y ,  benevolen t ly ,  
and superhumanly. In s h o r t ,  he does not provide the 
comic p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  a n a i f  o r  humoris t.
Delight  and i n s t r u c t i o n  a r i s e  l a rg e ly  from the 
mis takes and in co n s is te n c ie s  o f  the  n a i f  and humoris t.  
Because the  e v i l  world causes the  n a i f ' s  good in te n t io n s  
to go awry, h is  moral c h a r a c t e r  i s  not c a l le d  in to
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ques t ion  by h is  a c t io n s ;  because o f  the  complexity and 
l i m i t a t i o n  o f  the  hum oris t ' s  ch a rac te r ,  he remains lovable ,  
i f  not a p a t t e r n  o f  v i r t u e .  With both we a re  always aware 
of  the  he ro ic  or l auda to ry  and the  i r o n i c .  We always sense 
the  c o n t r a s t  between the  ind iv id ua l  and s o c ie ty ,  sub jec t ive  
and o b je c t i v e ,  mental s t a t e  and outward c o n d i t io n .  The 
paragon, on the  o th e r  hand, has no f a u l t s ,  in c o n s is te n c ie s ,  
or  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  and he triumphs i n  a l l  h i s  ex te rnal  
c o n f l i c t s .  We accept the concept he rep re sen ts  as worthy, 
but we do not b e l i e v e  in him as a c h a ra c te r  any more than 
we b e l i e v e  in  the l i f e l i k e n e s s  of  a l l e g o r i c a l  f igures  o r  
heroes in  romance. Thus, the  paragon is  not always 
d e l i g h t f u l  and e n t e r t a i n in g ,  but he f u l f i l l s  a s ig n i f i c a n t  
ro le  in  providing i n s t r u c t io n  and developing themes.
This chap ter  is  s u b t i t l e d  "The Soc ia l  Aspect" 
because of the  emphasis t h a t  is  im p l ic i t  in the charac te r  
of  the  paragon. The moral charac te r  of th e  n a i f  i s  not 
quest ioned because the emphasis im p l ic i t  in  h is  ch a rac te r  
is  upon in t e r n a l  goodness, motive, innocence, in  a l l  of 
which he is  impeccable. The moral c h a ra c te r  o f  the  humorist 
is c a l l e d  in to  quest ion  because the  emphasis im p l ic i t  in  
his  c h a ra c te r  i s  upon both in te rn a l  goodness (because he 
has good nature)  and goodness in the  world o f  experience
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(because he has some s o c ia l  u n d e rs tan d in g ) . He is  
in co n s is te n t  in one or both .  The moral c h a ra c te r  of  the 
paragon i s ,  o f  course,  not c a l le d  into  quest ion  because 
the emphasis im p l ic i t  in  h i s  c h a ra c te r  i s  upon p ruden t ia l  
phi lan thropy in the  world o f  experience and he provides 
the p e r f e c t  example. Moreover, i t  i s  c l e a r l y  h is  high 
so c ia l  s t a t u s ,  wealth, and s o c ia l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  th a t  
p ro te c t s  h is  good n a tu re .  I'Jhen he d i sg u ise s  h imself  o r
assumes a f a l s e  name as do, fo r  example, Burchel l  in
The Vicar  of Wakefield and Hermsprong in  Man as He Not, 
he loses  the  esteem of many and finds h im sel f  in  t roub le  
with the  lo rds  and la d ie s  o f  so c ie ty .
Since th e  Good-Natured Man as paragon has resolved 
the c o n f l i c t  between the  idea l  and r e a l ,  moral and s o c i a l ,  
innocence and experience,  n a tu re  and a r t ,  impulsive 
goodness and prudence, g e n e ro s i ty  and s e l f i s h n e s s ,  he is  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l - s u i t e d  fo r  minor ro le s  in  works s t a r r i n g  
the n a i f .  He n a tu ra l ly  funct ions as a moral s tandard or  
norm, a t rus tworthy  commentator upon the  weaknesses,
e r r o r s ,  and worthy q u a l i t i e s  o f  the  n a i f ,  and a means of
giv ing  s t ra igh t fo rw ard  express ion  to th e  ideas and values 
of  th e  au thor .  He also may come to the  rescue o f  the 
n a i f  and overru le  the  blocking ch arac te rs  and n u l l i f y  t h e i r
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a c t io n s .  We have a l ready  noted t h a t  S i r  William Thornhil l  
and S i r  William Honeywood in Goldsmith 's  The Vicar of  
Wakefield and The Good N atur 'd  Man fu n c t io n  in  t h i s  way.
As a minor c h a ra c te r  the  paragon becomes involved 
with the  n a i f  who has h is  s t a b l e ,  harmonious, simple order  
(u su a l ly  a country soc ie ty )  d i s ru p ted  and i s  introduced 
in to  u n s ta b le  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The n a i f  may not understand 
the  d i s r u p t iv e  forces  or events ,  and h i s  r e l a t io n s h ip s  
may become more and more complicated u n t i l  the  paragon 
s teps in  to  reso lve  the  complications and remove the 
i n s t a b i l i t y .  Thus, he br ings about the  conventional  comic 
r e s o lu t io n  and tu rns  a l l  the n a i f ' s  t ro u b le s  in to  i l l u s i o n s .  
But as poin ted  out in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  conclusion  of The 
Vicar  of  Wakefie ld , i t  i s  erroneous to contend th a t  since 
t h i s  p lo t  r e v e r sa l  i s  conventional  i t  should not be taken 
s e r io u s ly .  For when the  Good-Natured Man as paragon 
funct ions  as a conventional  comic device ,  we may be sure 
t h a t  h i s  a c t io n  i s  in  keeping with  h is  i d e a l  cha rac te r  and 
h is  func t ion  as a moral norm. Accordingly we do not be l ieve  
in the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  the  rescue any more than  we do in  
the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  any o th e r  comic r e s o l u t i o n  o r  p lo t  
r e v e r s a l .  We f e e l  t h a t  " th i s  should be" because i t  
s a t i s f i e s  the  expec ta t ions  aroused in  t h e  work; we ask
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"what does t h i s  mean?" because of  the  j u x ta p o s i t io n  of 
t h e  n a i f ,  the  paragon, and the  r e p re se n ta t iv e s  o f  co rrup t  
s o c i e ty  a t  t h i s  c r i t i c a l  point  in  the  ac t io n .
The ju x ta p o s i t i o n  o f  the  good-natured n a i f  as an 
apparent  f a i l u r e  in  so c ie ty  and the  good-natured paragon 
as a so c ia l  success has many im p l ic a t io n s .  The very 
presence o f  the  paragon undercuts  the  worth o f  th e  n a i f  
and renders  him somewhat r id i c u lo u s .  îvTien no paragon 
i s  p resen t  (as i n  Joseph Andrews) , we a s so c ia te  the  n a i f  
w i th  genuine goodness; when a paragon is  present  the  n a i f  
i s  equated with simple,  untaught goodness. We have already 
discussed  in Chapter Three o th e r  im plica t ions  t h i s  
j u x t a p o s i t i o n  has fo r  the  n a i f .  The in te rv e n t io n  o f  the  
paragon, who rep re sen ts  both a moral, and so c ia l  id ea l ,  
i n  behalf  of the n a i f  tu rns  the  r i d i c u l e  back upon the 
s o c i e ty  which causes d iscomfort  to the  n a i f .  But the  
ve ry  fac t  t h a t  t h e  s a v io r  i s  an id e a l i z e d ,  romantic hero 
r e in f o r c e s  the  im p rob ab i l i ty  o f  the  su rv iv a l  o f  the  simple, 
good man in  contemporary s o c ie ty .
The j u x t a p o s i t i o n  o f  the  paragon and so c ie ty  has 
even broader im p l i c a t i o n s , but they w i l l  be c l e a r e r  a f t e r  
we have discussed  the  paragon as p ro ta g o n is t .
ÏThen the  Good-Natured Man as paragon is  the  main
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c h a r a c t e r ,  t h e  work i s ,  of course, much c lo s e r  to  what 
F ie ld in g  def ined  as se r ious  romance than  to  what he 
defined as comic romance, c lo s e r  to  the  mode o f  f i c t i o n  
Northrop Frye c a l l s  romance than to  the  mode he c a l l s  
low mimetic.  The themes a s so c ia ted  with the  c h a rac te r  o f  
the  Good-Natured Man rece ive  d i r e c t  t rea tm ent  and almost 
any idea o f  i n t e r e s t  to an author ga ins  a u th o r i ty  by being 
spoken by t h e  paragon. Thus, the  d id a c t ic i s m  i s  o v e r t ,  
but s i m p l i s t i c .  The danger in  such a work is  expressed 
by th e  h e ro in e  of  Robert Bage's Barham Down (1783): 
"Uniformity in  goodness, i s  un i fo rm ity  in  dulness ;  and 
the  most u n i n te r e s t i n g  of  a l l  c h a ra c te r s  t h a t  ever  were 
drawn i s ,  I  f in d ,  the  s t i f f  s ta rch ed ,  demure, formal,
3
a l l - v i r t u o u s  S i r  Charles Grandison."- However, when the  
paragon p r o ta g o n i s t  i s  surrounded by s t ro n g ly  in d iv idu a l ized  
c h a r a c t e r s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  when some o f  those  a re  charac te rs  
o f  simple goodness o r  ch arac te rs  who do not value o r  are  
unw il l ing  to  b e l iev e  in the  paragon 's  thorough goodness, 
as in  S t e e l e ' s  Conscious Lovers and Bage's Hermsprong, 
the  work i s  saved from d u l ln e ss .
In  Conscious Lovers I s a b e l l a ,  the  aunt to Indiana ,  
has lea rned  from harsh experience i n  the  world not to 
put too much t r u s t  in  men. She once had "much love fo r
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a man who poorly Left _/her/ to  marry an e s t a t e . " ^
Therefore ,  to  save Indiana from th e  same f a t e  she intends ■ 
to prevent he r  from "being any o th e r  than a v i r g i n ,  except 
upon proper terms" ( I I ,  i i ,  41) . In  counseling Indiana 
she admits t h a t  "Mr. Bevil c a r r i e s  h i s  hypocrisy  the 
bes t  of  any man l iv in g ,  but s t i l l  he i s  a man, and 
th e re fo re  a hypocr i te .  . . . They embrace without  love; 
they make vows without conscience o f  o b l ig a t io n ;  they 
a re  . . . seducers to  the  crime wherein they pretend to 
be l e s s  g u i l t y . "  She says Bevil J r .  and a l l  mankind are  
"serpents- who l i e  in  wait fo r  doves," and they " th ink  
the  worse of  you fo r  your confidence in  them." "Such is  
the  world" t h a t  " f a i r  and n a tu r a l  deal ings  i s  to i n v i t e  
i n j u r i e s ;  ' t i s  b lea t ing  to escape wolves who would devour 
you'." ( I I ,  i i ,  39).
Because of  the  complications which a r i s e  from Bevil 
J r . ' s  love f o r  Indiana and h is  f a t h e r ' s  wish fo r  him to 
marry Lucinda Sealand, B e v i l ' s  good c h a ra c te r  i s  quest ioned 
by almost everyone. When Mr. Sealand and S i r  John Bevil 
a re  t ry in g  to  agree upon a " t r e a t y  fo r  u n i t i n g  our f a m i l i e s , "  
Mr. Sealand says " ' T i s / B e v i l ' ^ /  morals t h a t  I doubt"
(IV, i i ,  74).  The doubt a r i s e s  because o f  D e v i l ' s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  
with Indiana .  Myrtle,  who has a " v io le n t  and u n t r a c ta b le  .
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pass ion  of j ea lousy ,"  loves Lucinda and suspects  tha t  
Bevil  i s  t r y in g  to cheat him o f  h e r .  He does not t r u s t  
B e v i l ' s  apparent good nature  any more than I s a b e l l a  does. 
"This cool manner i s  very agreeab le  to  the  abuse you have 
a lready made of  my s im p l ic i ty  and frankness ,  and I  see 
your moderation tends to your cun advantage and not mine-- 
to  your own sa fe ty ,  not con s id e ra t io n  of your f r iend ."
And he chal lenges Bevil  to  a duel (IV, i ,  70).
There a re  many more complica t ions ,  but Bevil  resolves 
them a l l  and proves t h a t ,  "His ac t ions  a re  t h e  r e s u l t  of  
th ink ing ,  and he has sense enough to make even v i r tu e  
fashionable"  ( I I ,  i i ,  40) . In  aver t ing  the  sense less  
duel he teaches  Myrtle tha t  " th e r e  i s  nothing manly but 
what is  conducted by reason and agreeable  to the  p rac t ic e  
of v i r t u e  and j u s t i c e "  (IV, i ,  73). Bevil says of  h im se l f - -  
and he is  never  wrong--that  he is "no more than what every 
gentleman ought to  be and I b e l i e v e  very many a re .  He is 
only one who takes more d e l ig h t  in  r e f l e c t i o n s  than in 
se n sa t io n s ."  He is one "who has a t ru e  t a s t e  o f  l i f e "  
and a "humane d isp o s i t io n"  and f inds g rea t  p leasure  in 
easing "an aching h e a r t , "  and seeing the  human "countenance 
l ig h te d  up in to  smiles of joy ,  on the  r e c e ip t  o f  a b i t  of 
ore which i s  superf luous and otherv?ise u se le s s  in a man's
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own pocket" ( I I ,  i i ,  46, 47) .
Although Bevil  J r .  i s  a r a t h e r  f l a t  c h a r a c te r ,  through 
him S te e le  p resen ts  in  a d e l i g h t f u l  but unambiguous manner 
h i s  ideas on marriage fo r  convenience, due l ing ,  the  merchant 
c l a s s ,  the  danger of excess ive  pass ion ,  the  duty o f  ch i ld ren  
to  p a re n t s ,  to  name the  major themes.
Hermsprong appeared in  1786, but  Bage's e th i c a l  theory ,  
c h a r a c t e r s ,  themes, and p lo t  s i t u a t i o n s  show him to be 
c lo s e r  to  F i e l d i n g ' s  g e n e ra t io n  in  temperament and concerns 
than to th e  w r i t e r s  o f  h is  own time l i k e  Godwin and H olc ro f t .^  
The in f luences  o f  V o l t a i r e ,  Rousseau, and l a t e  e igh teen th-  
century  English  thought a re  ev iden t ,  but fo r  the  most pa r t  
the  c o n f l i c t s  in  Bage's works a r e  between c h a ra c te r s  who 
a re  confirmed in  idea ls  s im i l a r  to  those of  the  
L a t i t u d in a r i a n s  and Shaftesbury  and ch arac te rs  who are  
confirmed in  th e  ideas s i m i l a r  to  those of Hobbes and 
Mandevil le . George Paradyne in  Bage's Man He %s (1792) 
i s  much l i k e  Tom J o n e s . He knows and accepts the  idea l  of 
good n a tu re  but f inds t h a t  th e  id e a l  is impossible  to 
achieve in  t h i s  world. Hermsprong has c o n f l i c t s  s im i l a r  
to  those  encountered by Tom Jones ,  Joseph Andrews, and 
Parson Adams, but he can confront  corrupted s o c ie ty ,  
expose i t s  co rrup t io n  and triumph over i t .  Dr. Bl ick
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and Lord Grondale a re  l i k e  most of  the  "grea t"  men in  
F i e ld i n g ’s works. They search d i l i g e n t l y  fo r  some 
s i n i s t e r  information about Hermsprong in  o rder  to be 
ab le  to  commit him to p r i so n .  "The inq u iry  was u n fo r tu na te .  
Mouths in  p len ty  were open in  h i s  p r a i s e ;  not one to h is  
d i s c r e d i t . "  The Hobbesian log ic  they apply to t h i s  data  
r e f l e c t s  on them and s o c ie ty ,  fo r  they a re  "very seldom, 
very seldom indeed,"  mistaken in  t h e i r  judgments o f  men.
They conclude " th a t  no man would give h imself  the  t ro u b le  
to  p lea se  everybody, without g rea t  and uncommon motives.
In p ro p o r t io n  as he was p l a u s ib l e ,  he must be the more 
dangerous.  His t a l e n t s  were f i n e ly  ca lcu la te d  fo r  the  
o f f i c e  o f  a spy; and a spy he c e r t a i n l y  was."^
Hermsprong is  a more i n t e r e s t i n g  c h a rac te r  than many 
o f  the  o th e r  paragon f ig u res  because, though his  goodness 
and h i s  s o c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  are  impeccable, his cha rac te r  
and l iv in g  h a b i t s  a re  unique.  His e c c e n t r i c i t i e s  never 
render  him r id ic u lo u s  because they a l l  de r ive  from h i s  
conscious choice .  He walks wherever he goes and "he w i l l  
walk you f o r t y  miles in  a morning," r i s e s  very e a r ly ,  drinks 
only w ater ,  takes  ba ths ,  and re fuses  to g ive  deference to  
Lord Grondale, Dr. B l ick ,  o r  any o ther  s o c i a l l y  p re s t ig io u s  
p e rs o n s .
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Hermsprong g ives  to Caroline Camplnet and Marie 
F lu a r t  an account of  his  background wherein we l ea rn  th a t  
he i s  the  son of a nobleman, was ra i sed  among the  "abor ig ines  
in America" and educated in France, and has made "excursions 
h a l f  over  Europe." He in h e r i t e d  the  fo r tunes  of h is  parents  
and g ra n d fa th e r  and has "d ispersed  the  money in to  d i f f e r e n t  
banks,  p r i n c i p a l l y  in  England, I t a l y ,  and America." He 
t e l l s  them t h a t  he has "come over in to  England, to  look 
a t  i t  ; r e so lv ed ,  i f  I  did not f ind i t  more su i t e d  to my 
t a s t e  than  th e  r e s t  o f  Europe, to  r e t u r n  to America, buy 
t h i r t y  thousand acres  of land,  and amuse myself peopling 
a d e s e r t "  (p .  171). L a te r  we f ind  o u t ,  however, t h a t  he i s  
S i r  Charles Campinet and has proof t h a t  Lord Grondale, 
Hermsprong's f a t h e r ' s  younger b r o th e r ,  acquired h is  e s t a t e s  
by f r au d .  Hermsprong did not immediately b r ing  a s u i t  
a g a in s t  Lord Grondale because soon a f t e r  a r r i v in g  at 
Grondale in  a d i s i n t e r e s t e d  and courageous ac t  he saves 
the  l i f e  of  Carol ine  Campinet, Lord Grondale 's  daughter,  
and lo se s  h is  hear t  to  h e r .  Like Burchel l  in  The Vicar of 
W akefie ld , he i s  an e i ron  cha rac te r  who appears to  be l e s s  
than  he i s ,  and l i k e  Burchell  he wants to  be apprecia ted  
and loved by a c e r t a i n  person fo r  what he i s  r a t h e r  than 
fo r  what he has .  His ro le  as e i ron  o f  course in v i t e s
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misjudgment o f  him by o th e r  c h a ra c te r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by 
the  a lazon  cha rac te r s  who are i n  c o n t r o l  of s o c ie ty .
The so c ie ty  of the  novel i s  the  v i l l a g e  o f  Grondale 
and the  v i l l a i n s  who o f f e r  r e s i s t a n c e  to  Hermsprong are  
c h ie f ly  Lord Grondale and Dr. B l ick ,  the  r e c to r  of Grondale 
and S i t h i n .  Bl ick  gains h is  power by " the agreeable  a r t  
o f  a s se n ta t io n "  which he uses t o  hold the  favor of  Lord 
Grondale. Lord Grondale i s  as unbel ievab ly  e v i l  as 
Hermsprong i s  good. The focus of  th e  novel i s  upon the  
c o n f l i c t  of  Hermsprong and Lord Grondale, and even though 
n e i t h e r  c h a ra c te r  is  be l iev a b le ,  t h e  v a lues ,  i s su e s ,  and 
sometimes even persons a t  stake in  th e  c o n f l i c t  a re  d i s t i n c t l y  
human. And the  a b s u r d i t i e s  Hermsprong f inds in  the  so c ia l  
system o f  Grondale a re  the  a b s u rd i t i e s  of  a l l  European 
s o c ie ty .
The p r in c ip a l  va lue  inherent  in  any Good-Natured Man 
i s ,  o f  course ,  a c t iv e  cha r i ty .  Hermsprong's benevolent  
a c t io n s  a re  p rofuse .  On one occasion he en ters  the  scene 
j u s t  a f t e r  Dr. Bl ick  has to ld  Miss Campinet concerning 
him t h a t  "yes, I  do know something o f  h im--I  wish I could 
say, something good. But, madam, he i s  a proud, haughty 
young man, who th inks  too well o f  h im se l f  to pay a proper 
r e sp ec t  to  h i s  b e t t e r s .  Over and above t h i s ,  madam, he i s
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an i n f i d e l ;  and you know, without f a i t h  our b e s t  works 
a re  splendid  s i n s . "  After  Miss Campinet informs Hermsprong 
th a t  Dr. Blick  had said  " th a t  benevolent  p ro p e n s i t i e s ,  
without  f a i t h ,  a r e  only splendid s in s , "  Hermsprong r e p l i e s ,  
"Surely  under any system, kindness to our  su f fe r in g  fel low- 
c re a tu re s  cannot be s in .  But f a i t h  i s  t h e  d o c to r ' s  vocat ion. 
I t  is  h i s  to speak comfort to  th e  sou l ,  and at yonder 
co t tag e  (po in t ing  to a d i s ta n t  one) i s  a proper  object  
of  h is  care ;  a poor woman in  agony f o r  h e r  l i t t l e  one, 
who per ished ,  I know not how, in  the confusion of  the  
n ig h t .  To me belongs the i n f e r i o r  care  o f  administer ing 
to  the  wants of  t h e  body" (p.  70) .
Dr. B l ick  i s  f u r th e r  r id ic u le d  by t h e  c o n t r a s t  between . 
h imself  and the  good country parson Woodcock. Dr. Blick 
"has church preferment  to  near 5.1000 per  annum; and has 
no t ,  I am to ld ,  l a i d  as ide  h is  expec ta t ions  of a b ishopr ic .  . 
Besides, tak ing  ca re  not to lose  anything of h i s  dues, by 
a fo o l i s h  l e n i t y ,  or  by a love o f  peace, the doctor  knows 
i t  i s  h i s  duty r a t h e r  to govern than to teach h i s  f lock;  
and he governs a_'la_ r o y a l , with imperious a i r s  and imperious 
commands." Woodcock, on the o th e r  hand, " is  one of the  
m ildes t  sons o f  men. I t  is t r u e ,  he preaches hum il i ty ,  
but he p ra c t i c e s  i t  a l s o ;  and takes p a in s ,  by example as
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well  as p recep t ,  to  make h i s  p a r i s h io n e r s  good, in  a l l  
t h e i r  o f f i c e s ,  t h e i r  d u t ie s ,  and r e l a t i o n s .  To the  poor 
he i s  indeed a b le s s in g ;  fo r  he g ives  comfort when he 
has nothing e l s e  to  g ive .  To him they apply when s i c k - -  
he gives them simple medicines;  when they are  in  doubt, 
he gives  them wholesome counsels '.  He is  learned too ,  and 
l i b e r a l  in  h is  op in ions ;  but o f  manners so simple, and so 
ignorant  of fash ion  and f o l l y ,  t h a t  to  appear in  t h e  world 
would sub jec t  him to i n f i n i t e  r i d i c u l e "  (p. 44) . Woodcock 
i s  obviously  a Parson Adams and B l ick  i s  a T r u l l i b e r .  The 
values o f  f a i t h  and good works and a r e l i g io n  t h a t  s t r e s s e s  
a c t iv e  benevolence rece ive  b a s i c a l l y  the  same t rea tment  
as in  F i e ld i n g ' s  novels .  The s imple  good na tu re  of  Parson 
Woodcock i s ,  l i k e  Parson Adams, v ind ic a te d  because of  
h is  r o l e  as country parson. Other  good-natured c h a rac te r s  
in  the  novel a re  esteemed not f o r  simple good nature, but 
fo r  acqu ir ing  "minds to reason,  unders tandings  to judge; 
fo r  when they w i l l  take  the  t r o u b le  to  reason a l i t t l e ,  
and judge fo r  themselves,  they do i t  so w e l l ,  t h a t  p r o p r ie ty  
o f  a c t io n  must follow of  nece ss i ty "  (p.  170).
One theme of  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  in  Hermsprong is  t h a t  
o f  duty and g r a t i t u d e  to  pa ren ts  and b en efac to r s .  This 
theme is  not n e c e s s a r i ly  inheren t  in  the  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e
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Good-Natured Man, but  when happy married l i f e  with the  
hero ine  i s  the  goal o f  the  good-natured hero, n a i f  o r  
paragon, the  idea o f  duty to  parents  i s  always p resen t  a t  
l e a s t  as an o b s ta c le  to  the  hero. The recu r ren t  l i n e  
spoken by both daughters  and sons of  a lazon f ig u re s  i s  
" I  promise, S i r ,  not to  marry without your approbat ion ."
The more s to u t  h e a r ted  ones may add " . . .  i f  you w i l l  
have the  goodness not  to  i n s i s t  on my marrying a g a in s t  
my own w i l l . "  But b e fo r e  we can t r e a t  t h i s  theme 
adequately we must f i r s t  consider  the  c h a ra c te r  and 
funct ion  of  good-natured females.
All  of the  females in  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e  
th a t  can be taken s e r i o u s l y  as e th ic a l  agents a re  paragons 
in  the  sense t h a t  they  can and w i l l  do no wrong. Like 
C la r i s s a  Harlowe, they  would r a th e r  d ie  than have t h e i r  
v i r t u e  t a i n t e d .  Another reason th a t  good-natured females 
are  paragons i s  the  e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  a t t i t u d e  t h a t  "a 
young woman was damned fo r  good and a l l ,  and must pass h e r  
l i f e  d r ipp ing  with pen i ten ce  i f  she had once s l ip p ed  from
7
the  pa th  of v i r t u e . "  O l iv ia  Primrose s u f f e r s  g r e a t l y  
because she, her  fam ily ,  and her  so c ie ty  accept t h i s  no t ion .  
Most of  the  female paragons t h a t  have prominent ro le s  must 
be f i t t i n g  rewards f o r  the  Good-Natured Man, e . g . ,  Sophia
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Western, in  Tom J o n e s , Fanny in  Joseph Andrews. Amelia
in Amelia, Sophia Primrose in  The Vicar  of W akefie ld .
Miss Richland in  The Good N a tu r 'd  Man, Evelina in Fanny
Burney's  E v e l in a , Carol ine  Campinet in  Hermsprong. and
th e  l i s t  could go on and on including  almost every comic
work s t a r r i n g  the  good-natured n a i f  o r  paragon. A l lworthy 's
remarks in  p r a i s e  o f  Sophia Western defines t h e i r  a rchetypa l
r o l e  r a t h e r  w e l l :
" . . .  I  never  heard anything o f  p e r tn e s s ,  o r  what 
i s  c a l l e d  r e p a r t e e ,  out  of her mouth; no p re tence  to  
w i t ,  much les s  t h a t  kind o f  wisdom which is  th e  r e s u l t  
o f  g r e a t  lea rn in g  and experience,  the  a f f e c t a t i o n  of  
which, in  a young woman, i s  as absurd as any o f  the 
a f f e c t a t i o n s  of  an ape. No d i c t a t o r i a l  sen t im ents ,  no 
j u d i c i a l  op in ions ,  no profound c r i t i c i s m s .  WTienever 
I  have seen h e r  in  the company of  men, she ha th  
been a l l  a t t e n t i o n ,  with the  modesty of  a l e a r n e r ,  
not  t h e  forwardness of  a te a c h e r .  . . . Indeed,  she 
has always showed the h ighes t  deference  to  th e  
unders tand ings  o f  men; a q u a l i ty  abso lu te ly  e s s e n t i a l  
t o  the  making o f  a good w i f e . ” (XVII, i i i ;  V, 256)
However, they  a re ,  i n  some in ex p l ica b le  way, paragons by
n a tu r e .  They have i n s t i n c t i v e l y  and i n t u i t i v e l y  t h e  prudence
t h a t  t h e  Good-Natured Man must l e a rn  by experience.  Thus,
l i k e  t h e  Good-Natured Man as paragon they func t ion  as a
moral norm, bu t  they r a r e ly  func t ion  as commentator o r  as
spokesman f o r  the  au tho r .
A l l  o f  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  subordinate  ro le  of women
and th e  double s tandard  of moral i ty  in  the  e igh teen th
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century .  Because Bage championed the cause o f  sex equ a l i ty ,  
h i s  t rea tment  of  women d i f f e r s  from t h a t  o f  F ie ld ing ,  
Goldsmith, Smollet t  and o th e r  e a r l i e r  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  
w r i t e r s .  To be su re ,  Carol ine  Campinet is a female paragon 
almost id e n t i c a l  to  th o se  described above. She loves 
Hermsprong and recognizes  in  him "a s p i r i t  of undevia ting 
r e c t i t u d e ,  which spurns a t  everything mean and s e l f i s h - -  
an u n ru f f led  sweetness o f  temper, and a soul  o f  benevolence" 
(p. 216). And though, l i k e  Sophia Western, she w i l l  not 
marry the  "beau" Lord Grondale has chosen f o r  he r ,  she w i l l  
not  marry Hermsprong without  her  f a t h e r ’ s consen t .  This i s  
of  course  a device to  keep up the  c o n f l i c t  between 
Hermsprong and Lord Grondale, fo r  without C a r o l in e ' s  
obedience the  alazon would have no power. But C a ro l in e ' s  
conception of  f i l i a l  duty and g ra t i tu d e  proves to  be, l i k e  
Tom Jones '  conception o f  honor when ly in g  to  p ro te c t  Black 
George, a mistaken concept.  She almost ru ins hers and 
Hermsprong's l iv e s  because she w i l l  not recognize  th a t  love 
and obedience a re  due to  pa ren ts  only i f  t r ey  give  the  care 
and tenderness  of  p a r e n t s .  Hermsprong i s  the  t r u e  paragon 
who teaches Carol ine  and Marie Fluart  t h a t  t h e i r  preconceived 
no t ions  of  duty and of  th e  subordinate  r o le  of women a re  not 
pra iseworthy .
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Hermsprong says " I  consider  a woman as equal to  a 
man" and she should l e a r n  to reason and judge fo r  h e r s e l f  
r a t h e r  than l e t  the  p r o p r i e ty  o f  h e r  ac t ions  be d ic ta ted  
by o th e r s .  I t  i s  to  h i s  c r e d i t  t h a t  Bage t r i e d  to  demolish 
the  s te reotyped idea t h a t  women were e i t h e r  paragons of  
v i r t u e  o r  s l u t s .  The r o l e  of Marie F lu a r t  i s  j u s t  the 
oppos i te  o f  th a t  fo r  which Sophia Western i s  p ra ised  by 
Allworthy. In Barham Down K i t ty  Ross i s  seduced by a 
v i l l a i n ,  but  the  man who l a t e r  f a l l s  in  love with her 
f inds  her  none the  l e s s  charming o r  d e s i r ab le  fo r  i t .
C a ra l ia  in  Mount Kenneth i s  raped by two Indian  s o ld ie r s ,  
and h e r  lover  and he r  f a t h e r  have to convince her  tha t  
she i s  f i t  fo r  marr iage .  C a ra l ia  says to he r  f a th e r ,
" In  a l l  these  English books your goodness has procured 
fo r  me, I  f ind  i t  the  leading  idea :  women who have suffe red
/ t h e  loss  o f  v i r g i n i t y / ,  must d ie ,  or  be immured forever;  
ever  a f t e r  they a re  t o t a l l y  u se le s s  to  a l l  purposes of 
s o c i e ty ;  i t  is  the  foundation of  a hundred fabulous things 
c a l l e d  novels ,  . . .  no author has yet been so bold as 
to  permit  a lady to l i v e  and marry, and be a woman a f t e r
O
t h i s  s t a i n . "  Thus, Bage allows some of  h is  females to be, 
l i k e  the  n a i f ,  imperfec t ,  ye t  admirable-- imperfect  in 
c o n t r a s t  to  the  paragon f ig u re ,  admirable in  con t ra s t  to
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corrupt so c ie ty .
The r o l e  of  women in  English so c ie ty  i s ,  perhaps, 
the  major concern of  Hermsprong, but I have e labora ted  
upon i t  mainly to  i l l u s t r a t e  something about the  funct ion  
of  the Good-Natured Man as paragon. In works where the 
major c h a ra c te r  is a paragon, whether the  themes a re  moral 
or  so c ia l ,  the  paragon i s  important as a device, as a 
judge and commenter t o  i d e n t i f y  and v e rb a l iz e  v a lues ,  but 
not as a c h a ra c te r  whose experience t e s t s  v a lu e s . The 
phi losophies and d o c t r in e s  o f  the  author  are  put in to  the 
mouth of  h i s  p e r fe c t  man to be spoken d i r e c t l y ;  they  are 
not depicted in  the  e r r o r s  and va lues  of an imperfect  
n a i f .  Hermsprong, Bevil  J r . ,  S i r  Charles Grandison, and 
o th e r  paragons,  are p reach e rs ,  not s i n n e r s .  IVhat they 
say is  ed i fy ing ;  what they a re  i s  in c re d ib le  and u n in te re s t in g ,
And t h i s  brings us back to consider  the  im plica t ions  
of  the j u x ta p o s i t io n  o f  the  paragon and soc ie ty  which we 
postponed e a r l i e r .  F i r s t ,  in  regard to the  moral values 
inherent  in  h is  c h a r a c te r ,  the  very presence o f  an idea l  
Good-Natured Man in s o c i e ty  both aff irms and g losses  over 
the  fac t  t h a t  the  i d e a l  i s  not v i a b l e .  I t  a ff i rms i t  
because only the  i d e a l ,  unbel ievable  Good-Natured Man 
succeeds; i t  g losses  over  i t  by presen t ing  the  Good-Natured
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Man succeeding.  In o t h e r  words, the Good-Natured Man 
as paragon reso lves  to  the  advantage of  the  n a i f  and 
h imself  c o n f l i c t s  which, except in  romance, a re  in so lu b le - -  
e . g . ,  idea l  versus r e a l ,  innocence versus experience.
Thus, the  presence o f  th e  paragon aff i rms the  value  of  
good na tu re  by defending i t  aga ins t  the  a s s a u l t  of  experience,  
and a t  the  same time a ff i rm s  the  im p r a c t i c a l i ty  of  good 
n a tu re ,  because except  i n  romance i t  can never succeed 
in  a so c ie ty  o f  s e rp e n t s  and wolves. The Good-Natured 
Man as paragon has t h a t  impossible but id ea l  combinatio n - - 
t h e  wisdom of  se rp en ts  and the  innocence of  doves. And 
even i f . t h i s  were not an impossible  combination fo r  
everyone, the  sen t im en ta l  e th ic s  behind the  Good-Natured 
Man make i t  impossible  f o r  him.
Secondly, the  s o c i a l  themes the  paragon exhorts  a re  
not n e c e s s a r i l y  in he ren t  in  h is  c h a rac te r  or  experience.
Since th e  human t r u t h s  which th e  a r t i s t  takes  s e r io u s ly  
may have nothing to  do w i th  good na tu re  o r  the  e th i c s  
a sso c ia ted  with good n a tu r e ,  the  paragon becomes, even 
in  works which bear  h i s  name in  the  t i t l e ,  o f  secondary 
i n t e r e s t  as a c h a r a c t e r .  Because of  the  t i t l e  and the  
s ta tement  of  purpose by th e  n a r r a to r  Gregory Glen a t  the  
beginning of  Hermsprong, the  reader  expects the  novel to
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be about Hermsprong. But as i t  t u rn s  o u t ,  the  novel is 
about the  ideas and values of Hermsprong. With the  n a i f  
and the  humoris t  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  the  Good-Natured Man and 
the  themes o f  the  work a re  in sep a rab le ,  and t h e i r  experience 
i s  more than  the  equ iva len t  o f  a s ta tement  about t h e i r  
experience .  But s ince  the  paragon has no " l i f e , "  his  
experience i s  merely the  dram atiza t ion  o f  a precept which 
is  a lso  u s u a l ly  included.  Or to put i t  another  way, the  
n a i f  and humorist  a re  symbolic-- they  stand fo r  something 
e l s e  but  they  a lso  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  the  r e a l i t y  to  which they 
p o in t .  For example. Parson Adams and Uncle Toby dramatize 
and p e rs o n i fy  in  t h e i r  ac t ions  and c h a ra c te r s  th e  values 
of  c h a r i ty  and sympathy, but they a re  not merely walking 
concepts . Or to be more s p e c i f i c ,  Abraham Adams has 
mythical  p ro to types  in  Adam the  f a t h e r  o f  mankind and 
Abraham the  f a t h e r  of  the  f a i t h f u l ,  but he an innocent 
and good man in  e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  England and th e  s p i r i t u a l  
adv isor  to  Joseph Andrews. The paragon,  on the o ther  hand, 
merely s tands  fo r  something e l s e ;  he means, not i s .
Thus, t h e r e  i s  a paradox i m p l i c i t  in  the  Good-Natured 
Man as paragon. He rece ives  the  most h o n o r i f i c  treatment  
of  any of th e  good-natured c h a r a c t e r s ,  but  he i s  t r ea ted  
the  l e a s t  s e r i o u s l y .  The very presence  o f  the  paragon as
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p ro tagon is t  i s  the  b e s t  evidence t h a t  moral goodness is 
not o f  c e n t r a l  importance to  the  work, but t h a t  soc ia l  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s .  Since so c ia l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  is  not inherent 
in "n a tu re ,"  the  concept o f  good n a tu re  funct ions  mainly 
not as a theme but as a device f o r  e n l i s t i n g  our good will  
toward the c h a r a c t e r ,  op in ions ,  and act ions  of  the social  
hero. Good n a tu re  becomes an accessory l i k e  a white hat.
In the  development of  the  Good-Natured Man as a type, 
what appears to  be the  h igh es t  po in t  in  h is  development 
as a man tu rn s  out to  be an apo theos is ,  o u t s id e  the  realm 
of human experience .  I t  was not then ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  the 
w r i t e r s  who c rea ted  paragons who were the  most op t im is t ic  
about good n a tu r e .  For th e  bes t  o f  good-natured men we 
must r e t u r n  to  Henry F i e ld i n g ' s  Squire  Allworthy and Dr. 
Harr ison.  They are  only a l i t t l e  lower than the  angels, 
but they a re  d i s t i n c t l y  human. Because of  t h i s ,  they do 
not f i t  comfortably in to  any one o f  the four  types I  have 
defined .  They 'func t ion  as paragons in the  sense t h a t  each 
is  the s tandard  o f  v i r t u e  in  the  novel in which he appears, 
each makes re spo n s ib le  e t h i c a l  comments, and each i s  a 
device fo r  determining th e  reader's a t t i t u d e s  toward 
c h a ra c te r s ,  a c t io n s ,  and thoughts presented in the  novel. 
But they a re  un l ik e  the  paragons in  th a t  they a re  f a l l i b l e ;
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they make mis takes on occasion because they a re  not 
conversant  with a l l  r e la te d  f a c t s .
Here again is  a paradox. The f a l l i b l e  paragons^ 
a re  moral ly  the  most admirable of  the  be l ievab le  good- 
na tured  c h a r a c te r s ,  but they are  the  l e a s t  l i k e a b le .
Unlike Adams, whose ded ica t ion  to id ea ls  is  j u s t i f i e d  by 
h is  r o l e  as country parson and whose involvement in  the  
l iv e s  o f  o th e r s  i s  an a c t iv e  c h a r i ty ,  the f a l l i b l e  paragons 
have c i v i l  a u th o r i ty  and o the r  power to  con tro l  the  l i v e s  
of o thers  in  concre te ,  physical  r e a l i t y .  Allworthy 's  
good na tu re  and h is  ded ica t ion  to " r ig h t"  do not q u a l i fy  
him f o r . t h i s  r o l e .  Admittedly, he i s  loved by those under 
h i s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  and h is  motives are  never malevolent and 
h i s  moral precep ts  a re  good, but h is  judgment in  ind iv idua l  
cases brought before  him is  almost in va r iab ly  wrong. He 
i s  an instrument of i n j u s t i c e  in  the  l iv e s  of  Jenny Jones, 
P a r t r id g e ,  and Tom Jones. Because o f  h is  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  
so c ie ty  we a re  forced to  judge Allworthy by soc ia l  s tandards  
(pe rcep t ion  and a r t )  r a th e r  than by h i s  motives and i n t e g r i t y  
a lone .  His p ropens i ty  to be fooled by knaves, h is  f a i l u r e  
to pe rce ive  th e  motives of  o th e r s ,  i s  a considerable  
imperfec t ion  and weakens the  e f fe c t iv en e ss  of h i s  v i r t u e .  
Thus, because of  h is  s i t u a t i o n ,  l a r g e ly ,  he i s  not much
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loved and esteemed by the  reader .
However, the  a reas  in  which Squire Allworthy and 
Dr. Harrison e r r  a re  c a r e f u l ly  ind ica ted  and t h e i r  
f a l l i b i l i t y  adds depth to t h e i r  charac te rs  and complexity 
to the  moral themes o f  the  work. Allworthy acknowledges 
his  e r r o r s  when he d iscovers  them and is  repentan t  and 
fo rg iv in g .  Dr. Harr ison  is  a c i t y  parson and j u s t  as 
Booth i s  something of a humorist in  t h a t  he is co n t ro l le d  
by h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  Dr. Harrison i s  something of an 
a f fe c te d  humorist who cloaks h i s  good na ture  with sarcasm.
Also Dr. Harrison fun c t io n s ,  l i k e  Hermsprong, as an ever­
present  judge and commentator on the  a c t io n .  Unlike 
Hermsprong, however, he e r r s  and u n ju s t ly  sends Booth to  
p r ison  and causes Amelia and he r  ch i ld ren  to  s u f f e r .  When 
he discovers  h is  mistake he c o r re c t s  i t ,  but in  c o r r e c t in g  
i t  and in  o ther  p o t e n t i a l l y  sen t im enta l  (emotional) 
s i t u a t i o n s  he remains r e s t r a i n e d  and c a u s t i c .  Again the  
e iron  f ig u re  as moral s tandard  adds complexity to  t h e  themes.
These c h a rac te r s  a re  no t ,  o f  course ,  the  p ro tag o n is t s  
of the  works in  which they  appear,  and l ik e  o th e r  paragons 
in  minor ro les  they a re  important  mainly in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h ip  
to good-natured c h a rac te r s  who cannot or  have not su c ce ss fu l ly  
adapted to  so c ie ty .
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Thus, we f ind in  e ig h tee n th -cen tu ry  English  l i t e r a t u r e  
good-natured cha rac te rs  as thoroughly good and thoroughly 
a r t i c u l a t e  paragons, female paragons,  and f a l l i b l e  paragons. 
All  o f  them except the  f a l l i b l e  paragons a re  inadequately  
rep resen ted  and th e r e f o re  unbe l ievable  as c h a ra c te r s ,  
but a l l  o f  them serve  as major devices f o r  e s t a b l i s h in g  
value judgments, c re a t in g  and c o n t r o l l i n g  the  re a d e r ' s  
a t t i t u d e s  and opinions ,  p ro te c t in g  innocent goodness from 
exper ience ,  and thereby shaping the  s t r u c tu r e s  and themes 
of  the  works in  which they appear.
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Chapter VI 
The Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y
The Man of S e n s i b i l i t y  may be considered  to  be a 
degenerat ion of th e  Good-Natured Man type by both moral 
and soc ia l  s tandards .  The degenera t ion  of  the  type 
p a r a l l e l s  t h e  change in  th e  base  o f  m o ra l i ty  in  mid­
e igh teen th -cen tu ry  sent im enta l  e th i c s  and th e  change in 
the  connotations of  the  term "sen t im en ta l"  from moral i ty  
to  f e e l in g .  Actual ly  he i s  not r e a l l y  a Good-Natured Man 
a t  a l l ,  but a humor c h a rac te r  whose o bsess ion ,  whose 
hobbyhorse, is  h i s  conception o f  benevolent  good nature .  
Thus, his  own e g o c e n t r i c i t y ,  s e l f - c o n c e r n s ,  and s e l f - l o v e  
motivate  him to c u l t i v a t e  t h a t  responsiveness  to  s e n s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  was considered an in d ic a t io n  "o f  a r i g h t  d i sp o s i t io n  
and the  n a tu ra l  working of a w e l l - tu rn ed  s p i r i t . " ^
The Man of S e n s i b i l i t y  has l i t t l e  in  common with 
genuinely good-natured c h a ra c te r s .  He consciously  asp i res  
to discover in  h im sel f  and o thers  good n a tu re ,  but h is  
conception o f  good na ture  i s  f a l s e .  He craves fee l ings  
of  benevolence and sympathy both fo r  the  p leasu re  which 
a r i s e s  from them and the  assurance o f  h i s  own good nature
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t h a t  he gets  by t e s t i n g  his  emotional respons iveness .  I 
did not t r e a t  the  Man o f  S e n s i b i l i t y  with  the  good-natured 
humorists because, though he i s  a man o f  f e e l in g ,  he does 
not possess good na tu re  as i t  i s  defined in t h i s  study. 
Because he i s  a se a rc h e r  a f t e r  benevolence, h i s  perception 
of  r e a l i t y  is  d i s t o r t e d ,  sometimes w i l l f u l l y  and o f ten  
because,  l i k e  o th e r  humoris ts ,  h is  ru l in g  pass ion  causes 
a l l  experience to  se rve  his  hobby-hors ica l  notions and 
h i s  sub jec t iv e  v i s i o n  o f  o rd e r .  He is  t r i p l y  a fool because 
he is  "a c h i ld  in  the  drama o f  the  w o r l d , h e  i s  e n t i r e l y  
occupied by a f a l l a c io u s  concept which he th in k s  i s  an 
id ea l  of v i r t u e ,  and h is  own se l f - c e n te re d n e s s  is  
d i a m e t r ica l ly  opposed to  the  id ea l  he a sp i r e s  t o .  He is 
as r id icu lou s  as Malvolio in Shakespeare 's  Twelfth Night 
who wears yellow stockings c ross  g a r te red  and smiles pe r­
p e tu a l ly  in  the  presence of O l iv ia  because he th inks  tha t  
i s  what she d e s i r e s .  In r e a l i t y  O l iv ia  abhors the  co lor ,  
d e te s t s  the  fash ion ,  and is  in  no mood fo r  sm iles .  The 
Man of S e n s i b i l i t y  th inks  t h a t  the  outward express ion  of 
emotion is  proof of  h i s  good na tu re .  In  r e a l i t y  the  outward 
show of a f fe c t io n s  has no more to do with moral i ty  than 
wearing yellow s tock ings  cross  g a r te red  has to do with 
winning the  love of O l iv ia .
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I t  should be pointed out tha t  t h e  outward express ion 
of f ee l in g s  had always been assoc ia ted  with the  Good- 
Natured Man as a conventional  technique fo r  d isplaying 
h is  inner  r e a l i t y .  There i s  nothing in  the  e th i c a l  theory 
behind the  Good-Natured Man tha t  demands expression of 
emotions in  phys ica l  g e s tu re s  and s igns ,  but "The eighteenth- 
century n ov e l i s t  had as h i s  he r i tage  the spec tac le  o f  drama 
and a s t rong t r a d i t i o n  o f  p i c t o r i a l  express ion;  so i t  is  
l i t t l e  wonder t h a t  he conceived o f  emotion as something 
to be shown v i s i b l y . " ^  I t  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  important to 
exh ib i t  the  emotional l i f e  of  the Good-Natured Man, and 
the  s tock  express ive  formulas borrowed from drama and a r t  
a re  u su a l ly  a p a r t  of  th e  Good-Natured Man's ch a rac te r ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  the  c h a r a c te r  is a n a i f  o r  humorist.
F ie ld ing  has been c r i t i c i z e d  because the  emotions of  h is  
charac te rs  a re  always descr ibed  with hackneyed hyperboles 
and depicted by way o f  exaggerated phys ica l  reac t ions  
For example, when Tom Jones i s  turned out by Allworthy,
"He p re sen t ly  f e l l  in to  th e  most v io le n t  agonies,  t e a r in g  
h is  h a i r  from h is  head, and using most o th e r  ac t ions  which 
g e n e ra l ly  accompany f i t s  o f  madness, rage and d ispa i r"
(VI, x i i ;  I I I ,  318). The following passage from Joseph 
Andrews conta ins many of  th e  expressive  formulas common
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in  F ie ld ing :
. . . Mr .  Wilson, with wildness in h i s  looks,  and the 
utmost eagerness in  h i s  words, begged to be showed into  
the  room, where he en te red  without the  l e a s t  regard to 
any of  the company but Joseph, and, embracing him with 
a complexion a l l  pa le  and t rembling,  desi red  to  see the 
mark on his  b r e a s t ;  t h e  parson followed him capering,  
rubbing his  hands, and c ry ing  out "Hie est  quern q u a e r i s ; 
inventus e s t , &c." Joseph complied with the  reques t  of  
Mr. Wilson, who no sooner saw the  mark than, abandoning 
h imself  to the  most ex travagan t  r ap tu re  of  pass ion ,  he 
embraced Joseph with in e x p re s s ib le  ecs ta sy ,  and cr ied  
out in  t e a r s  of Joy, " I have discovered my son, I  have 
Him again in  my arms'." Joseph was not s u f f i c i e n t l y  
apprised yet  to t a s t e  t h e  same d e l igh t  with h i s  f a th e r  
( fo r  so in r e a l i t y  he w a s ) ; however, he re turned  some 
warmth to h i s  embraces; but he no sooner perceived ,  
from h i s  f a t h e r ’ s account,  the  agreement of  every 
circumstance, o f  person ,  t ime, and p lace ,  than he threw 
himself  at  h i s  f e e t ,  and,  embracing h is  knees,  with 
t e a r s  begged h i s  b l e s s i n g .  . . . (IV, xv i ,  339).
But a l l  the  e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  n o v e l i s t s  presented the  inner
l i f e  by describing, i t s  o u t e r  s ign s .  And, with the  notable
exception of  Sterne,  they r e l i e d  genera l ly  upon the
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  s tock express ive  formulas which "were not
adequate to  the  t a sk ;  they were too gross to d i f f e r e n t i a t e
emotions with s im i la r  m an i fe s ta t io n s  or to  convey f e e l in g
as modified by c h a ra c te r . " ^  To F i e ld in g ’ s c r e d i t  i t  should
be sa id  th a t  he sensed the  l i m i t a t i o n  of h is  techn ique .  He
sometimes gives up in  f r u s t r a t i o n  and appeals to  the  models
he im i t a t e s :  "0, Shakespear'. had I thy pen'. 0, Hogarth,
had I  thy penci l ' ,  then would I  draw the p i c tu r e  of  the
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poor serving-man, who, with p a le  countenance, s t a r in g  
eyes, c h a t te r in g  t e e t h ,  f a u l t e r i n g  tongue, and trembling 
limbs . . . en te red  the  room" (X, v i i i ) . And h i s  use  of  
hyperbole and exaggeration implies  th a t  the  conventional  
express ive  formulas, l i k e  t h e  o th e r  epic and comic con­
ven t ions ,  a re  important not in  themselves but  fo r  what they 
point  towards.
S te rne ,  an a r t i s t  h im se l f ,  recognized t h a t  h ighly  
in d iv id u a l ized  g e s tu re  and a c t i o n  could reveal  inner 
r e a l i t y ,  and in  T r is t ram  Shandy he " u n i r o n ic a l l y  records 
the o u te r  s igns  of f e e l in g  with  a minute f i d e l i t y  and a . . . 
c lose  concern for  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  not only between cha rac te r s  
but a lso  between shades of th e  same emotion."^ The express ion 
of emotions becomes f o r  S te rne ,  not a convention, but  an 
i n t e g r a l  pa r t  o f  h i s  themes--sympathy, communication, and 
n a tu re  versus a r t . For S te rne  be l ieved  l i k e  Hume th a t  
d e t a i l s ,  when observed c a r e f u l l y ,  give clues to the cha rac te r s  
of men and human psychology. And because of  h i s  concen tra t io n  
upon and s k i l l  in p resen t ing  "verba l  p i c t u r e s , "  i t  i s  f i t t i n g  
th a t  he should s a t i r i z e  in A Sentimental  Journey the  l a t e  
e igh teen th -cen tu ry  confusion of  goodness with adherence to 
p rescr ibed  conventions of express ing  emotions. Sentimentalism 
in the  e igh teen th  century  got  i t s  p e jo r a t i v e  connota tion
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p a r t l y  because readers  (and w r i t e r s )  concentra ted  on the  
outward express ion  r a t h e r  than the  inner  r e a l i t y  of  the  
f i c t i o n a l  good-natured heroes and he ro in e s .  Through 
Yorick, S terne s a t i r i z e s  t h a t  e r r o r .
Unlike the  n a i f  and good-natured humoris t ,  the f ee l in gs  
of  the  Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y  a re  no longer  ones th a t  witness 
to a moral n a tu re  o r  judge s o c ie ty ,  but  ones th a t  witness 
to h i s  confusion of f e e l in g  and v i r t u e ,  s e n s i b i l i t y  and 
p r in c ip le ,  and judge him to be a sen t im enta l  ( i n  the  
p e jo r a t iv e  sense) foo l .  The Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y  i s - -and  
th i s  w i l l  have to  be supported by argument--always a foo l ,  
the  ob jec t  o f  d e r i s iv e  r i d i c u l e ,  when th e  a u th o r ' s  concept 
of  benevolent good na tu re  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of h is  
created  c h a ra c te r ,  as i t  always is  in the works I consider  
below.
Since the  Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y  embodies few i f  any 
respected va lues ,  works in  which he i s  a main ch a rac te r  
a re  b a s i c a l l y  psychological  s tu d ies  of ind iv idua ls  with 
l i t t l e  s o c i a l  i n t e r e s t .  Works of  t h i s  type in  e ighteenth-  
century English l i t e r a t u r e  a re  S t e r n e ' s  A Sentimental  
Journey (1768), Mackenzie 's The Man of Fee l ing  (1771), and 
Henry Brooke's The Fool o f  Qual i ty  (1766). There a re  also 
works of  t h i s  type in  e ig h tee n th -cen tu ry  French and German
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l i t e r a t u r e ,  o f  v:hich I  have read only Goethe’ s The 
Su f fe r in g s  of  Young W erther . I f ,  as some be l ieve ,  the Man 
o f  S e n s i b i l i t y  in  these  works i s  a t r a n s i t i o n a l  f igure  
between e ig h tee n th -cen tu ry  sen t im enta l ism  and n ine teen th -  
cen tu ry  romanticism, i t  i s  h is  i n t r o s p e c t io n ,  not h is  
sympathy, th a t  provides the  l i n k .  Unlike the  genuinely 
good-natured c h a r a c t e r s ,  h i s  sympathetic  fee l ings  are  not 
r e f l e c t e d  in d i s i n t e r e s t e d ,  a c t iv e  c h a r i t y  but in  h i s  own 
o r  the  n a r r a t o r ' s  d e s c r ip t io n  and an a ly s i s  of  them; 
u n l ik e  the  major rom an t ic s , h i s  i n t r o s p e c t io n  i s  not a 
means, perhaps the  only c re d ib le  means l e f t ,  of  g e t t ing  
th e  not-me in to  c l e a r  p e rs p e c t iv e ,  but  r a th e r  h is  in te rn a l  
c o n ce n t ra t io n  i s  a means of  g e t t i n g  as much p leasure  as 
p o s s ib l e  from indulging and analyzing h is  emotion.
Those who have read A Sentimenta l  Journey and The 
Man o f  Fee l ing  th ink ing  t h a t  Yorick and Harley embody 
th e  a u th o r s ’ moral id e a l  have missed the  s a t i r i c a l  t r e a t ­
ment of  these  two c h a rac te r s  as su re ly  as those who be l ieve  
t h a t  Swift th inks  horses a re  su p e r io r  to  humans have missed 
th e  s a t i r i c a l  t rea tment  of  G u l l iv e r .
We have a l read y  d iscussed th e  moral bas is  of  S te rn e 's  
a r t . In  the  d isc u ss io n  o f  T r is t ram  Shandy we s t re s se d  h is  
id e a l  of  a benevolent temper, of sympathy which i s  informed
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by a knowledge of  customary motives and a t t i t u d e s .  Since 
t h e  hobbyhorses o f  T r is t ram ,  Walter , Toby, and Trim were . 
p r im ar i ly  r a t i o n a l  concerns and obsess ions ,  sympathetic  
i n t u i t i o n  o f  each o thers  f e e l in g s ,  needs,  and concerns 
was the  only means o f  success fu l  communication among them. 
But as we have a lso  pointed out be fo re ,  a l l  t h e  supporters  
of  sent im enta l  e th ic s  mentioned in  t h i s  study believed 
t h a t  the  r o le  of reason was extremely important to  the  
Good-Natured Nan. The a f f e c t io n s  immediately and 
spontaneously d i s t in g u i s h  between r i g h t  and wrong, but 
reason, r e f l e c t i o n ,  must always cons ider  the good of  the  
whole, must guide the  person to ac t ions  o f  benevolence 
t h a t  a re  u n iv e r s a l ly  good. F ie ld in g  sa id  in the  Champion, 
27 March 1740, t h a t  good-nature  is  an ac t ive  concern fo r  
th e  happiness of mankind "with a cons tan t  regard fo r  
deser t"  and, as i f  he foresaw the  ind isc r im ina te  
sent im enta l ism  of  the  Man of S e n s i b i l i t y  and want ed to 
sep a ra te  h imself  from i t ,  "as good-nature requ i re s  a 
d i s t in g u i s h in g  f a c u l ty ,  which is  ano ther  word fo r  judgment, 
and is perhaps the  so le  boundary between wisdom and f o l ly ;  
i t  i s  impossible fo r  a fo o l ,  who ha th  no d i s t ing u ish in g  
f a c u l ty ,  to  be good-natured."^  Yorick, in  A Sentimental  
Journey, is  confused and, a l though he i s  a clergymen, has
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no adequate unders tanding o f  t r u e  moral v i r t u e .  He has 
given h imself  completely over  to the  con tro l  of his emotions, 
b e l iev in g  a f f e c t io n s  in  themselves a re  v i r tu o u s ,  and is 
a fool  because he , u n l ik e  Uncle Toby, i s  capable  of f a r  
more autonony and v i r t u e  than  he p r a c t i c e s .  Therefore, 
in  A Sentimental  Journey i t  i s  Y or ick 's  misconception 
t h a t  benevolent  a f f e c t i o n s  a re  equiva len t  to  moral v i r t u e  
t h a t  i s  s a t i r i z e d .  Because of  S t e r n e ’ s s a t i r i c a l  t rea tment  
o f  f e e l in g ,  Arthur H i l l  Cash, and perhaps o th e r s ,  draws 
th e  conclusion t h a t  Sterne was a f t e r  a l l  a r a t i o n a l i s t  
and th a t  his  c e n t r a l  theme i s  t h a t  the  h e a r t  t r i c k s  the  
head, but th e  head ought always to  r u l e  the  h e a r t .  Sterne 
was not a r a t i o n a l i s t ,  and the  v a l i d i t y  of most of what 
Cash says about S te rne  i s  not  a f f e c te d  by whether he was 
o r  no t .  A f te r  Hume, the  d i s tan c e  between th e  r a t i o n a l i s t s  
and the  s e n t im e n t a l i s t s ,  which was never g r e a t ,  was 
diminished. Therefore ,  t h e  l a b e l s  a re  not r e a l ly  important 
any way. The point I  wish to make here  is  th a t  even though 
Sterne  s a t i r i z e s  "sentimentalism" he does not  confuse 
what he i s  a t tack in g  with th e  e t h i c a l  theory which, a f t e r  
S t e r n e ' s  t ime, was labe led  " sen t im enta l  e th i c s . "  Sterne 
i s  d e f i n i t e l y  in the  t r a d i t i o n  of the  L a t i t u d i n a r i a n s , 
Shaftesbury,  and Hume, and he is not advocating in A
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Sentimental  Journey t h a t  m o ra l i ty  i s  d iscoverab le  through 
reason a lone .  Reason i s  s t i l l ,  as Hume says,  a s lave  of  
the  passions simply because i t  i s  not an ac t iv e  f a c u l ty .
I f  he is  saying the  head should r u l e  the  h e a r t ,  he means 
only t h a t  i t  should r u l e  as a rudder  ru le s  a sh ip .  For 
he i s  aware th a t  benevolence as a f a c e t  of  human n a tu re  
i s  e s s e n t i a l  fo r  goodness o f  c h a r a c t e r .  He i s  s a t i r i z i n g  
the  no t ion  th a t  as long as the  p a ss io n s ,  the  g a le s ,  a re  
benevolent  one would allow them to both  move and guide 
the  sh ip .
Yorick i s  obsessed with  th e  idea o f  courtesy  and 
kindness,  g e n e ros i ty ,  and f e e l i n g .  He t e l l s  Count de 
B**** t h a t  he has come to  France,  where he had p rev ious ly  
decided he would f ind  "a  people so c i v i l i z e d  and courteous,  
and so renowned fo r  sentiment and f i n e  f e e l in g , "  "to 
spy the nakedness of  . . . h e a r t s ,  and . . . f ind out
what is  good in them to fashion  my own by." He says th a t
the  t h i r s t  fo r  t h i s  in s ig h t  has lead him into  France and 
w i l l  lead him in to  I t a l y .  " . . .  'T i s  a quiet  journey 
of  the h ea r t  in p u r s u i t  of  n a tu re ,  and those a f f e c t io n s
which a r i s e  out of  h e r ,  which make us love each o t h e r - -
and the  world, b e t t e r  than  we do."® But fo r  the  reader  
the  journey i s  l a r g e ly  a discovery o f  the  s e l f - f l a t t e r y ,
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s e l f - d e c e p t io n ,  and s e l f - l o v e  o f  Yorick.
A f te r  Yorick has had h i s  f i r s t  meal in  France, he 
i s  c o n g ra tu la t ing  h imself  on h i s  benevolent a t t i t u d e  
toward th e  King o f  France and enjoying the  " su f fus ion  of 
a f i n e r  kind" he f e e l s  upon h is  cheek which he a t t r i b u t e s  
to h i s  own humanity in s tead  of to  the  burgundy he has been 
d r ink ing .  "VJhen a man i s  a t  peace with man, how much 
l i g h t e r  than  a f e a th e r  i s  the  h eav ie s t  o f  metals in  h is  
hand: he p u l l in g  out h i s  purse ,  and holding i t  a i r i l y
and uncompress'd,  looks round him, as i f  he sought fo r  an 
o b jec t  to  share  i t  w i th ."  He enjoys the  f ee l in g  th a t  t h i s  
produces:  " In  doing t h i s ,  I f e l t  every vesse l  in  my frame
d i l a t e - - t h e  a r t e r i e s  beat  a l l  c h e a r i ly  to g e th e r ,  and every 
power which sus ta ined  l i f e ,  performed i t  with so l i t t l e  
f r i c t i o n . "  But when a poor Franciscan Monk en ters  to  beg 
fo r  h i s  convent,  Yorick immediately predetermines "not 
to  g ive  him a s in g le  sous ." and even t r e a t s  the  old monk 
rudely  (pp. 4,  5) .  This p a t t e r n  with minor v a r i a t io n s  
r ep ea ts  i t s e l f  throughout  A Sentimental  Jou rn ey . Sterne 
d isp lays  in  Y or ick 's  various encounters not t r u e  benevolence, 
but the  l a c k  of i t .
t*Jhen Yorick meets the  lady a t  Monsieur D e sse in 's 
coach yard,  he c a l l s  the  emotions she s t i r s  up in  him
166
"benevolence" so t h a t  he can c u l t i v a t e  them. " I  f e l t  
benevolence fo r  h e r ;  and resolved  some way o r  o ther  to 
throw in my mite o f  c o u r t e s y - - i f  not of  se rv ice"  (p. 17).
And one i s  forced to  wonder i f  Yorick 's  generous motivations 
are  ever t r u l y  benevolent and d i s i n t e r e s t e d .  He admits 
th a t  he has "been in  love with one p r incess  or another" 
almost a l l  o f  his  l i f e ,  and th a t  a t  i n t e r v a l s  "betwixt 
one passion and ano the r  . . .  I  always perce ive  my h e a r t  
locked u p - - I  can sca rc e  f ind  i t  to  g ive  misery a sixpence,
. . . and the  moment I am rek ind led ,  I  am a l l  generos i ty  
and good w i l l  again,  and would do anything i n  th e  world 
e i t h e r  fo r ,  or  with anyone, i f  they w i l l  but  s a t i s f y  me 
th e re  i s  no s i n  in  i t "  (p. 34) . IJhen Yorick leaves the 
inn a t  Montriu l ,  a f t e r  admit t ing " the re  is  no man gives 
so l i t t l e  as I  do," he s e t s  out to  play the  ro le  of the 
generous good man, but s ince  he w i l l  g ive  only e ight  sous 
among s ix te e n  people , he g ives  to those  who give him the  
most emotional p leasu re  e i t h e r  by benevolent act ions or  
f l a t t e r y .  Also i t  should be noted, h i s  c h a r i ty  i s  a publ ic  
act  th a t  a t t r a c t s  much a t t e n t i o n  to h imself  (pp. 35-37).
When Yorick p a r t s  from the  f i l l e  de chambre to 
Madame R**** a f t e r  meeting her  fo r  the  f i r s t  time, "so 
c o rd ia l  was the  p a r t in g  between us,  t h a t  had i t  happen'd
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any where e l s e .  I 'm not sure  but I  should have signed i t  
with a k i s s  of  c h a r i ty ,  as warm and holy as an apostle"
(p .  78) .  S te rne  maintained in  h i s  sermons t h a t  i f  human 
passions were l e f t  unchecked, man would be impelled f i r s t  
one way by benevolent f ee l in g s  and then  another  by equally 
n a tu r a l  s e l f i s h  pass ions .  We  see Yorick sometimes come 
c lose  to  ac t ing  from benevolent motives a lone ,  but Sterne 
always shows s e l f i s h  passions tak ing  c o n t r o l .  Since 
Yorick i s  eager  to e n t e r t a i n  f e e l in g s  o f  love and p i ty ,  
he deceives himself  in to  be l iev in g  t h a t  a l l  h i s  sexual 
passions are  benevolent and v i r tu o u s .
Yorick a lso  finds love,  sympathy, and v i r t u e  every%vhere 
because he i s  determined to .  Yorick i s  sure  t h a t  a l l  o f  
the  ove r tu res  which the  b e a u t i f u l  G r i s s e t  makes to him 
at the  shop in  Paris  prove h e r  to  be exac t ly  opposi te  what 
the  reader  suspects  o f  he r .  He says, "Any one may do a 
casual  ac t  o f  good na tu re ,  but a c o n t in u a t io n  o f  them 
shows i t  i s  a p a r t  of  th e  temperature" (p. 52) .  The 
p r i n c i p l e  i s  v a l id ;  th e  ac t ions  to which i t  i s  applied a re  
in a p p ro p r i a t e .  And though Yorick had not a s in g l e  sous to 
spare th e  monk, he t r i e s  to  f ind  a way to g ive  the  b e au t i fu l  
G r i s s e t  a l i v r e  above the  p r i c e  of  the  two p a i r s  of gloves 
he buys i n s p i t e  of  the  f a c t  t h a t  they do not f i t .  When
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he meets th e  f i l l e  de chambre to  Madame R**** a t  the  book 
s e l l e r ,  he immediately presses  he r  to r e c e iv e  from him a . 
crown and says,  " I t  was a small t r i b u t e  . . . which I 
could not  avoid paying to v i r t u e ,  and would not be mistaken 
in  the  person I had been rendering i t  to  fo r  th e  world— 
but I  see  innocence, my dear , i n  your face" (p. 66).
Sterne provides ample evidence t h a t  Yorick sees in her 
face what i s  not  t h e r e .
Y or ick 's  defense of the  fee l in g s  he has when the  
f i l l e  de chambre i s  ly ing  across h is  bed in the  ho te l  
does not  v i n d ic a t e  him. He argues t h a t  "Nature has so 
wove h e r  web o f  kindness,  t h a t  some th read s  of  love and 
d e s i re  a re  entangled with the  piece" (p .  94). For the 
im p l ic i t  judgment throughout th e  work i s  t h a t  s e n s i t i v i t y  
to  f e e l in g s  i s  n e i t h e r  good nor bad in  i t s e l f .  In S te rn e 's  
e th i c a l  theory  expressed in  h i s  sermons fee l in g s  are 
v i r tuous  only in  so f a r  as they motivate  one to v i r tuous  
a c t io n s ,  and ac t ions  a re  v i r tu o u s  not because  they are 
motivated by benevolent  emotions but because  they are  
in  keeping with some standard o u ts ide  t h e  emotional 
c o n s t i t u t i o n - - t h e  law of  God, th e  na tu re  o f  th in g s ,  the 
good of  mankind. Y or ick 's  moral shortcoming is  not only 
th a t  he i s  wholly engrossed in  h i s  own search  f o r  p leasure .
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but a lso  he i s  a t  f a u l t  because he has confused moral 
worth with benevolent  a f f e c t i o n s ,  he th inks  the  wantonness, 
p r id e ,  and van i ty  he f e e l s  is benevolence,  and he never 
cons iders  the  e f f e c t  o f  benevolence beyond p a r t i c u l a r  
o b jec ts  o f  sense in  the  soc ia l  or u n iv e r sa l  o rder .^
Yorick cannot,  a t  l e a s t  does h o t ,  t h in k  a b s t r a c t ly  
about moral problems. lÆien he hears the  caged s t a r l i n g  
cry ing  " I  c a n ' t  ge t  o u t - - I  can’ t  ge t  o u t , "  he says,  " I  
never had my a f f e c t io n s  more t e n d e r ly  awakened" (p. 71).
One o f  the  reasons he i s  so moved by the  inc iden t  i s  th a t  
he has been cons ider ing  th e  danger o f  being a r re s ted  
f o r  t r a v e l i n g  in an enemy country without a pa sspo r t .
He t r i e s  to  f r e e  the  s t a r l i n g  a t  f i r s t ,  but a f t e r  the  
emotion i s  passed he never  c a r r i e s  through h is  in te n t io n s  
even though he has every opportuni ty  to do so. In fac t  
he becomes respons ib le  f o r  the b i r d ' s  c a p t i v i t y  by becoming 
i t s  owner. When he s e t s  cut  i n  search  o f  Maria, the 
demented peasant g i r l ,  he acknowledges t h a t  he i s  going 
" i n  quest  o f  melancholy adventures" (p .  113). Yorick 
r e p e a te d ly  shows h im se lf  greedy fo r  pathos and in t e r e s t e d  
in  every s e n sa t io n a l  p leasu re  o f  benevolence,  but he is 
c a r e l e s s  o f  the  p i t i a b l e  and h i s  benevolence i s  t r a n s i t o r y  
and m e r i t l e s s . Yorick i s  not even capable  of  any
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c o a s id e ra t io n  o f  man’ s o b l ig a t io n  to animals or  the  e f fec ts  
o f  forced marr iages in  so c ie ty .
A Sentimental  Journey ends with Yorick s t i l l  s e l f -  
centered (more concerned about h is  own comfort than that  
of  th e  l a d i e s ) ,  s t i l l  indulging and r a t i o n a l i z i n g  h is  
amorous d e s i r e s ,  s t i l l  obeying out o f  f e a r  th e  l e t t e r  of 
God's laws but not  the  s p i r i t .  The quest i s  incomplete 
and unsuccess fu l .  But the  reader  i s  aware t h a t  in  Yorick 's  
encounters with th e  monk and the  peasant family  e spec ia l ly ,  
he had the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to d iscover  t r u e  benevolence and 
gen e ro s i ty ,  but he does not l e a rn  the  le s so n  th a t  they 
o f f e r .  And th e  l e s so n  in  benevolence they o f f e r  Yorick 
i s  the  same as t h e  lesson  of fe red  the  rea d e r  by the  en t i r e  
work. S e n s i t i v i t y  to  benevolent  a f f e c t i o n s  i s  not an index 
to moral worth.
Henry Mackenzie was as much aware t h a t  s e n s i t i v i t y  
to benevolent a f f e c t i o n s  i s  not a r e l i a b l e  index to  moral 
worth as Sterne was. The r e l a t i o n s h ip  of  sentiment and 
s e n s i b i l i t y  to v i r t u e  i s  a recu r ren t  theme o f  h is  essays 
in  The Mirror  and The Lounger. Mackenzie demonstrates 
both h is  f a m i l i a r i t y  with the  sent im enta l  t r a d i t i o n  in 
seventeenth  and e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e  and h i s  own 
e t h i c a l  theory in  these  essays .  I i n s e r t  t h e  following
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quotat ions  as evidence t h a t  " s ick  s e n s i b i l i t y , "  was
a t tacked ,  not  defended, in Mackenzie's works. In an
essay  on the  "Danger of r egu la t ing  our conduct by the
r u l e s  of romantic  sentiment" Mackenzie w r i t e s :
In books, whether moral o r  amusing, th e r e  a re  no 
passages more c a p t iv a t in g  both to the  w r i t e r  and the  
reader  than those  d e l i c a t e  s t rokes  of  sen t im enta l  
m o ra l i ty ,  which r e f e r  our ac t ions  to the  de te rminat ion  
of  f e e l in g .  In these  the  poet,  the  novel w r i t e r ,  
and the  e s s a y i s t ,  have always d e l ig h te d ;  you are  no t ,  
th e r e f o re ,  s i n g u la r ,  f o r  having dedicated so much 
of  the  MIRROR to  sentiment and s e n s i b i l i t y .  I 
imagine, however. S i r ,  th e re  i s  much danger in  pushing 
these q u a l i t i e s  too f a r :  the ru le s  of  our conduct
should be founded on a bas is  more s o l i d ,  i f  they 
are to  guide us through the  var ious  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  
l i f e ;  but  the  young e n th u s ia s t  of sentiment and 
fee l ing  i s  apt to  desp ise  those  lessons of vu lgar  
v i r tu e  and prudence,  which would confine  the  movements 
of  a sou l  formed to  r e g u la te  i t s e l f  by f i n e r  impulses.
In h i s  essay "On nove l-w r i t ing"  Mackenzie says:
The p r in c ip a l  danger of novels ,  as forming a 
mistaken and p e rn ic ious  system of m ora l i ty ,  seems 
to me to  a r i s e  from t h a t  c o n t ra s t  between one v i r t u e  
of exce l lence  and ano the r ,  t h a t  war o f  du t ie s  which 
is  to be found in  many of  them, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  th a t  
species ca l led  sen t im en ta l .  . . .  In t h i s  r iv a l s h ip  of  
v i r tu e s  and of d u t i e s ,  those a re  always l i k e l y  to  be 
p re fe r red  which in t r u t h  and reason a re  subordina te ,  
and tho se  to  be degraded which ought to  be paramount.
. . . The duty to pa ren ts  is  c o n tra s ted  with the  t i e s  
of f r ien d sh ip  and lo v e ;  the  v i r t u e s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  of  
prudence, of  economy, a re  put in  competi t ion with 
the ex e r t io n s  o f  g e n e ro s i ty ,  o f  benevolence, and of 
compassion. . . .
In the  enthusiasm of  sentiment,  t h e re  i s  much 
the  same danger as in th e  enthusiasm of r e l i g i o n ,  of 
s u b s t i t u t i n g  c e r t a i n  impulses and fee l in g s  o f  what 
may be c a l le d  a v i s io n a ry  kind,  in  p lace  of  r e a l
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p r a c t i c a l  d u t ie s ,  which, in morals as in  theology,  
we might not improperly denominate good works. In 
morals,  as in  r e l ig io n ,  th e re  a re  not  wanting instances 
of  r e f in e d  s e n t im e n ta l i s t s ,  who a re  contented with 
t a lk in g  o f  v i r tu e s  which they never  p r a c t i c e ,  who 
pay i n  words what they owe in  a c t io n s ;  o r  perhaps 
what i s  f u l l y  as dangerous, who open t h e i r  minds to  
impressions which never have any e f f e c t  upon t h e i r  
conduct, but are considered as something fo re ign  
to  and d i s t i n c t  from i t .  This s e p a ra t io n  of  conscience 
from fe e l in g  is a depravi ty  of the  most pe rn ic ious  so r t ;  
i t  eludes th e  s t ronges t  o b l ig a t io n s  to  r e c t i t u d e ,  i t  
b lu n ts  th e  s t ronges t  incitement to v i r t u e .  . .
Mackenzie p re sen ts  charac te r  a f t e r  c h a ra c te r  who i s  generous
with  undeserving applican ts  but neg l igen t  in  du t ie s  to
h is  family ,  h i s  neighbors , and h i s  country ,  o r  who can
weep over a t e n d e r  novel o r  cry when wi tness ing  a generous
deed but i n  r e a l  l i f e  s ca rce ly  ever  has "been known to
r e l i e v e  the  d i s t r e s s e s  he i s  so w i l l in g  to  p i t y ,  o r  to
13e x e rc i s e  t h e  generos i ty  he i s  so ready to  applaud."
The Mirror  and The Lounger c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  reveal  t h a t  
the  sen t im enta l i sm  of  the  1770's and 1780 's was pern ic ious  
to  m o ra l i ty .
. . . the  indulgence in  th a t  s e n s i b i l i t y  which a r i s e s  
from th e  contemplation o f  ob jec ts  in  d i s t r e s s ,  i s  
apt to  produce and f l a t t e r  a conscious v an i ty  in  the  
mind o f  the  person who gives way to  such indulgence.
The v a n i ty  tu rns  and r e s t s  upon i t s e l f ,  and without 
lead ing  to  ac t ion ,  i t  f o s t e r s  a s e l f i s h  and contrac ted  
approbat ion o f  our own f e e l in g s ,  which i s  catched 
hold o f ,  and serves as a kind of  s u b s t i t u t e  in  p lace  
o f  the  consciousness of  rea l  goodness. . . . Hence 
the  mind may be open to  the  f e e l in g s  of  compassion 
and tende rness ,  may take  d e l ig h t  in  indulging them.
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and by tha t  means acquire  g rea t  acuteness of 
s e n s i b i l i t y ,  when i t  may harden and shut i t s e l f  aga ins t  
every o b je c t ,  where th e  g iv ing  way to the  fee l ings  
which such ob jec t  produces req u i re s  r e a l  a c t i v i t y  and 
e x e r t io n .
To t h i s  i t  may be proper to  add, t h a t  the  very 
indulgence in  the  pass ive  f ee l in g s  of  s e n s i b i l i t y  
has a tendency to produce indolence ,  languor,  and 
feeb leness ,  and to u n f i t  the  mind fo r  anything which 
re q u i r e s  a c t i v e  and f irm e x e r t io n .  %hile the  mind 
contemplates d i s t r e s s ,  i t  i s  acted upon, and never 
a c t s ;  and by indulging in t h i s  contemplation, i t  
becomes more and more u n f i t  f o r  a c t io n .  . . .  He whose 
nervous s e n s i b i l i t y  could not bear  the  s ig h t  of  a 
wound, would, in  such a case ,  be incapab le ,  were he 
o therwise  q u a l i f i e d ,  to  a s s i s t  in  i t s  cure ;  while 
the  person of  l e s s  d e l i c a t e  f e e l i n g s ,  and who is  l e s s  
a f f e c te d  with the  sore ,  w i l l  be both more able  and 
more w i l l i n g  to  lend h i s  a id  in  g iv ing  r e l i e f .  . . . 
I'Jhile t h e r e f o r e  a c e r t a i n  degree o f  s e n s i b i l i t y  ought 
to  be c u l t i v a t e d ,  we ought a t  the  same time to  be 
upon our guard not to push i t  too f a r . ^ ^
Mackenzie's own e t h i c a l  p o s i t io n  which emerges is  th a t
v i r t u e  and v ice  do not  c o ns is t  of  pa ss ive  sent iments ,  but
o f  a c t io n s .
Mackenzie's The Man of  Feelins; has ,  unders tandably ,  
o f t e n  been m is in te rp re te d .  Harley seems to  be s im i l a r  to  
the  n a i f s  in  F i e ld in g ' s  novels .  As a boy he was b e re f t  
o f  p a re n t s ,  and he grew up in  th e  country .  He attended 
a country school fo r  a time and gained the  r e s t  of h is  
educa t ion  from independent reading in  l i t e r a t u r e ,  "with 
some a s s i s t a n c e  from the  parson of  th e  p a r i sh  in  languages 
and philosophy, and from th e  exciseman in  a r i th m e t ic  and
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bookkeeping" (p. 12) .  As a young man he f a l l s  in love 
with  Miss Walton, and l a t e r  se t s  out  fo r  London, th a t  
■'sad place" which is  " rep le te  with tem pta t ions"  in  hopes 
of  " in c re as in g  h i s  fortune" (pp. 15, 12).  In  h is  
r e l a t i o n s  with Miss Walton and with those  he meets in 
London, he proves h imself  to be "a c h i ld  in  the drama of 
the  world."  One could give many more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and 
ac t io n s  t h a t  Harley shares with c h a r a c t e r s  l i k e  Joseph 
Andrews and Tom Jones .  I  have no doubt t h a t  Mackenzie 
conscious ly  used the  good-natured n a i f  a rchetype  in  order  
to c r i t i c i z e  the  p lac ing  of  too much f a i t h  i n  the  hear t  
by r e t e l l i n g  and r e v i s in g  the l i f e  o f  the  "man of f ee l in g ."
The element missing in  Mackenzie's v e r s io n  is  b e l i e f  
in good-nature  o r  n a tu r a l  goodness. I t  i s  very c l e a r  in 
both The Man of Feeling  and in  h i s  essays t h a t  Mackenzie 
be l ieved  th e  primary b as is  of m ora l i ty  to be not in  nature 
or  i n  God's law but  in  s o c ie ty .  Duty to p a re n t s ,  f r iends ,  
and country ,  j u s t i c e ,  prudence, and economy are  v i r tu e s  
which take  precedence over the exe r t io ns  o f  generos i ty ,  
benevolence,  and compassion. And th e  mere f ee l in g s  of 
g e n e ro s i ty ,  benevolence,  and compassion a re  not v i r tu e s  
a t  a l l .  "The code of moral i ty  must n e c e s s a r i l y  be enlarged 
i n  p ro p o r t io n  to t h a t  s t a t e  of manners to which cu l t iv a ted
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eras  give b i r th - -A s  the  idea o f  p roper ty  made a crime of  
t h e f t ,  as th e  invent ion  of oaths made falsehood p e r ju ry ;  
so th e  necessary  refinements in  manners o f  h ig h ly -p o l i sh ed  
na t ions  c re a te s  a v a r i e ty  o f  du t ies  and of  o f fen c es ,  which 
men in  ruder ,  and, i t  may be ( f o r  I e n te r  not in to  t h a t  
q u e s t io n ) ,  happ ie r  periods o f  so c ie ty ,  could never have 
i m a g i n e d . I n  The Man of  Feeling the  term ' 'good-nature" 
r a r e l y  ( I  th in k  never) appears .  N e i the r  does i t  appear 
in  Mackenzie 's essays in  The Mirror  and The Lounger which 
I have read.  One f inds o f ten  terms l i k e  " th e  good man" 
and " the  good-hearted man," and Mackenzie speaks of benevolence, 
sent im ent ,  and s e n s i b i l i t y  as being a p a r t  o f  one 's  "cha rac te r ,"  
not  h i s  "na tu re ."
Harley i s  not t r e a te d  h a rsh ly ,  fo r  he i s  amiable 
and, as Mackenzie says about another  good-hear ted  man in  
The M ir ro r , "he i s  no one 's  enemy but h i s  own." In doing 
good to every man who asked him, he did some t r u l y  
c h a r i t a b l e  ac t ion s  to  very deserving persons ,  l i k e  Edwards 
and h i s  g randchi ld ren .  But fo r  the  most p a r t  Har ley 's  
experience revea ls  t h a t  extreme s e n s i b i l i t y  i s  a weakness 
in  t h i s  world. I t  causes him to be a f a i l u r e  and a fool  
in  handling h i s  own domestic concerns and economy, which 
" sh ine  not in  the eyes of  the  world" but " a re  yet  the
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su re s t  guardians of  v i r t u e ,  o f  honour, and o f  independence."^^ 
Harley bungles both chances he has to  inc re ase  h is  fo r tu n e ;  
he gives money to the  beggar even a f t e r  th e  beggar t e l l s  
him th a t  work goes aga ins t  h i s  stomach and he l iv e s  by 
s t e a l in g  and by preying upon p eo p le ’s sentiment and v a n i ty ;  
he v i s i t s  the  mad house and chooses to  leave  th e  conductor 
and allows an i d io t  to  become h i s  guide;  he i s  deceived 
time and t ime again in  London. Because o f  h i s  s e n s i b i l i t y  
Harley can never t e l l  Miss Walton o f  h i s  love o r  propose 
marriage to  her ,  and when she f i n a l l y  t e l l s  him of  her  
fee l ings  f o r  him he dies of  an excess of  s e n s i b i l i t y .
The c o n t r a s t ,  which i s  im p l i c i t  in  th e  foregoing 
paragraph between the  p lo ts  of  The Man o f  Fee l ing  and, 
say,  Tom J o n e s , i s  i n d ic a t iv e  of  what Mackenzie is  doing 
with c e r t a i n  conventional  n o t io n s .  The movement from 
country to  London and back to  the  country i s  common to 
both, but the  town-country c o n t r a s t  has a d i f f e r e n t  func t ion  
in  each. In Fie ld ing  the  c i t y  s o c i e ty  i s  judged by the  
Good-Natured Man from the  country;  in  The Man o f  Feeling 
th e  c i t y - s o c i e t y  judges th e  s te reo typed  ideas  a sso c ia ted  
with the  country and with benevolence.  The two works a lso  
have a m isan th ro p is t .  In Tom Jones the  m isan th rop is t  i s  
judged by th e  simple wisdom of  Tom; in  The Man o f  Feeling
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t h e  misanthropist  i n d i r e c t l y  judges Harley. Harley has 
a lready demonstrated i n  h is  own c h a rac te r  the  t r u t h  of  
much tha t  the  m isan thropis t  says:  "With v a n i ty  your bes t
v i r tu e s  a re  g ross ly  t a i n t e d :  your benevolence, which ye
deduce immediately from the  n a tu ra l  impulse of the  h e a r t ,  
squints  to i t  for  i t s  reward. There are  some, indeed, who 
t e l l  us of the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  which flows from a sec re t  
consciousness of good a c t io n s :  t h i s  s e c re t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  is
t r u l y  excellent--when we have some f r iend  to  whom we may 
discover  i t s  excellence" (p. 42) . F in a l ly ,  in  Tom Jones 
we are  l e f t  with knowledge t h a t  the  world i s  not  f r i en d ly  
to  naive good-nature;  in  The Man of  Feeling we a re  l e f t  with 
the  knowledge th a t  excess ive  s e n s i b i l i t y  i s  not b e n e f i c i a l  
to soc ie ty  or  to o ne 's  s e l f .
I t  may well be th a t  The Man of  Feeling is  a more 
complex and a r t i s t i c  work th a t  has been commonly thought.
The common mistake i s  to  assume t h a t  the  n a r r a t o r  or 
Harley speaks for  Mackenzie as the  n a r r a t o r  or  the  good- 
natured charac te rs  speak fo r  F ie ld in g .  But Mackenzie poses 
as the  e d i to r  and the  s to r y  i s  to ld  by an in s id e  n a r r a to r ,  
Charles,  who has unalloyed admirat ion  fo r  H a r ley 's  s e n s i b i l i t y .  
When one c a re fu l ly  deduces the  values of th e  au thor  from the 
c h a ra c te r s ,  a c t io n s ,  and s t r u c t u r a l  elements o f  the  e n t i r e
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work, he f in d s  t h a t  the  work does not hold up fo r  admirat ion 
a s e n s i t i v i t y  to f e e l in g  which th e  author  and h is  genera t ion  
admired but which the  tw en t ie th -c en tu ry  read e r  f inds 
s t u l t i f y i n g .  Rather he holds up a s e n s i t i v i t y  to fee l ing  
t h a t  h is  g e n e ra t io n  equated with  v i r t u e  and sub t ly  s t r i p s  
away every cla im to  goodness. I f  h i s  contemporaries 
thought Harley to  be a paragon, i t  speaks wel l  fo r  the  
q u a l i t y  o f  Mackenzie's s a t i r e .  S w i f t ' s  "Modest Proposal" 
and G u l l i v e r ' s  Travels  were misread in  the  same way.
However, Mackenzie meant to  d isparage not  a l l  p r e ­
tens ions  to  v i r t u e ,  but excess ive  s e n s i b i l i t y .  He gave 
Harley in s ig h t  near  the  end of  h i s  l i f e  in to  the  f a c t  
t h a t  during h is  l i f e t i m e  h i s  f r i e n d s  "o f ten  laughed very 
h e a r t i l y  a t  the  awkward blunders o f  the  r e a l  Harley, when 
the  d i f f e r e n t  f a c u l t i e s ,  which should have prevented them, 
were e n t i r e l y  occupied by th e  idea l"  and t h a t  in  the midst 
o f  t h e i r  "unnoticed lev i ty "  he had viewed l i f e  "through 
the  medium of  romantic imagination" (pp. 17, 18).  Harley 
t e l l s  the  n a r r a t o r  sh o r t ly  b e fo re  he dies t h a t  in  h i s  ex­
per ience  in  the  world "a thousand th ings  occurred, where 
I  blushed fo r  the  improprie ty  of my conduct when I thought 
on the  world, though my reason t o l d  me I  should have 
blushed to  have done o th e r w i s e - - I t  was a scene of  d i s s im u la t io n ,
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of r e s t r a i n t ,  o f  d isappointment ."  He hopes t h a t  in  heaven 
he w i l l  f ind  the  happiness t h a t  i s  believed to  be a t t en d a n t  
upon v i r t u e .  "There a re  some fee l ings  which perhaps are 
too tender  to be su f fe red  by the  world. The world i s  in  
genera l  s e l f i s h ,  i n t e r e s t e d ,  and unthinking,  and throws 
the  imputation of  romance and melancholy on every temper 
more su s c e p t ib l e  than  i t s  own." These f ee l in g s  "a re  c a l l e d , - -  
perhaps they  are--weaknesses h e re ; - -b u t  t h e r e  may be some 
b e t t e r  m odif ica t ions  o f  them in  heaven, which may deserve 
the  name o f  v i r tu e s "  (pp. 128-129). This speech i s  q u a l i f i e d  
by H a r le y 's  c h a r a c t e r ,  the  speech of the m isan th ro p is t ,  
and by the  thematic  t r a j e c t o r y  of  the e n t i r e  work, but  i t  
i s  a t  l e a s t  c l e a r  t h a t  excessive s e n s i b i l i t y  is  not a v i r t u e  
in  t h i s  world.
Thus both Yorick and Harley are  descendants of  th e  
Good-Natured Man type  but they in h e r i ted  only his  s u b j e c t iv e  
d i s p o s i t i o n  of  mind and some of  h is  outward f e a t u r e s .
S terne  does not deny th e  o n to lo g ica l  r e a l i t y  of  good n a tu re ,  
but he l i f t s  Y or ick 's  mask to  show us th a t  Yorick does not 
possess i t .  But Harley i s  much more l ik e  the  n a i f  and 
when Mackenzie rev ea ls  to us t h a t  Harley does not possess 
good na tu re  we a re  supposed to  conclude th a t  th e re  i s  no 
such th ing  as n a tu r a l  goodness. As the  name implies ,  the
180
Good-Natured Man can be a v i t a l  c h a ra c te r  only as long 
as goodness and na tu re  are  i n d i v i s i b l e .  But the  trend 
in  the  e th i c a l  philosophy of  th e  period was to  divorce 
goodness from na tu re  and to  wed i t  to s o c i a l  j u s t i c e ,  
custom, and opin ion .  And the  p o p u la r i z a t io n  o f  the  
’’sen t im en ta l"  brought about a confusion o f  emotional 
responsiveness  as a guide to moral conduct with  emotional 
responsiveness  as moral conduct in  i t s e l f .  Yorick is  
an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of th e  fac t  t h a t  goodness and na tu re  may 
not  be the  same th ing  and t h a t  fee l in g s  may be confused 
with  v i r t u e ;  Harley i s  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  th e  fac t  th a t  
goodness and nature  are  not th e  same th ing  and t h a t  fee l ings  
a r e  not v i r tuous  in  themselves. A ppropr ia te ly ,  and 
i r o n i c a l l y ,  the pe lagian ,  s o c i a l l y - o r i e n t e d  m o ra l i ty  which 
t h e  L a t i t u d in a r i a n s  and Shaftesbury gave a u th o r i t y  to by 
a s s o c i a t i n g  i t  with the  u n iv e r sa l  and e t e r n a l  na tu re  of 
th ing s  and which was i l l u s t r a t e d  by embodying i t  in  the 
Good-Natured Man type survived to  s e t  in  judgment upon the 
Man o f  S e n s i b i l i t y  and to f ind  him lac k in g .  Changes in  the  
b a s i s  o f  m ora l i ty ,  not changes in  moral v a lu e s ,  u l t im a te ly  
brought about the  disappearance o f  the  Good-Natured Man.
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion
A paradox was p resen t  in  the  concept o f  the  Good- 
Natured Man from the  beginning.  How could goodness be 
n a tu ra l  in  an unna tu ra l  environment? How could n a tu ra l  
" so c ia l  a f f e c t i o n s , "  o r  benevolence, be an adequate 
guide to moral conduct amidst the  fraud and dece i t  o f  
socie ty?  How could n a t u r a l ,  spontaneous goodness become 
a r t i s t i c ,  c a lcu la ted  goodness without lo s in g  i t s  moral 
worth? The paradox can be s t a te d  numerous ways, but  the  
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  no t ions  a re  t h a t  to  ac t  v i r tu o u s ly  i s  
to act  in accordance with na tu re  (berievolent fee l ings  
and the  "nature  of th ings")  and th a t  amidst the  so c ia l  
conventions and i n s t i t u t i o n s  c rea ted  by human a r t i f i c e  
the  ideas of  v ice  and v i r t u e  a re  assigned to  ac t ions  
which have no n a tu ra l  m otiva t ion .  In s h o r t ,  i f  the Good- 
Natured Man is to be t r u l y  a good man, he must be able  
to act  according to  the  d i c t a t e s  o f  h i s  na tu re  and o f  
h is  s o c ie ty .  Even a Good-Natured Man thoroughly  acquainted 
with th e  a r t i f i c i a l  world can not re so lv e  th e  paradox, 
fo r  na tu re  and a r t  do not match fac t  f o r  f a c t .  But the
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paradox was not only in so lu b le ,  but a l s o  Inescapable .
The moral values o f  the period were a t  s take  because 
m ora l i ty  could not be e a s i l y  o r  suddenly separa ted  from 
n a tu re .  The response was not a t  f i r s t  to quest ion  the  
base  of m ora l i ty  but  to  ask whether moral conduct in  
so c ie ty  i s  p o ss ib le ,  whether s e r io u s ly  held values a re  
t en a b le .
In the  e a r l i e r  par t  o f  the  e igh teen th  century  those 
who had f a i t h  in good na tu re  and human reason were 
o p t im i s t i c  about reso lv ing  the  paradox by teaching  the  
Good-Natured Man prudence, t h a t  i s ,  by teaching  him to 
use his  reason to d i r e c t  and p ro te c t  h i s  benevolent  passions 
w i th in  so c ie ty .  F i e ld i n g ' s  moral idea l  of  the  union of a 
good h ea r t  and a good head implies h i s  f a i t h  in  bo th ,  and 
h i s  avowed purpose in many o f  h is  w r i t in g s ,  e . g . ,  "An 
Essay on the  Knowledge of th e  Charac ters  of  Men" and 
Tom Jo nes , i s  to teach prudence to the  Good-Natured Man.
But an in c reas in g ly  p e ss im is t i c  a t t i t u d e  toward the  v i a b i l i t y  
of  the  id e a l  is r e f l e c t e d  in  F i e ld i n g ' s  works.
The t rend  in  F i e ld i n g ' s  l a s t  t h r e e  novels i s  from 
the  judgment of the  Good-Natured Man by a predominately 
a b s t r a c t  moral s tandard  to judgment o f  the  Good-Natured 
Man by a predominately concre te  s o c i a l  s tandard .  F ie ld ing 's
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t rea tment  o f  the Good-Natured Man i n  these  works p re f igu res  
the  change in  a t t i t u d e  toward the  Good-Natured Man th a t  
evolves in  the  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  the e igh teen th  cen tu ry .
The fac t  t h a t  the  naive Parson Adams and Joseph Andrews 
a re  not adept in the  ways o f  the world only emphasizes 
t h e i r  n a tu r a l  goodness. The comic s t r u c tu r e  o f  Joseph 
Andrews and i t s  h ig h ly  symbolic and a l l e g o r i c a l  q u a l i t i e s  
cause the  focus o f  a t t e n t i o n  to be upon the c o n f l i c t  of  
such values as c h a r i t y  versus v a n i ty ,  revealed in the  
confron ta t ion s  between good and bad c h a rac te r s ,  r a t h e r  
than  upon the  f a t e s  o f  c h a ra c te r s  who embody these  va lues .
The country,  the road, London, the  v i l l a i n s  ( l a d i e s ,  beaus, 
ro a s t in g  squ i re s )  a re  a rche typ a l .  Parson Adams i s  h igh ly  
in d iv id u a l i z e d ,  b u t ,  because of  h i s  unqua l i f ied  idea l ism  
and a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  as a person,  he functions p r im ar i ly  
to e n l i s t  support fo r  h is  v a lues .
In Tom Jones the  themes are  presented in le s s  a l l e g o r i c a l ,  
genera l  terms. The country so c ie ty  is tha t  u n i d y l l i c  one 
which surrounds Parad ise  Hal l ;  the  road is  not p r im ar i ly  
an a rche typa l  p a t t e r n  of human experience but one which 
Tom t r a v e l s  from Allworthy 's  e s t a t e  to London; London 
becomes a s p e c i f i c  place with p a r t i c u l a r  persons and e v i l s  ; 
and the  v i l l a i n s  a re  not p r im a r i ly  types but in d iv id u a ls
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l i k e  B l i f i l  and charac ters  l ik e  Squire  Western and Black 
George who are  not unadu l te ra ted ly  e v i l .  Tom is  faced with 
a complex r e a l i t y  in which choices o f  ac t ion  a re  not e a s i l y  
labe led  r ig h t  or wrong. Also the  presence o f  Squire 
Allworthy gives th e  work a new emphasis. The c h a r i ty  
versus v a n i ty  theme i s  s t i l l  prominent in th e  c o n t r a s t s  
between Tom and the  "bad"' c h a r a c t e r s ,  but th e  impulsive 
goodness versus prudent ia l  goodness theme i s  equal ly  
emphasized in  the  contras t  between Tom and Allworthy.  
Allworthy is  not the  apotheosis o f  th e  Good-Natured Man, 
but he does possess good n a tu re  and prudence. And because 
he i s  an approximation of th e  idea l  Good-Natured Man and 
has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and au tho r i ty  to give counsel and 
judgment in  human society ,  the  paradox becomes c l e a r .
The success o f  Allworthy in  admin is te r ing  j u s t i c e  r e f l e c t s  
very l im i ted  optimism about the  p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  t ransforming 
good motives into  good ac t ions  w i th in  the context  o f  so c ie ty .  
But Allworthy is a minor c h a r a c te r  and F ie ld ing  once again 
eludes the  paradox by comic manipulat ion and by judging 
the  m ora l i ty  of the  naive, youthfu l  hero by h is  motives, 
and by separa t ing  moral ity from a c t io n ,  u n t i l  Tom has 
learned  the  lesson of  prudence from experience.  But 
through the  fa te s  of  the  Man on the  H i l l ,  Be t ty ,  Jenny
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Jones (Mrs. Waters),  and o th e r  b a s i c a l l y  good-natured 
c h a ra c te r s ,  F ie ld ing  p resen ts  p lenty  o f  evidence th a t  
the  impulsive Good-Natured Man who can survive his  
experience in  soc ie ty  and r e t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  c h a rac te r  
and r e p u ta t io n  to b e n e f i t  from h is  experience i s  exceptional  
indeed. And even Tom, who miraculously does surv ive ,  is 
not l i k e l y  to  supersede the  standard o f  goodness which 
Squire  Allworthy demonstrates to be p ragm atica l ly  p o ss ib le .
F ie ld ing  f i n a l l y  confronts  the  paradox head-on in  
Amelia, h is  l e a s t  comic, most r e a l i s t i c ,  most o v e r t ly  
d id a c t i c  novel.  Amelia does not r e f l e c t  a lo ss  of f a i t h  
in  good na tu re  but in  the  e f f i c a c y  of good n a tu re .  Dr. 
Harr ison ,  who speaks fo r  F ie ld in g ,  says,  "The na tu re  o f  
man i s  f a r  from being in  i t s e l f  e v i l  ; i t  abounds with 
benevolence, c h a r i ty ,  and p i t y ,  coveting p ra i s e  and honor, 
and shunning shame and d isg race .  Bad education, bad. 
h a b i t s ,  and bad customs, debauch our na ture ,  and drive i t  
head long as i t  were in to  v ic e .  The governors of  the  world, 
and I am a f r a id  the  p r ies thood ,  a re  answerable fo r  the  
badness o f  i t "  (VII, 144-145 ; IX, v ) . And Dr. Harrison 
t e l l s  Amelia in  regard to Colonel James, who has t r i e d  to 
seduce her ,  " I  am convinced th e re  are  good stamina in  the 
n a tu re  of  t h i s  very man; fo r  he hath  done ac ts  o f  f r iendsh ip
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and generos i ty  to your husband b e fo re  he could have any 
e v i l  design on your c h a s t i t y ;  and in  a C h r i s t i a n  so c ie ty ,  
/which,  fo r  F ie ld in g ,  i s  a n a tu r a l  s o c i e t y /  which I no 
more esteem t h i s  na t ion  to  be than  I  do any p a r t  of  
Turkey, I  doubt not but t h i s  very co lone l  would have 
made a worthy and va luab le  member" (V II ,  145; IX, v) .
Booth, the  hero of the  novel,  dramatizes Dr. H a r r iso n 's  
s ta tem en ts .  He i s  l i k e  an o ld e r  Tom Jones who s tays  in  
London and does not l e a r n  from h i s  p a s t  exper iences .  He 
has married a female paragon, Amelia, but  continues  to  
be imprudent, u n f a i t h f u l ,  i r r e s p o n s i b l e ,  and, in  Dr. 
H a r r i s o n ' s  view, unworthy of  h is  w i f e .  He i s  a humor 
c h a ra c te r  who b e l ieves  u n t i l  l a t e  in the  novel in  the  
d e te r m in i s t i c  dominant passion  and e g o i s t i c  t h e o r i e s .
But even a f t e r  he is  converted to C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  Dr.
Harrison advises Amelia to  get Booth away from the  temp­
t a t i o n s  o f  London in to  t h e  country .  Even Dr. H arr ison ,  
who is  w i t t i e r ,  w ise r ,  and tougher than  Squire Allworthy 
o r  any o th e r  Good-Natured Man in  F i e l d i n g ' s  works, cannot 
be c o n s i s t e n t ly  good in  London and he too leaves i t .
Dr. Harr ison is  l e s s  c o n t r i t e  than  Squire  Allworthy when 
he d iscovers  h is  judgments were mistaken because he knows 
t h a t  the  complexity and knavery o f  s o c ie ty  makes c o n s i s t e n t
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goodness impossible .
F ie ld in g  f i n a l l y  acknowledges t h a t  th e  paradox is  
insurmountable, bu t  he i s  c o n s i s t e n t  in  r e t a in i n g  h i s  
b e l i e f  in  th e  n a tu r a l  goodness of human n a tu re  and in 
damning so c ie ty  f o r  "debauching" i t  by educa t ion  o r  making 
i t  a l i a b i l i t y  to those  who r e t a i n  i t  because of  corrupt  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The Good-Natured Man is  untenable  as a 
moral i d e a l ,  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  v i r tuous  conduct i s  impossible  
because s o c ie ty  i s  unna tura l  and c o r ru p t .
Goldsmith 's  Dr. Primrose is  not  much d i f f e r e n t  from 
Tom Jones in  th a t  h is  conscious motives a re  good, but 
h is  ac t ions  f requen t ly  a re  n o t .  And the  e f f e c t  o f  
Goldsmith 's  works i s  to v i v i f y ,  not r e so lv e ,  the  paradox.
He va lues  good n a tu re  and so c ia l  j u s t i c e .  Thus th e  only 
adequate so lu t io n  remained an idea l  one, as represen ted  
by S i r  William T h o rn h i l l .
The good-natured humorist r e f l e c t s  growing pessimism 
about the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  goodness in  s o c i e t y .  The 
Benevolent Misanthrope i s ,  of  course ,  a c h a r a c t e r  who 
t r i e s  to reso lve  the  paradox fo r  h im sel f  by adopting the  
a r t  and wisdom of the  se rpen ts  of  s o c ie ty  to p r o t e c t  h i s  
good n a tu re .  The f i r s t  Benevolent Misanthrope in  the  
E nglish  l i t e r a t u r e  of  the  e igh teen th  cen tury  is  Mr. S p a t te r
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in  David Simple (1744). He is  a minor c h a ra c te r  and is 
ap p aren t ly  su ccess fu l  in so lv ing  th e  problems of the 
Good-Natured Man who at tempts  to  l i v e  amidst fraud and 
d e c e i t .  He func t ions  in  the  novel as a c o n t r a s t  to  the 
g u l l i b l e ,  na ive  Simple. But in the more f u l l y  developed 
Man in  Black and Matthew Bramble good n a tu re  and reason 
a re  not brought in to  harmony so e a s i l y .  Benevolent fee l in g s  
do not e a s i l y  submit to  reason in  th e  Man in  Black, and 
th e  c o n f l i c t  of  the  two wreck Bramble's h e a l th  and p e rso n a l i ty .  
These l a t t e r  two c h a rac te r s  a re  humorists because they a re  
c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e i r  dominant pass ions ,  and the  im p l ic i t  
judgment i s  th a t  they should be capable of r a t i o n a l  prudence 
l i k e  Mr. S p a t te r ,  l i k e  the  i d e a l  th e  Man in  Black preaches,  
o r  l i k e  Mr. Dennison in  Humphrey C l inker .
I f  reason or  good n a tu re  alone can not insure  moral 
conduct in  s o c ie ty ,  and i f  they w i l l  not ac t  in  harmony, 
not  only the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of  so c ie ty  but the  c o n s t i t u t io n  
of  man h im self  makes c o n s i s t e n t  moral conduct impossible.  
S te rne  is  a p e s s im is t i c  ye t  o p t im i s t i c  c r e a t o r  of the 
Good-Natured Man. There a re  no paragons in  S te rn e ' s  
nove ls ,  only humoris ts ,  and i f  h is  id ea l  is  r a t i o n a l  
benevolence, he gives  no evidence t h a t  i t  has been or hope 
t h a t  i t  ever  w i l l  be a t t a i n e d .  Like Hume, he does not
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even s e r i o u s l y  cons ide r  reason alone as a guide to  moral 
conduct.  He does take  benevolent feel ings s e r io u s ly  and 
t r i e s  to  sa lvage t h e i r  t ru e  worth by s a t i r i z i n g  mistaken 
Ideas about them and by I l l u s t r a t i n g  th e i r  p r a c t i c a l  
va lue .  C e r ta in ly  the  n a tu ra l  s e l f - a f f e c t io n s  get In the 
way; assu red ly  over much s e n s i t i v i t y  to feeling may Inca­
p a c i t a t e  one fo r  the  app rop r ia te  a c t io n s ;  no, f ee l in g s  
do not r e f l e c t  the  abso lu te  moral law of  the u n iv e rse .
But th e r e  I s  such a th in g  as n a tu r a l  sympathy which Is 
good and has p r a c t i c a l  worth to m o ra l i ty  and so c ie ty .
Thus, as the  century  progressed a compromise evolved. 
E th ic a l  phi losophers  l i k e  Hume and Smith and l i t e r a r y  
a r t i s t s  l i k e  S terne  and Mackenzie took from sent imental  
e th i c s  and the  concept o f  good n a tu re  only n a tu r a l  sympathy; 
from the  e th i c s  o f  the  r a t i o n a l i s t s  and the e x a l t a t io n  of 
reason they  took only, an awareness of  social  custom and 
opin ion .  They be l ieved  th a t  with  these  two Ingredients  
f a i r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  moral conduct In society was poss ib le .
The compromise re ta ined  the  values of c h a r i ty ,  sympathy, 
e t c . ,  but he ld  t h a t  the  code of  m ora l i ty  to which each 
so c ie ty  and era g ives b i r t h  superseded nature as the  base 
o f  m o ra l i ty .  The compromise r e j e c t e d  the e g o i s t i c  psy­
cholog ica l  theory  but  accepted the  r e l a t i v i t y  o f  m ora l i ty .
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When philosophers  in  the  seventeenth  century  proposed 
the  autonomy of e th ic s  in  order to give the  a u th o r i ty  
o f  both God and u n iv e r s a l  na ture  to  t h e i r  systems, they 
could not have fo reseen  t h a t  they had u l t im a te ly  s t r ipped  
m ora l i ty  o f  i t s  abso lu te  base. Wlien they wrote and when 
they c rea ted  the  Good-Natured Man type, they had g rea t  
f a i t h  in na tu re  and in  human reason, but by the  end o f  
the  e igh teen th  century  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to have much 
f a i t h  in e i t h e r .  Only th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  aspects  of t h e i r  
ph i losoph ies  were s t i l l  t en a b le ,  and the  p r in c ip le  of  the  
g r e a t e s t  good fo r  the  g r e a t e s t  number was about a l l  t h a t  
remained as a b a s i s  fo r  m o ra l i ty .  The disappearance of  
the  Good-Natured Man a t  t h e  end of  the e igh teen th  century 
i s  concurrent with the  se p a ra t io n  of  moral i ty  and n a tu re .
The Man of S e n s i b i l i t y ,  in the  works o f  Sterne and 
Mackenzie, is  a c h a ra c te r  who r e l i e s  on h is  fee l ings  as 
i f  they alone were an adequate guide to v i r t u e  and as 
i f  they corresponded to  an abso lu te  moral i ty  inherent  
in  n a tu re .  He i s  s a t i r i z e d  not only fo r  t h i s  mistaken 
n o t ion ,  but a lso  because h is  ac t ions  do not measure up 
to  what i s  p ragm atica l ly  p o ss ib le  for  every person with a 
modicum of  sympathy and s o c i a l  awareness who is  se r ious  
about moral conduct .
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A good man can be found in any body o f  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
but the  Good-Natured Man i s  unique to one period and the  
presence and in f luence  of t h i s  c h a rac te r  type in th e  
l i t e r a t u r e  o f  the  e igh teen th  century  is  pe rvas ive .  I f  
the  works con ta in ing  the  Good-Natured Man are  coherent ,  
t h e i r  s t r u c t u r e  and meaning w i l l  be c o n s i s te n t  with and 
perhaps determined by the  c h a ra c te r  and funct ion  o f  the  
Good-Natured Man. Like metal  f i l i n g s  around a magnetic 
pole,  the  var ious  aspec ts  of  a work are  shaped by t h e i r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  to the  Good-Natured Man. For example, one 
element common to a l l  the  works discussed in  the previous 
chapters  is  the  town-country c o n t r a s t .  I t  is  impossible  
to  unders tand the  func t ion  of  t h i s  c p n tra s t  in the  works 
discussed except in  r e l a t i o n s h ip  to the  Good-Natured Man.
Of course ,  t h e r e  i s  no necessary  r e l a t io n s h ip  between 
good na tu re  and a r u r a l  environment. The country versus 
c i t y  theme i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  to  many periods and modes of  
l i t e r a t u r e .  Nature, innocence, v i r t u e ,  peace and s im p l i c i t y  
a re  commonly a ssoc ia ted  with the  country, and honest l ab o r ,  
independence, h e a l th ,  chas te  love,  f r ien d sh ip ,  and c o n te n t ­
ment with th e  s u f f i c i e n t  a re  the sources o f  the  genuine 
happiness to  be found t h e r e .  The c i t y  embodies everything
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a n t i t h e t i c a l  to the  country l i f e .  But i t  i s  easy to  see 
why w r i t e r s  of  the  e igh teen th  cen tury  who were concerned 
with the  r e l a t i o n  between goodness and na tu re  and happiness 
and v i r t u e  would have found the  r u r a l  idea l  a u s e f u l  
l i t e r a r y  convention.  The express ion "God made the  country, 
man made the  town" implies the  genera l  so c ia l  and moral 
va lues  th e  e igh teen th  century  emphasized by the  c o n t r a s t .
For the  authors of  the  works discussed above the  ru ra l  
id ea l  is  important as a s e t t i n g  where the  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
i s  i d e a l l y  su i t e d  to the  charac te r  o f  the Good-Natured 
Man. The w r i t e r ' s  i n t e r e s t s ,  a t t i t u d e s  and values determine 
h i s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t io n  o f  the Good-Natured Man, and, in  tu rn ,  
determine the  dep ic t io n  and symbolic meaning of  the  r u r a l  
s o c i e ty  i n  h i s  work.^
The r u r a l  id ea l  represented  by the d e s c r ip t io n  o f  
"Wilson 's  way of l iv in g "  ( I I I ,  iv ,  225-229) i s  important 
in  Joseph Andrews as "a s e t t i n g  wherein, because o f  i t s  
s i m p l i c i t y ,  a c h a ra c te r  can b e s t  develop and lead th e  good, 
i . e . , the  moral l i f e .  S im pl ic i ty  renders  i t  sub jec t  to  
the  c o n t ro l  o f  reason and good n a tu re ;  t h e re fo re  the  
i n t e l l e c t  can fashion the  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ap p ro p r ia te  to  the 
p r a c t i c e  o f  v i r t u e . "  Of course, many of F i e ld i n g ' s  s o c i a l  
and moral ideas a re  apparent in t h i s  so c ia l  microcosm.
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Each member performs the honest  labo rs  t h a t  are  appropria te  
to  h is  h i e r a r c h i c a l  p o s i t io n ,  the  c h i ld r e n  are not t ra ined  
to  be "above the  rank they a re  l i k e l y  to  f i l l  h e r e a f t e r , "  
and duty a r i s e s  out o f  love and love a r i s e s  out of  duty 
not  only in  r e l a t i o n  to  o the r  members o f  th e  family but 
a lso  in  r e l a t i o n  to guests  and ne ighbors .  Wilson's soc ie ty  
i s  o rd e r ly  because love is  t r a n s l a t e d  in to  ac t ion ,  and i t  
i s  f u l l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  even to  th e  n a i f  because th e re  is  a 
p e r f e c t  i d e n t i t y  of  appearance and r e a l i t y .  Thus Fie ld ing  
uses  th e  country simply as a ph y s ica l  s e t t i n g  f o r  h i s  
id e a l  o f  a s o c i a l  and moral o r d e r .^
WTiereas F ie ld ing  descr ibes  p r im a r i ly  the  s o c ia l  and 
moral o rder  o f  the  r u r a l  so c ie ty  of th e  Wilson family,  
Sm olle t t  desc r ibes  p r im ar i ly  the  p h ys ic a l  o rder  of 
Dennison 's  e s t a t e  in Humphrey C l in k e r . I f  we approach 
th e  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  Dennison's e s t a t e  by way of the  charac te r  
o f  Matthew Bramble, we can understand why Smollet t  emphasizes 
p hy s ic a l  o rd e r .  I t  i s  not merely ano ther  in s tance  of the 
tendency o f  S m o l l e t t ' s  novels to  dwindle in to  a geographical 
r e p o r t .  Rather  S m o l l e t t ' s  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  the  phys ica l  
o rd e r  o f  Dennison 's  e s t a t e ,  and Dennison's  order ing  of  his  
e s t a t e ,  embodies in  concrete  terms th e  moral idea l  im p l ic i t ,  
ye t  lack ing ,  in  the  c h a ra c te r  o f  Matthew Bramble. Bramble
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h im self  t e l l s  us as much when he says Dennison i s  a person 
"who has r e a l l y  a t t a in e d  to t h a t  p i t c h  o f  r u r a l  f e l i c i t y ,  
at which I  have been a sp i r in g  th e se  twenty years  in vain" 
(p. 320). The reason t h a t  F i e l d i n g ’s d e p ic t io n  is 
a p p ro p r ia te ly " q u i t e  genera l ,  in  terms both o f  the  concrete 
d e t a i l  and time, with the  r e s u l t  t h a t  i t  suggests  g rea te r  
u n iv e r s a l i t y "  and "S m ol le t t ’ s is  more s p e c i f i c ,  mundane, 
r e a l i s t i c  in  a t e c h n ic a l  sense" i s  t h a t  F ie ld ing  is con­
cerned with the  a b s t r a c t ,  moral aspect  o f  human nature
and Smollet t  i s  concerned with the  concre te ,  c o n s t i tu t io n
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aspect  of  good-nature.  Dennison’s va lues a re  l ik e  
Bramble’s:  "The ob jec ts  he had in  view, were hea l th  o f
body, peace of mind, and the p r iv a t e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of 
domestic q u ie t ,  unalloyed by a c tu a l  want, and unin terrupted  
by the  fea rs  o f  indigence--He was very moderate in his 
e s t im ate  o f  the n e c e ssa r ie s ,  and even of  the  comforts of 
l i f e - - H e  required nothing but wholesome a i r ,  pure water, 
agreeab le  exe rc ise ,  p l a in  d i e t ,  convenient  lodging,  and 
decent apparel" (p . 322). Dennison has a l l  o f  these and 
Bramble has few of  them because Dennison has d isc ip l ined  
c o n t ro l  o f  his passions and Bramble does no t .  The moral 
q u a l i t i e s  Bramble admires are a c tu a l i z e d  in so c ie ty  as a 
r e s u l t  of  con tro l  o f  the passions and, o f  course ,  the
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presence of  benevolent pass ions .
The r u r a l  i d e a l  in  The Vicar of  Wakefield is  seen 
both through the eyes of  th e  n a i f  and the  paragon. Dr. 
Primrose in  Chapter IV descr ibes  a microcosmic soc ia l  
s t r u c t u r e  l i k e  the  ones descr ibed  by F ie ld ing  and Smollet t .  
The moral s ig n i f i c a n c e  of  the  duty, a f f e c t io n ,  h o s p i t a l i t y ,  
moderation,  and s i m p l i c i t y  is  p resen t ,  but  j u s t  as Dr. 
Primrose had an eye out f o r  the  rewards o f  v i r t u e  in  t h i s  
l i f e ,  in desc r ib ing  the  p hys ica l  and s o c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of  h is  " l i t t l e  repub l ic"  he i s  concerned pr imar i ly  with 
the a e s t h e t i c  r a t h e r  than the  moral q u a l i t i e s .  "Our l i t t l e  
h a b i t a t i o n  was s i t u a t e d  a t  the  foot of a sloping h i l l ,  
s h e l te r e d  with a b e a u t i f u l  underwood behind and a pra t t le ing .  
r i v e r  b e fo re ;  on one s id e  a meadow, on the  o ther  s ide  a 
green. . . . Nothing could exceed the neatness of  my l i t t l e  
enc losures ,  the elms and th e  hedge rows appearing with 
in e x p re s s ib le  beau ty ."  Even in descr ib ing  the labours 
he emphasizes the  b e a u t i f u l  r a th e r  than the  p r a c t i c a l  and 
simple: "As we rose  with the  sun, so we never pursued our
labours a f t e r  i t  was gone down, but re turned  home to the  
expecting family,  where smiling looks, a neat  hear th ,  and 
p leasan t  f i r e  were prepared fo r  our reception" (IV, 32,33). 
The i d y l l i c  q u a l i ty  o f  the  v i c a r ' s  l i f e ,  which he consciously
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c u l t i v a t e s  and reve ls  in^ is  fu r th e r  emphasized by th e  
f a c t  t h a t  the  v i c a r - n a r r a t o r  focuses on the  " i n t e r v a l s  of  
id le n es s  and p leasure"  in  t e l l i n g  the s to ry  (IV, 32) .
Mr. Burcheli  ( S i r  William T h o rn h i l l ) ,  the  paragon 
f i g u r e ,  reveals  t h a t  the  r u r a l  so c ie ty  i s  not va luab le  
because  of i t s  beauty and f e l i c i t y  but  because i t  i s  
conducive to m o ra l i ty .  Dr. Pr imrose 's  bas ic  f a u l t ,  of  
which he i s  unaware, i s  h i s  excessive concern with world ly  
fo r tu ne  and happiness .  His a t t i t u d e  toward h is  country 
l i f e  i s  c o n s i s ten t  with t h i s .  But a l l  o f  h is  ca lam i t i e s  
t e s t i f y  to the  f a l seness  o f  h i s  not ions about ru ra l  f e l i c i t y .  
Burchel i ,  the  paragon, revea ls  t h a t ,  among o th e r  of the  
v i c a r ' s  mistakes which r e s u l t  from h is  n a iv e te .  Dr. Primrose 
va lues  the  r u r a l  id ea l  fo r  th e  wrong reason. All  o f  t h i s  
is c o n s i s te n t  with the teno r  of  the  work implied by the 
c o n t r a s t  o f  the  n a i f  and the  paragon: simple good-nature
is worthy by an a b s t r a c t  moral s tandard which judges 
moral in te n t io n ,  but  unworthy by a concrete  s o c i a l  s tandard  
t h a t  judges e f f i c i e n c y .  The s h i f t  in emphasis i n  Goldsmith 
as compared to  F ie ld in g ,  which we have t r i e d  to show in 
the  previous chap ters ,  i s  c l e a r  in  an exchange between Dr. 
Primrose and Burcheli :  "Both wit and unders tanding a re
t r i f l e s  without i n t e g r i t y ;  i t  is tha t  which gives  va lue  to
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every c h a r a c t e r .  The ignorant  peasant without f a u l t ,  is 
g r e a t e r  than  th e  ph i losopher  with many; . . .  An honest  
man is  the  no b le s t  work of God. ” Mr. Burchel i  r e tu r n s ,
' ' I  always held t h a t  f a v o u r i t e  maxim of Pope as unworthy 
a man o f  gen ius ,  and a base d e se r t io n  of  h is  own s u p e r i o r i t y . "  
Men should be "p r ize d  not f o r  t h e i r  exemption from f a u l t ,  
but the  s i z e  of  those  v i r tu e s  they are  possessed of" (IV, 78-79) 
The r u r a l  idea l  i s  not important  as a r e t r e a t  fo r  v i r tuous  
l iv in g  but  as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  moral values which 
should shape a l l  s o c i e t i e s .  The id ea l  Good-Natured Man 
has r e t a in e d  the  values of th e  r u r a l  id ea l  but has become 
a par t  o f  c i t y - s o c i e t y .
Thus, F ie ld in g  i s  concerned with the  co n tra s t  between 
m o ra l i ty  and s o c i a l  r e a l i t y ,  and t h e - n a i f  and Wilson 's  
r u r a l  s o c ie ty  p rov ides  a moral c o n t ra s t  to the immoral norm. 
Smolle t t  i s  concerned with the  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t  o f  the  
good-natured humoris t ,  and Dennison and h is  o rd e r ly ,  
p roduct ive ,  happy l i f e  on h i s  e s t a t e  provides the  moral 
i d e a l  toward which Bramble has s t rugg led  fo r  twenty y e a r s . 
Goldsmith is  concerned with the  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  of  the  Good- 
Natured Man, and with the  help  of  the  paragon the  n a i f  
lea rns  t h a t  the  m o ra l i ty  a ssoc ia ted  with the  ru ra l  idea l  
i s  good but the  ignorance and na ive te  assoc ia ted  with i t
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i s  not  m e r i to r io u s .  To f u r t h e r  s u b s t a n t i a t e  the  v a l i d i t y  
o f  the  above argument we need only no t ice  th a t  the  c i t y  in  
each work i s  t r e a t e d  with  a s im i la r  emphasis. F ie ld ing  
shows e v i l  p r im a r i ly  in  " c i t y ” r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;  Smollet t  
p re sen ts  e v i l  p r im a r i ly  in  the  nauseat ing and graphic 
d e s c r ip t io n s  o f  London and Bath; and Goldsmith allows 
on ly  h is  n a i f  c h a rac te r s  to  make the  c i t y  equal e v i l  
equat ion .
But Yorickj  the  Man of  S e n s i b i l i t y  in A Sentimental 
Journey , i s  not  a Good-Natured Man and the  i d y l l i c  dep ic t ion  
he gives us o f  the  peasant  family  in  "The Supper," "The 
Grace,"  and th e  beginning o f  "The Case o f  De l icacy ,"  i s ,  
as he su sp ec t s ,  a product  o f  h is  own " imaginat ion which 
i s  e t e r n a l l y  misleading" him (p. 12Q.). The peasant  family 
" co n s is ted  o f  an old gray-headed man and h i s  wife ,  with 
f i v e  o r  s i x  sons and so n s - in - law ,  and t h e i r  severa l  wives, 
and a joyous genealogy out o f  'em." This family o f  twenty- 
odd persons l i v e s  in  a " l i t t l e  farmhouse," and when they 
s e t  down to  ea t  " l e n t i l  soup" and bread Yorick descr ibes  
the  scene as a " f e a s t  of  love ."  Evidences of poverty  a re  
everywhere, but  Yorick chooses only to see the  "p len ty ,"  
the  joy ,  th e  "simple  j o l l i t y , "  the  "simple v i r t u e s , "  the  
" s a f e ty , "  and th e  " p ro tec t io n "  (pp. 118-120), There a re
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evidences of  the v i r t u e s  which Yorick has been seeking, 
but Yorick i s  not i n t e r e s t e d  in the peasants as persons, 
but as food fo r  h is  romantic imaginat ion. Yorick, unl ike  
Parson Adams and Matthew Bramble, does not inqu ire  into 
the  ac tua l  mode o f  l i v i n g  o f  these  peasan ts ,  but r a th e r  
he i s  i n t e r e s t e d ,  as usua l ,  with the  sub jec t ive  s ig n i f ican ce  
o f  the  scene upon h imself .
In a l l  th e se  works we a re  made to care  about the 
Good-Natured Man's m o ra l i ty .  And the  r u r a l  idea l  presented 
i s  id e a l  only in the moral and symbolic sense .  There is 
ample evidence in  a l l  these  works t h a t  the  l i t e r a l  i d y l l i c  
ex is ten ce  never has and never w i l l  be r e a l iz e d  in  r e a l i t y .  
But the  t r a d i t i o n  of  the  r u r a l  idea l  gave to  these  w r i te r s  
a convention fo r  p resen t ing  an idea l ized  symbol of  t h e i r  
moral values and fo r  providing a f i t t i n g  environment and 
reward for  good-natured charac te r s  in  the comic re s o lu t io n s .  
But again, t h e  r e t r e a t  in to  the  country i s  more important 
fo r  i t s  symbolic meaning, i . e . ,  a rep re se n ta t io n  of the 
moral values of  the  new o rder ,  than fo r  i t s  l i t e r a l  meaning, 
i . e . ,  a r e p re se n ta t io n  o f  the  country as b e t t e r  su i ted  
fo r  v ir tuous l iv in g  than the  c i t y .
The town-country c o n t r a s t  is  f a r  more complex and 
pervas ive  in these  works than th i s  d iscuss ion  implies
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and a t reatment  of  i t s  funct ion  and meaning in  the context 
of e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry  English  l i t e r a t u r e  would make up a 
complete study w i th in  i t s e l f .  This d iscuss ion  of i t  i s  
intended only to i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t ,  as has been pointed out 
time and time again in  the  preceding chap ters ,  an under­
s tanding  of the  c h a r a c te r  and funct ion  of the  Good-Natured 
Man provides a f r u i t f u l  approach to a study of  both theme 
and technique in  s p e c i f i c  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  works. As a 
c h a ra c te r  in  a s p e c i f i c  work the Good-Natured Man reveals  
the  i n t e r e s t s ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  and values of  the  author th a t  
shape the  work; as a c h a r a c t e r  type in  e igh teen th-cen tury  
English  l i t e r a t u r e ,  the  development of  the Good-Natured 
Man p a r a l l e l s  the  development of the  predominant e th i c a l  
theory  in a period  when m ora l i ty  was a dominant concern.
Therefore ,  with the  d e f i n i t i o n  of the Good-Natured 
Man provided in  t h i s  s tudy,  we are  b e t t e r  equipped to 
understand the  r e l a t i v e  importance of  themes, of conven­
t i o n s ,  of techniques in  e igh teen th -cen tu ry  l i t e r a t u r e .
For the  a r t i s t ' s  conception o f  the  Good-Natured Man is 
f requen t ly  the  germ or  seed which gives l i f e  to  h is  work 
and gives form and meaning to  every major and minor aspect 
of  i t .
Notes to Chapter VII
^Je f f re y  Duncan's "The Rural Idea l  in  Eighteenth 
Century F i c t i o n , "  Studies in English  L i t e r a t u re 1500- 
1900, 8 (1968), 517-535, deals with the  r u r a l  idea l  in 
s e lec te d  scenes from Joseph Andrexvs, Humphrey C l in k e r ,
The Vicar of  Wakefie ld, A Sentimental Journey, and Tr is t ram . 
Shandy. He recognizes t h a t  the r u r a l  idea l  is  used in 
each work as an id e a l i z e d  symbol o f  moral va lues ,  but he 
is  not always su re ,  and i n  regard to A Sentimental  Journey 
is  mistaken,  about how t h i s  symbol i s  important to and 
o rg a n ic a l ly  a p a r t  of  the  work in which i t  ap p ea rs . I  am 
indebted to  Duncan in  the  following d iscuss ion ,  but my 
purpose is  to i l l u s t r a t e  the  va lue  of  the  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
the  c h a rac te r  and func t ion  of the  Good-Natured Man provided 
in t h i s  study by going beyond Duncan’ s conclusions to 
f resh  in s ig h ts  t h a t  a re  made p o s s ib le  by an understanding 
of the  Good-Natured Man type.
^Duncan, pp. 518-520; B a t t e s t i n ,  The Moral Basis of 
F i e ld i n g ’ s A r t , pp. 84, 92-93.
^Duncan, p. 522.
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